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ABSTRACT
Science In Politics: Eugenics, Sterilization, and Genetic Screening
September 1988
Douglas C. Telling, B.A., Beloit College
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Glen Gordon
This work examined applications of genetic knowledge for
political purposes. A debate exists over whether technology operates
according to deterministic imperatives or is subject to human control.
The central concern of this work, therefore, was the capability of the
political system to ensure that technological applications served ends
consonant with the democratic and moral values of the American political
system.
The first topic examined was the eugenic legacy. Beginning in
the first third of this century as a nativistic enterprise, it was
transformed after the 1930's into the application of genetic knowledge
for the purposes of breeding a genetically perfected race. A review of
contemporary sterilization practices followed. Despite the appearances
of revived eugenics, the lure of the technical fix proved to be a better
explanation for most sterilization uses studied. The final case study
examined carrier, prenatal, and neonatal screening. Particular
attention was paid to the legal status of the techniques, the politics
of their establishment and accessibility, and their potential future
applications. All of the techniques examined extended society's ability
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to address the issues motivating their introduction, but they also
created new opportunities which extended their influence into new areas,
challenging existing values (e.g., reproduction, marriage, individual
autonomy, sanctity of life). The final discussion examined the
political institutions' response to these techniques and their extended
influence. Generally, the political system responded by addressing the
techniques narrowly, paying minimal attention to the social values
affected by the cumulative impact of the techniques. The courts reduced
the techniques to individual rights and the legislatures narrowly
defined the issues as technical or responded to interest group
pressures. The result was technological incrementalism. For the
political system to control democratically the ends to which
technologies are applied, the legislative branches will have to act more
systematically and substantively. Politics as usual—both
institutionally and morally—is incapable of addressing the extended
responsibility required by technological politics.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between biology and politics is not a new
subject. The eugenics movement, beginning in nineteenth century England
and spreading to the United States in the twentieth century, is the most
developed modern attempt to connect the two. Today, the two mix in a
society increasingly dependent on science. The interest in biology
grows in part from what biology can do for politics, but also as part of
the political system's broader interest in science.
The subject is of interest to a political scientist because of
the great promises made for the new biology and the fundamental nature
of the research: it studies the biological keys to life. But the
political scientist is also aware of the broader science/politics
context. The experience with nuclear physics provides the policy
background against which biology will be examined here; and it is
important to realize that that legacy was, and is, contentious. As a
society, we approached science and technology in search of a
"technological fix" that would cure an ill or improve a condition. What
society came to discover was that the fix, while often doing what was
immediately promised, also brought with it new problems and
environmental hazards. Consequently, many believed that scientists
imposed horrendous burdens on the human race, while others indicted
misguided (or evil) politics. Now, at a relatively early stage of
research, the biological sciences are undergoing strict scrutiny.
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This work is a case study of two among the many ways public and
private power have employed biological techniques to achieve power's
ends. The hope underlying this work is that these examples will provide
insights into how best to approach the developing relationships between
politics and biology.
1
During the second two-thirds of the twentieth century, power
(both public and private) has increasingly employed science to solve
problems and conquer frontiers. 1 Most notable has been the role of
physics; but the biological sciences, too, played an important role that
dates back to the first years of the century. Organized in 1904, the
eugenics movement sought to exploit the young field of genetics in order
to control what many eugenicists perceived to be a growing threat both
from new immigrants and, more generally, from those of lesser than
normal mental and physical stature. Now, governments fund, regulate,
and deploy genetic knowledge as part of their public health function.
The private sector, too, has used it as a way to regulate the workplace.
The core of this work will examine this relationship between
biological knowledge and power. The study is descriptive and
inquisitive in nature
,
seeking simply to understand the uses to which
various centers of power have put scientific knowledge and how best to
understand those practices. The study begins by reviewing eugenics: the
first significant modern attempt to employ the knowledge and authority
of the biological sciences for political ends. Next, two examples of
2
this relationship, sterilization and genetic screening, are reviewed.
Of overriding concern is the nature of this relationship: Does politics
control its own destiny. From this review, it is hoped we will be
better able to evaluate the new biological discoveries and techniques
that are now flowing from scientific laboratories into our political
economy
.
II
Recently, new medical technologies have thrust previously
private medical decisions into the headlines. Baby Fae became a public
person as a result of technologies that allowed us to extend life in
time and quality. Baby Jane Doe and Karen Ann Quinlan became notorious
because of a refusal to employ powerful technologies . 2 These medical
technologies, and the promise in current genetic research of greater
capabilities, have provided us with the possibility of controlling life
in a most sophisticated manner.
French philosopher Michel Foucault offered a provocative account
of society's interest in the life sciences, an account that captures a
concern of this work:
But what might be called a society's "threshold of modernity" has
been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own
political strategies. . .
.
[Mjodern man is an animal whose politics
places his existence as a living being in question.
3
Foucault's argument did not refer to such overt threats as a nuclear
doomsday. Rather, he referred to a politics that treats as a political
question the nature of the "living being." His account presented
3
politics managing life. It is a bureaucratic relationship. The
expansion of biological knowledge offers possibilities for the political
system to achieve its goals. Politics exploits, in a subtle and precise
manner, the fact that man has a body.
The direction of the action is important. Politics acts on the
person. The purposes and goals are those of politics, not science. Not
all students of science accept this last point. Some observers contend
that technology is out of control; that technology grows to meet its own
needs. This precludes meaningful political action.^ Others argue that
science responds to the priorities of politics. ^ Granted, the
consequences of a deployed technology may necessitate a political
response (e.g., pollution), but these all occur within a politically
defined context. The political system when confronted with
technologically-caused problems may re-evaluate the original purpose
behind deploying the technology in question. The point of this position
is that politics can choose. Consequently, two of the general questions
under study are, first, whether or not the pattern of technology's
deployment reflects political choice or rather technological imperatives
and, second, to what extent is the body treated as a means toward
political ends.
In the following discussion politics generally will refer to
policy. This involves, for example, concerns such as regulating the
sterilization of the mentally impaired. But politics also encompasses
issues of public and private. By this account strict enforcement of
rules would, under certain conditions, interfere with the ethics of
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medical practice, the doctor/ patient privileged relationship, and a
doctor's expertise. In other words, the public crosses into the private
when it interferes with the traditionally private relationship between a
doctor and patient, a relationship generally constrained by the ethical
framework obligating the doctor to employ whatever means are necessary
to treat the patient. It is not uncommon for the public and private to
be merged under the rubric of "power". Three aspects of the public-
private relationship account for this. For one, both public and private
power view science instrumentally . They support science for what
science can do for them. Another reason follows from an increasingly
mixed economy. As each realm becomes involved in the other's affairs,
their interests and needs (even identity) merge. Finally, both realms
may be seen as serving different needs of the State or Order. This
follows from membership in an organized collectivity. Different
distributions of functions between the public and private realm reflect
a polity's decision as to how the State operates. But both realms exist
to fulfill needs of the State and in that sense share common purposes.
Unless the State is defined as a- or non-political, this implies an
interest for the political scientist in both the public and private
realms
.
Finally, politics has a moral and ethical component. In many
ways, this dimension is what defines the polity and gives it a reason to
exist. This perspective encompasses concerns about life, nature, and
spirit. Returning to sterilization, from this perspective sterilization
may be objected to as unnatural or against God's wishes. This
5
represents a paradigmatic concern while the the issues of policy and
public/private exist at the level of consensus or contentious politics.
The thrust of this work is contentious analysis: analysis where the
analyst acts as moral critic questioning the specifics of policy
(although not necessarily the paradigmatic framework) with an eye toward
ensuring that the political system understands the consequences of its
actions and that these consequences are consonant with policy
objectives. ^ Most of the following will be within the context of
institutions and programs, but it is also intended to speak to politics
more broadly understood.
This study is confined to science in the United States. Some
argue that science needs a democratic system, but from the success of
science in the Soviet Union we know that science can survive (maybe not
flourish) in a system better described as totalitarian than democratic.
The latter allows for an unfettered research system but has a limited
capacity to control the political dimension of scientific research,
while the former, better able to deal with the political side of
science, suffers from the tendency to an exaggerated influence on
scientific practice. The following presumes the democratic context.
Ill
The fruits of scientific research have provided us with greatly
enhanced abilities. These extended capabilities allow us to explore
areas ranging from the vastness of space to the minuteness of the atom.
In genetics, scientists have been able to identify the basic units that
6
determine an individual's characteristics. Specific diseases or
conditions can be identified before birth and this knowledge may be used
to plan reproduction. Science continues to expand our understanding of
the role genes play in our lives and, at a slower pace, brings with that
knowledge the ability to act on those genes to attain desirable goals.
These impact on politics because of the values that they affect and
political officials interest in using the techniques as policy tools.
As genetics has deepened its understanding of the human body, the
political system has made the technological fruits of this research
available to the public.
But with these extended capabilities come strains to our
political, economic, and social fabric. Some question the
appropriateness of mankind "playing God." Others question mankind's
ability to make these judgments, even if it is appropriate.
Increasingly couples are confronted with the difficult decision of
aborting their fetus or letting it come into the world with mental or
physical defects. These choices wrench the lives of the individuals and
challenge the values of large segments of the population. Why then do
we continue to push these limits? One explanation resides in a
"technological faith." The motives here resemble those of the old PF
Flyers sneaker advertisements: we can run faster and jump higher if we
wear the correct sneaker. By adopting improved technologies "[m]embers
of the society are able to do more things, more efficiently, over
further distances, at much faster speeds."'’ These factors become a
benchmark of progress.
7
The use of genetic techniques has moved from the explicitly
eugenic programs to therapeutic and diagnostic applications. The next
stage will involve more profound genetic manipulations. Have these been
adapted to serve political ends? What unintended ends become served 7
Confronted with extended capabilities, has the political system been
able to reflect on these abilities, identify their strengths and
weaknesses, and assess their value? Have the value of the techniques
been compared to other means to achieve the political ends?
Caught up in a belief in technology's power, new or improved
technologies often become a part of the political agenda. A form of
"reverse adaptation"® occurs where public and private power adopts new
technologies on the assumption that their development ensures progress.
Technological faith may best describe this phenomenon. Salomon walks a
thin line between determinism and faith:
The idea of a science policy suggests that the decision-makers at
least intend to orient the research system towards the attainment of
certain goals, but are these goals themselves not in fact defined by
the momentum which the system itself has gathered? What science
deems feasible—'the technically sweet'—becomes in technonature
something which power cannot do without, not because it meets a real
need but because it determines the artificial needs of society.
Because it is feasible, because it can be done, it must be done,
even if the result creates more problems than it solves or even if
it solves nothing at all.^
At work are two political phenomena. First a system of action and
reaction exists between science and politics. While power may use
science to achieve its own goals, science's actions in turn influence
political goals (e.g., pollution or nuclear research). In response,
power again will look to science. This is the system's momentum. It
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also includes the second point of political interest: the progression of
technological development results, in part, from the unstated political
assumption that the "perfect sneaker" is indeed a goal worth achieving.
Technological advancement is often confused with substantive
change. Faith in a technological fix results from the inability to see
past technological reasons for failure. Reliance on scrubbers or tall
smoke stacks will not "solve" acid rain or industrially caused air
pollution. Expensive purifying systems will not end water pollution
just as hazardous waste problems will not disappear through the
monitoring of dumps. Rather, these issues need to be seen in the
political-economic context which produced them. Science may help, but
it cannot decide the political problems for us. To the extent that we
rely on science for solutions we deny politics substance and endow
politics with the instrumental rationale of technique. This reversal
and confusion is a key element of the technological fix.
When technological faith becomes overpowering, democracy
suffers. The implications for democracy center on the ability for
reflection and debate, which is made difficult on issues addressed
technically. The preferred position the structure gives to those who
understand its technical parts (never the whole) has direct implications
on the state of democracy:
But if matters of structure and mode of operations are to be
excluded from scrutiny by all but the appropriate experts, then the
most crucial aspects of the formative influence of technology in the
world are totally removed from any conscious, public attention or
dispute. It is in this formative character that technology gives ug
its claim to neutrality and becomes a distinctly political matter.
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This brings the discussion to the institutional question of who governs
and for what ends. Science and technology are of political interest
because of the capabilities they offer to the political system.
Recognizing that some mental conditions are genetically transmitted or
that certain workers carry a genetic predisposition to certain workplace
hazards may lead to more precise strategies to resolve those problems.
But this reduction may also cause the system to lose track of its
political ends and adopt techniques out of a faith in their progressive
and curative nature. In that case, politics loses control. The
reduction of mental health or workplace safety to genetic issues removes
them from broad political discourse. Who is to argue against expert
evaluation that new and more precise genetic remedies should be adopted?
The danger, albeit not guaranteed to manifest itself, is that the issue
will move from one of a safe workplace to one of perfecting the
individual worker.
Technological faith may also result in overstating the
technological dimension of the issue. Care must be taken to recognize
that a technology is both a technique and a set of a capabilities that
influences social and political values. Missing the latter point may
allow political figures to be overly deferential to experts during
technological assessment. The "who governs" question becomes an inquiry
into the extent to which the political, and in particular the
democratic, branches examined the substance of the technique in its
broadest political context.
10
IV
Chapters One through Three examine empirically biology and
politics through a combination of historical analysis and case studies
of contemporary practices. The two cases (Chapters Two and Three) were
chosen to exemplify the issues, but are not intended to be comprehensive
or definitive. They will examine how the use of science has created
peculiar problems stretching the political system's capabilities; how
the problems of science policy have merged with long-standing political
issues but provided more subtle means of handling them; and how the
political system has dealt with new scientific techniques. These are
issues of extended choice and capabilities. Throughout this section
runs a fundamental question: to what extent was the knowledge used to
meet a political problem or need employed because that knowledge was, in
Oppenheimer 's delightful phrase, "technologically sweet"^ and therefore
irresistible?
By way of introduction to this section, Chapter One will present
a review of eugenics in American politics. As one of the earliest and
most politically self-conscious attempts to link biology and politics,
the eugenics movement stands out as an enduring example. The leading
opponent of applying genetic engineering, Jeremy Rif kin, argued that
"eugenics is the inseparable ethical wing of the age of
biotechnology."^ Many writers on the new genetic techniques either
distinguish their interest in these techniques from eugenics or show how
certain elements of the eugenic agenda are benign and consistent with
11
sound public policy. The eugenicists even sought to distinguish their
past from their "new" eugenic program. Finally, those who do not
address eugenics or the issues tied to it probably should. The slope is
slippery between the purely technocratic use of biological knowledge and
the use of biology to achieve political goals. ^
The two case studies, sterilization and genetic screening, were
chosen because of their ties to the past and future, respectively.
Early in this century, sterilization became a controversial technique,
in part, because of the eugenicists' attempts to employ it as a policy
tool. While this effort failed in practice (over half of the states,
however, passed sterilization laws), the technique has remained and
grown in popularity and sophistication. If eugenics remains an
important idea, this is one place it might appear. In other words,
sterilization's ties to the past raise questions as to its current
practices. The second case, genetic screening, involves practices
growing out of contemporary research. Any significant attempt to
systematically employ genetic knowledge for political ends (as suggested
by Foucault) would necessarily need a technique to identify or screen
for those most appropriate for genetic alteration or control (or
whatever). Genetic screening has been around long enough to develop a
history and a pattern of "benign" uses (amniocentesis). This case may
provide a window through which to examine where the genetics-politics
nexus is heading.
Thus the proximate issues are evaluating the two case studies in
light of their eugenic background and the effect of technology on
12
politics. Which, if either, is the dominant force? What difference
does it make? Reviewing these experiences with genetic techniques
provides an opportunity to examine the scope and bias of the political
system's actions. The concluding chapter examines the political
institutions' response to technology in terms of the issues both
examined and neglected by the institutions and the characteristics of
the institutions themselves.
13
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CHAPTER I
THE POLITICAL BODY
The relationship between physics and government has been, to
date, the most controversial and prominent issue in the study of science
in American politics. This relationship grew out of the long standing
tie between government and the scientific community in the area of
weapons research. Notwithstanding a more limited governmental
connection, another science, genetics, also has a rich political
history.
Inspired by the writings of Sir Francis Galton, a political
movement began in England employing the knowledge of heredity to ensure
the continuing improvement of "the race." Galton christened this field
eugenics. Galton wrote during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century and a group of committed followers gathered around his ideas.
In America, however, no sustained movement developed until after 1900
and the rediscovery of Mendel's work. The American movement, primarily
middle class, consisted of sympathetic geneticists joining social
reformers. They focused primarily on state laws, although they briefly
reached into national politics with the Immigration Reform Act of 1924
and the 1927 Supreme Court case, Buck v. Bell .
*
The eugenics movement is important because of the political
agenda it enunciated and continues to advance. Eugenicists seek to
bring into fruition the political potential of genetic knowledge.
16
Despite the fact that the movement failed to achieve its goals, the
movement turned that failure into an opportunity to redefine the
movement and to ennunciate a position and strategy that allows for the
modern use of biology to achieve political influence on the race and
body. To understand their positions, the obligatory starting point is
Sir Francis Galton's thought.
Sir Francis Galton
Galton was in the best tradition of the English gentleman
scientist. Few, if anyone, would disparage his character, and his
scientific credentials were impeccable. He made major contributions to
statistics, psychological testing, and hereditarian research. He was a
respected scientific authority and a Fellow in the Royal Society. A
cousin of Charles Darwin, Galton was greatly influenced by Darwin's On
the Origin of the Species and, with his cousin's support, sought to find
its applicability to society.
Galton's research focused on how our ancestor's traits were
passed down to us. According to Darwin's theories, natural selection
ensured that the best traits were transmitted to future generations.
But, Galton feared, civilization "diminish[ed ] the rigour of the
application of the law of natural selection. "2 Man's social
organization interfered with natural selection by interjecting
irrelevant concerns into marriage decisions (e.g., religion, class,
education). Because natural selection is prohibited from working
17
freely, Galton sought to apply the success of animal breeding to human
breeding as a supplement.
To this end, Galton promoted eugenics. Relying on his faith in
science, Galton believed that man could overcome civilization's
perversions through careful planning and an educated public. His
interest in eugenics was not casual. He hoped that the eugenic spirit
could be "introduced into the national conscience, like a new
religion." But his new religion did not rest on ancient texts and
dieties; it relied on scientific knowledge working through an unselfish
community (nationalist) spirit. In a quintessential statement of social
action based upon scientific knowledge, Galton elaborated on this point:
[W]hat nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do
providently, quickly, and kindly. As it lies within his power, so
it becomes his duty to work in that direction; just as it is his
duty to succour neighbours who suffer misfortune.^
The obligation to act lies with society, not with the scientist. Once
we have the knowledge, it is our duty to use it to improve our society.
This argument contains two important aspects of eugenic thought. First,
it illustrates the naturalistic basis of eugenics. Man is not choosing
the direction to improve the race, rather he acts in ways nature
dictates. ^ The bias lies in favor of scientific knowledge and the ideal
resembles something akin to the philosopher's state of nature where non-
natural forces cannot intervene. Social knowledge, at least where the
development of the human race is concerned, is less reliable. The
obvious lesson is that only scientific facts can be considered reliable.
18
The second aspect of eugenic thought found in the above
quotation is the strong sense of social purpose. The eugenicist sees
himself as protecting society from itself, enabling it to move in the
only direction that will allow for the fullest expression of the human
potential. In Galton, this form of elitism takes the course one would
expect from the English gentleman scientist:
I cannot doubt that our democracy will ultimately refuse consent to
that liberty of propagating children which is now allowed to the
undesirable classes, but the populace has yet to be taught the true
state of these things. A democracy cannot endure unless it be
composed of able citizens; therefore it must in self-defence
withstand the free introduction of degenerate stock.
6
He saw eugenics as promoting democracy through the leavening of the
population. Education will enable all classes to understand their duty
and thus be willing to sacrifice some of their own desires (e.g.,
propagating children) in order that the society can benefit. Coercion
plays no direct role. The successful eugenics program will work
mechanistically but also "providently" and "kindly":
The aim of eugenics [asserted Galton, in 1904] is to bring as many
influences as can be reasonably employed, to cause the useful
classes in the community to contribute more than their proportion to
the next generation.
^
But true to the politics of the English middle class, class differences
offer telling evidence as to one's worth. This is not, however, an
insidious attempt to promote one's own class and keep down the lower
classes. Rather, Galton attempted to improve the race by ensuring that
those with the best traits bred together. He used success to measure
worth
.
19
The ideal Galton strove for was the sober, rational, and
predictable person. Specifically, he sought to create individuals of
"more vigour, more ability, and more consistency of purpose"^ than
existed at the time. These are the characteristics any head of state
would like to see in his citizens. Throughout all of his writings on
eugenics, Galton emphasized the role of the state: especially what
eugenics could do for it. The purpose of eugenics was not for enobling
individuals (although it did that), but rather to assist the state in
its missions at home and abroad. For example, he wrote:
Let us for a moment suppose that the practice of Eugenics should
hereafter raise the average quality of our nation to that of its
better moiety at the present day, and consider the gain. The
general tone of domestic, social, and political life would be
higher. The race as a whole would be less foolish, less frivolous,
less excitable and politically more provident than now. Its
demagogues who "played to the gallery" would play to a more sensible
gallery than at present. We should be better fitted to fulfill our
vast imperial opportunities. Lastly, men of an order of ability
which is now very rare, would become more frequent, because the
level out of which they rose would itself have risen.
9
The importance of this position lies in the juxtaposition of democratic
ideals and the statist bias. Despite his reasoning that democracy
depends on the intellectual and moral advancement of the citizenry, the
subversive or dissenting potential of democracy is minimized by the
characteristics Galton idealizes and the social stratas chosen for
advancement and restriction. These groups and ideals embody the values
of the status quo and those who currently set the parameters of debate
within the governing political and social circles. Galton s categories
for limited propagation also included the likely sources of social and
political dissent. Galton tapped into the dominant social sector's
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values, presumptively approving of them. Here, however, lies a danger.
Doubts should center on the invisible and undebated means by which the
ideal is assumed and left unquestioned by well-meaning people like
Galton
.
Galton developed a program and research agenda in order to
promote his eugenic ideas. Their specifics are of interest to a study
of American eugenics in that the Americans borrowed the major issues
from Galton, even as they passed over many of the details. For this
reason, a brief review of Galton's position will help explain the
background of the eugenic idea and the substance of the field.
Galton introduced the two strategic categories within which all
efforts at applied genetics fall: positive and negative applications.
Positive eugenics promotes those traits deemed superior. To this end,
Galton called upon talented men and women to marry one another. ^0 In
practice, this meant those of higher social rank— those society deemed
to embody the best traits—would marry and produce more children than
they currently did. This was their social obligation. By increasing
the population at this end of the eugenic scale ("its better moiety"),
the race would improve and, Galton hoped, reach a point where the
weaknesses passed on by our ancestors would be eliminated. In this way,
the race would be remade. Again, we see Galton drawing on breeding
analogies :
We might [after many generations] produce a highly bred race, with
no more tendency to revert to meaner ancestral types than is shown
by our long-established breeds of race-horses and fox-hounds.
To support this belief, Galton, like many eugenicists, relied upon
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impressionistic evidence. For example: "the enormous intellectual
digestion of German literary men, which far exceeds that of the
corresponding class of our own [English] countrymen, may, in some
considerable degree, be due to this practice [of German professors
marrying the sisters or daughters of other professors ] ." 12 Elsewhere,
he related the professions of "notable persons" and the frequency with
which "talent and peculiarities of character are found in [these
notables'] children."^ These sorts of evidence provided the
justification for his assumption that mental traits are transmitted in
the same manner as physical traits. Galton's use of social and economic
accomplishment as a standard to measure genetic worth is common among
eugenicists' writings.
Positive eugenics seeks to take what society deems as good and
to increase its proportion in the population. Negative eugenics tries
to eliminate or contain bad traits. Many of these undesirable traits
have been associated with the undesirables of society. Negative
eugenics seeks to convince these "genetically weaker" people to
reproduce less often, or not at all. This was Margaret Sanger's
position and that of the early American eugenicists who supported both
sterilization and institutionalization for criminals, feebleminded, and
those suffering from various infirmities. Galton's work emphasized
positive eugenics, but he recognized the negative dimension and later
others, with less benign motives than he, expanded on the theme.
Galton's research and policy agenda contained an important
institutional component. He isolated three eugenically important
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institutions: institutions for the criminal and feebleminded, charity,
and the customary institutions of religion and marriage. Treatment of
criminals, the feebleminded, and those on charity needed to be tempered
by their eugenic implications. Galton advocated keeping habitual
criminals segregated to restrict their opportunity to continue their
depredations and to preclude low class" offspring. Aid to institutions
for the feebleminded, however, was suspect on the ground that it might
promote their marrying one another and producing offspring resembling
themselves
.
Charity cases covered the range of abnormals and needed to be
dispensed in a scientific or planned manner. Rather than
indiscriminately supporting "needy" people, Galton urged that charity be
targeted according to eugenic purposes. Those "down and out," surviving
solely upon charity, could only contribute more of their kind while
draining the nation's resources and degenerating "the race."
Consequently, charity should be diverted away from them to those able to
contribute to society. He made a similar argument in regard to
educational funding: rather than waste educational support on those who
lacked the minimal skills necessary to benefit from the aid, educational
support should promote the students most likely to contribute to the
society. In sum, Galton supported scientific charity: rationally
planned and targeted. This became a goal of many American eugenicists
and remains a political issue.
A final institutional consideration centered on the customary
and social forces of religion, wealth, and marriage. These related back
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to his concerns about civilization interfering with natural selection.
Galton cited the socially pernicious effects of religious taboos against
interfaith marriage or pressures to protect family property through such
extreme means as compelling a man to marry the widow of his brother.
These examples illustrated how religious and property influences
produced marriages either indifferent or hostile to eugenic concerns;
the flexibility necessary for the eugenically best to meet and marry was
denied. Wealth, too, interfered in the eugenic treatment of
feebleminded or weak offspring. The wealthy, able to pay for special
care, could "hide" their feebleminded and sustain them into childbearing
years. A similar situation existed for their mentally normal but
physically weak: these children benefited from the wealthy's superior
medical care and often lived well beyond the years of comparable
children in poorer families. In both cases, the wealthy "defectives"
could live to reproduce while the poor's defectives would not
(especially if charity was scientifically distributed). Conversely,
poverty could result in the killing or hindering of the poor's strongest
children. This would result in a disproportionate birthrate among the
weak (but rich) over the genetically superior (but poor).^
Galton desired marriages to promote good qualities and expected
this priority to supercede more traditional and basic marriage desires.
This argument illustrates the central strategy of Galton's eugenic
agenda. To succeed, eugenics must be absorbed into the social
consciousness; people must naturally think and act eugenically.
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By way of summary, many of the key elements of American eugenics
can be found in Galton's thought. Foremost is Galton's reliance on
science as a means to social well-being. He sought to put into
political practice scientific knowledge as if it represented a neutral
truth. This constituted a naturalistic political and social outlook; an
outlook that relied on the scientific fact as the most reliable form of
knowledge. Four other elements of American eugenics are foreshadowed in
Galton's work. First, Galton worked to find ways to improve the race.
This was the proximate goal of his research. Second, eugenics was to be
placed within a nationalistic orientation. It subsumed the individual
to the greater social and national good. This was the ultimate goal.
Third, Galton exemplified the technocratic and elitist side of eugenics.
The technocratic dimension follows from naturalism. The elitism is seen
in the paternalistic view that the scientist can know who are best
suited to marry whom and isolate the ideal characteristics for social
and genetic growth. The elitism is also tied into the final parallel,
social conservatism. The identification of good traits is closely tied
to the contemporary standards of success. The full implementation of
eugenic goals would ultimately serve to re-enforce and perpetuate the
status quo.
American Eugenics : 1900-1930
Few people today would admit to being eugenicists. This
reaction results from the American eugenics movement during the first
third of this century. This rejection does not constitute a rejection
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°f eugenics core principles, rather the early tactics and underlying
political agenda of the movement repel most modern democrats.
The movement did not immediately follow from Galton's writings.
The American version of eugenics grew only after it had a scientific
field to support it. It gained this support in 1900 when genetics came
into its own with the rediscovery of Mendel's work. 15 Unfortunately,
the movement became captured by those interested in preserving the
northern European stock as the dominant American "race" rather than
promoting the sorts of racial goals Galton advocated.
Background
Linking itself to Mendelism and the new field of genetics
separated American eugenicists' methodology from Galton's ancestral
approach, but both shared a naturalist basis. American eugenicists
queried into biology's potential to improve society: what can biology
tell us about ourselves qua humans and about human society? 16 Natural
selection, as Darwin portrayed it, provided the outline that explained
the proper working of society and the rules by which the race could
improve. This biological determinism knew no limitations. The issue of
environment and heredity interacting had not yet gained legitimacy; the
most influential in the eugenics movement attributed most human traits
—
both good and bad— to heredity.
Mendel provided the scientific foundation to this view. His
position claimed that inheritance is particular to each individual.
One's traits result from the mixing of genes (some dominant, some
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recessive) of one's parents. In contrast, Galton believed that
inheritance can be traced in fixed proportions through ancestors.
Because of its youth, genetics lacked a sophisticated body of knowledge;
consequently, some simplified Mendel's conclusions to the so-called
"single gene theory" whereby each trait results from a single,
identifiable gene.
A significant implication of the single gene theory was the
rejection of Lamarquian genetics, or the acquired traits theory.
^
Previous to Mendel's resurrection, this view was widely accepted among
American students of heredity. Along with Lamarquian beliefs, however,
social reform lost out as a viable policy. If traits are an inherent
part of an individual's genetic make-up, then the hope that better
living conditions could contribute to a strengthened person and that
such strength could, in turn, be passed onto future generations lost its
credibility. This necessitated a move from a strategy involving social
reform to one regulating genetic stock.
A target for many eugenicists were the feebleminded and habitual
criminals. Each was believed to have hereditarian tendencies which
could only be addressed through breeding them out of the race. This
movement toward breeding was led by those who had previously worked in
the environmentally based reform programs: heads of prisons or
corrections departments, social workers, and directors of institutions
for the feebleminded. In short, they were middle class professionals
who saw their values as universals and did not believe that "normal
’
people could continue to live the way their "wards" did.^ Efforts at
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reform through environmental manipulation apparently had failed. The
problem, however, was not that the feebleminded were not cured, but that
their numbers, and the numbers of other "degenerates", were increasing.
Donald Pickens summarized their fears as follows:
The racial degeneration of modern urban society worried American
eugenists. [ sic ] They saw the increased number of the feebleminded
in the United States by immigration and natural increase, as
definite indications of racial inadequacy. In brief, they argued
that contemporary life increased the numbers of the inadequate at
the expense of the adequate. The task, therefore, was of
restoration, of returning the primacy of natural selection to men's
affairs. Modern society protected the naturally inferior from their
true destiny of extinction; eugenists [ sic ] urged policies of
removing the restrictions on natural selection. 19
In sum, biology provided the remedy for society.
The historical context helps explain the views held. At the
turn of the century, American society faced dislocations due to the
emergence of an industrial state. The political agenda had changed;^
the American role in the world had begun to grow; European dislocations
brought new immigrants to America; and within this country the migration
from the country to the city was in full blossom. Much of the most
virulent strains of eugenic thought and action reflected these
dislocations. It was nativistic, racist, anti-urban, and thoroughly
middle class. Many of the eugenicists were Progressives and active in
the Progressive reform movements. The extent to which the early
eugenics movement reflected the tensions then pervading American society
can be seen by the following thumbnail portrait of eugenicists
provided
by Mark Haller:
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Those most strongly influenced by hereditarian doctrines were such
persons as physicians, psychiatrists, social workers, members of
state boards of charity, and others whose direct responsibility was
with persons who, through crime or illness, became wards of the
state for care and cure. Those least influenced were residents of
settlement houses, sympathizers with labor organizations, and others
who were primarily concerned with the general problems arising from
industrialization and urbanization. 21
At issue were deeply held views on race and class that were able to find
expression in the eugenics movement and legitimacy behind the cloak of
genetics. The movement brought together scientists who shared a
political agenda with social reformers who sought to preserve the past
and present in the name of the future.
Science
The scientists' link with the early movement was tenuous.
Genetics, as an area of research, was new and many of the claims made by
eugenicists (especially those dealing with the scope of problems
associated with heredity) lacked a solid scientific foundation. But the
opposition positions also lacked foundation. As genetic research
progressed, the eugenicists' base crumbled. The legitimate scientists
left the movement as the evidence disproving the eugenicists' political
claims increased. But the important lesson here is the link between the
scientists and political ideas. In his study on genetics in American
society, Kenneth Ludmerer characterized this relationship as follows:
In acting upon the implications of these findings, the geneticists
were motivated by their aforementioned social commitments. This is
not to say that they allowed their presuppositions to color their
scientific interpretation of the discoveries, which they generally
did not, but to suggest that with different social commitments they
might have drawn from the discoveries another set of social
conclusions from those they in fact did draw.“
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Stephen Jay Gould made a related point in regard to science in general:
Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity ."23
Gould moved beyond Ludmerer and found a social influence on data
gathering and interpretation:
I believe, first of all, that satan also dwells with God in the
details. If the cultural influences upon science can be detected in
the humdrum minutiae of a supposedly objective, almost automatic
quantification, then the status of biological determinism as a
social prejudice reflected by scientists in their own particular
medium seems secure.^
Gould argued that culture influences our understanding of facts: "facts
are not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences
what we see and how we see it." 25 Two situations undercutting the ideal
view of science may result from this observation. First, "some topics
are invested with enormous social importance but blessed with very
little reliable information." 2 ^1 This describes pre-1930's eugenics.
But when the reformers succeed in invoking the cloak of science (even if
an illusion)
,
then the reformers obtain the powerful support of
scientific legitimacy. Society then acts on inadequate information as
if it were adequate and science becomes implicated in the actions. As a
result, the priorities and views of science may become "a mirror of
social movements. . . . This mirror reflects in good times and bad, in
periods of belief in equality and in eras of rampant racism.
"
z/
The second implication for "normal science" relates to the way
scientists ask their questions. (This subtlety is missed by Ludmerer
who portrays the work internal to science as somehow enclosed and
sacred.) By this account, the questions may be asked "in such a
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restricted way that any legitimate answer can only validate a social
preference. 28 Galton's assumption that biological worth is seen in
one's social position (success) illustrates this problem. The early
American belief that individual traits, including intelligence, resulted
from single genes provides an American example which had pernicious
consequences for the American eugenics movement. Working upon this
assumption led eugenicists to recommend policies aimed exclusively at
reproduction
.
Program
Following Galton, the American eugenicists' program divided
along positive and negative eugenics. The positive program relied on
education in an attempt to convince the "ideal" to marry out of social
conscience. Positive eugenics, however, was secondary to the negative
campaign
.
Among the negative policies pursued, birth control proved to be
the most benign, albeit one of the more controversial. Its advocates
sought to bring contraception to the lower and working classes. These
people, the eugenicists feared, propagated in disproportionately large
numbers and produced weaker (eugenically speaking) offspring. The birth
control strategy rested on two beliefs. First, the number of weak and
sickly would be numerically reduced. Second, decreased numbers would in
turn result in a better environment within which to raise the children
which would improve the quality of the individual. (Clearly these
reformers did not accept the extreme biological determinism pervading
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the eugenics movement.) According to one historian, this policy divided
the eugenicists.29 At the time, the middle and upper classes (those
whom eugenicists desired to reproduce in greatest number) practiced
birth control and the eugenicists' feared that loosening the legal
restrictions imposed on birth control methods would only extend this
pattern or spread it to the better of the lower classes (those who
shared the values of the "better stock"—and their genes—but lacked
their money). Consequently, birth control became a secondary strategy.
Another strategy employed was sterilization. This, too, caused
controversy, not in the least because of its ineffectiveness. In 1931,
twenty-seven states had sterilization laws, but California alone had a
history of widespread enforcement. 30 The scope of the problems
eugenicists believed sterilization could address is illustrated in the
following excerpts from a model sterilization law proposed in 1922 by
Dr. Harry Laughlin, a leader of the movement's reactionary wing (but,
nonetheless, prominent in the movement in general):
AN ACT to prevent the procreation of persons socially inadequate
from defective inheritance, by authorizing and providing for the
eugenical sterilization of certain potential parents carrying
degenerate hereditary qualities. . . .
. .
.
(a) A socially inadequate person is one who by his or her own
effort, regardless of etiology or prognosis
,
fails chronically in
comparison with normal persons, to maintain himself or herself as a
useful member of the organized social life of the state; provided
that the term socially inadequate shall not be applied to any person
whose expected exigencies of youth, old age, curable injuries, or
temporary physical or mental illness. . . .
(b) the socially inadequate classes, regardless of etiology or
prognosis, are the following: (1) Feeble-minded; (2) Insane, [ sic ]
(including the psychopathic); (3) Criminalistic (including
delinquent and wayward); (4) Epileptic; (5) Inebriate (including
drug habitues); (6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the
syphilitic, the leprous, and others with chronic, infectious and
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legally segrable [sic] diseases); (7) Blind (including those with
seriously impaired vision); (8) Deaf (including the crippled); (10)
Dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps
and paupers ) . 3
1
To be classified as a "potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring", only one-quarter of your offspring needed to be "socially
inadequate ."32 As Walter Berns observed: this would "rid the world
of . . . the likes of Beethoven, Mozart, Poe, and Napoleon. "33
More popular among eugenicists than sterilization laws was the
reform of the immigration laws. Again, Harry Laughlin played a major
role. He became advisor to the House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization. He also testified on behalf of biological
considerations as an immigration standard. (Laughlin taught
agricultural breeding at a Missouri normal school. 34) Laughlin
articulated the fear of many that the new immigrants— from Southern
Europe—would weaken the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon strain in America and
accelerate the decline of the American stock. They based their fears on
high "incidence of disease, illiteracy, poverty, and crime in immigrant
neighborhoods ."33 £n fact, they based it on racist fears. 33 The
proportions among the various national origins within the American
population were shifting and intermarriage was becoming increasingly
common. The older stock—who apparently "forgot" that they too came
from immigrant families, many of whom struggled to survive—refused to
consider the effect of a sudden immersion into a new culture on the
immigrants and translated these adjustments into genetic
characteristics
.
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Decline: The 193CTs
Among the reasons for the movement's decline was its style.
Note again the vicious language employed: "The socially inadequate
classes, regardless of etiology or prognosis." 37 "we are rapidly losing
ground to the emotional foreigner who is biologically unlike us and
therefore cannot understand that honesty, loyalty, and moral life are
principles inherent in good minds ." 38 In part because of this language,
the movement failed to establish a democratic base. It worked as an
elitist group lobbying state legislatures or serving as expert witnesses
before Congressional committees. But its racist language and its
elitist core contributed to its downfall.
By the 1930's, the movement had become small and less well
accepted by the public and by scientists. Its nasty political agenda
alienated its allies while developments within the science of genetics
proved much of the eugenics' agenda wrong. But the democratic and
genetic indictment of eugenics alone probably would not have been
telling. The fatal blows were inflicted by both the Depression at home
and Hitler abroad.
The depression removed from the capitalist system the image of
destiny and inviolability assigned to it by the eugenicists. Galtonian
eugenics was a victim of unemployment." 3 ^ The capitalist had failed, so
how could they embody all that was good? As the economic system
undercut the eugenics movement , their racist policies proved equally
fatal as Hitler adopted racial standards and the American eugenicists
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not only failed to distance themselves from his policies but endorsed
many of theml^O
After achieving its greatest success, the Immigration Act of
1924, the eugenics movement slowly disintegrated. Its political
positions on race and social status became irrelevant to the new
political period ushered in by both the Depression and World War II.
The movement faced the choice of extinction or fundamentally changing
its approach, if not its substance.
Interlude: Margaret Sanger
Even during its darkest days, the eugenic idea influenced other
reformers and reform movements. While these groups did not adopt
eugenics as their cause, the eugenic idea informed their program and, as
in the case of Margaret Sanger, became a major goal of their reforms.
Sanger represents an interesting example of the Progressive-era
reformer. She championed the cause of women, especially their right to
freely choose birth control. Her major concern was political; she
placed woman's problems into the larger context of social and political
power relationships. But in addition, she expressed concern over future
generations and the quality of "the race." This eugenic concern became
inseparable from her political critique and remedy. Sanger s joining of
these issues makes her an important figure in the history of birth
control and in current debates over control of our reproductive
practices
.
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Margaret Sanger's birth control crusade sought to repeal
restrictive birth control laws to enable women to exercise freedom of
choice over their reproduction. While her rhetoric portrayed the woman
as a political and social victim, Sanger grounded her work on basic
biological drives shared by all women. According to Sanger, the sex
drive was at the heart of the woman's being. This drive transcended
even income in importance to the woman/ 1 From this position, Sanger
proceeded to reject the traditional economic reforms as inadequate (but
important) and turned instead to birth control and negative eugenics.
In her analysis, Sanger linked together the industrial order,
population control, motherhood, and the American Race. ^2 The demands of
the industrial order required a population policy that denied women
control over their reproductive practices. The industrialists and the
nation-states required large populations to fulfill their tasks. Her
indictment of population growth detailed such offensive consequences as:
war, famine, unemployment, and child labor.^ To achieve others'
population goals, women were pressured into producing larger families
than they wanted or could care for. One form of this coercion was the
denial of information about their biology, information about birth
control, and birth control itself. Sanger argued that given a choice,
women would not reproduce so recklessly. Family size would coincide
with economic and social conditions so as to ensure the best possible
upbringing for each child. Birth control became an imperative need in
this system because, despite the parents' desire to ensure the best
conditions for their children, sex remained a powerful urge that was
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denied only at the women's physical and psychological peril. Therefore,
women, through the use of birth control, could respect this natural
drive while also controlling their families' size. Birth control was
more natural than abstinence, more moral than abortion, and better
policy than no control.
Sanger believed that freeing women would also rebuild the race.
In part she saw the race degenerating, but her primary belief was that
the woman's potential had been underutilized. Through motherhood passes
culture and learning. Free the mother from her chains and improve the
conditions of childrearing and the result will be an improved person
(both woman and child).
In her promotion of race, Sanger joined the eugenicists' ranks.
She used race in two ways. One was her concern over "bad stock":
The lack of balance between the birth rate of the 'unfit' and the
'fit', admittedly [sic] the greatest present menace to
civilization.^^
She focused on intelligence, which she believed was inherited, as the
key standard separating the fit and unfit. She warned about "recruiting
the next generation from the least intelligent and most unskilled
classes in the community. This became a real possibility given that
"degenerate stocks . . . have more than the normal size of family. "^6
Race also included a cultural dimension:
The cell plasm of these peoples [immigrants] are freighted with the
potentialities of the best in the Old World civilization.'
7*'7
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Consistent with Sanger's naturalistic bias, she placed culture within
heredity. This is a typically eugenic position: assigning biological
status to valued characteristics.
Sanger, however, added an environmental component to race. She
decried the treatment of immigrants, especially their confinement to
slums. This treatment meant we failed to gain culturally from the
diversity they added to the population; nor were they sufficiently
exposed to American culture in order to become acculturated . This
latter point admitted to an environmental role unthinkable to the hard
liners among the eugenicists. The failure to socialize the immigrants
into the dominant American culture (race) resulted in a hybrid culture
(part old world, part American slum) which Sanger believed to be
inferior. In sum, Sanger's conception of race was hereditary, but it
also possessed an American soul:
If we are to develop in America a race with a racial soul, we must
keep the birthrate within the scope of our ability to understand as
well as to educate. We must not encourage reproduction beyond our
capacity to assimilate our numbers so as to make the coming
generation into such physically fit, mentally capable, socially
alert individuals as are the ideals of democracy.
^
Hers was not a religious soul, but it encompassed more than a collection
of genes defining the race.
To achieve a distinctly American race, Sanger believed the
social system needed radical change. What political alternatives were
open to her? She isolated three: Marxism, philanthropy and charity, and
eugenics. She rejected the first two and provisionally accepted the
third. Marxism failed on two grounds. First, in order to provide for
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sufficient numbers of proletariat, Marxism, like its capitalist enemy,
required a large worker population. Marxism's second failing was its
propensity to blame others for the workers' failings. Sanger located
the demand for overpopulation in the state, industry, and church, but
she assigned responsibility for compliance to the worker:
When all is said and done, the workers who produce large families
have themselves to blame for the hundreds of thousands of unemployed
grasping for jobs, for the strike breakers, for the policemen who
beat up and arrest strikers and for the soldiers who shoot strikers
down.
Marxism failed to accept this and instead blamed the economic order for
the workers' condition. Charity failed on simpler grounds. Sanger's
goal was to prevent further degeneration of the race and to promote
improvement. Charity did neither. At best, charity was emotional and
altruistic: occasionally ameliorative, but never preventative.
This left eugenics. On this point, Sanger offered a good
critique of positive eugenics and proposed a modest negative program
that could work in tandem with her birth control crusade. The essence
of her objection to positive eugenics was its lack of realism. The
positive program desired those with the best traits—usually defined as
the socially successful— to propagate to improve the race. This
argument, Sanger predicted, would "fall on deaf ears" because it would
undercut a family's attempt to elevate its standard of living. 52 Aside
from the practical, she argued against it on principle. Raising a large
family strained the psychological well-being of the wealthy mother just
as it did the mother of the poor (although not as much!) and this was
unacceptable. She objected to any policy premised on an increasing
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population. Large families of all kinds—rich and poor alike—promoted
war and famine. 53
After eliminating positive eugenics as wrong and dangerous (an
ironic position in that positive eugenics is usually presented as
eugenics at its most benign), she confronted the negative alternative.
Her criticisms and modifications offer a preview of the post 1930's
eugenics movement.
To Sanger, negative eugenics correctly identified the
feebleminded—among whom she linked the insane, epileptic, criminal,
prostitute, pauper, and mentally defective—as a dangerous lot deserving
attention. She endorsed sterilization, although she added the
qualification that sterilization should only be allowed with a firm
genetic basis and fair laws. 54 Sanger identified the marginally
intelligent as especially worrisome. Their ability to be glib, good
looking, and outwardly normal could deceive many and the cultural and
intellectual consequences for the community were dire. 55 Sanger's
conclusion was that these people should be either segregated or
sterilized. She preferred, with qualification, sterilization.^
The impact of controlling the marginally intelligent's
reproduction would be more immediate than the positive eugenicists'
program. However, she found this approach incomplete. Sanger faulted
negative eugenics on two grounds. While eugenics recognized the
biological dimension, it misunderstood the role of sex. Sanger believed
sex to be more than biological: it was spiritual. 57 Programs simply
aimed at marriage (positive eugenics) or the sex act (segregation) miss
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the spiritual side of sex. Birth control filled the void. Because
people other than married couples partake of seX58 and all COUples need
to maintain a healthy sex life, her strategy was designed to allow for
this, allow for family limitation, and bring these limiting practices to
those who most need to limit their numbers: the less intelligent and
mentally defective (often lumped by Sanger with the lower classes).
Sanger also criticized the reductionism inherent in eugenics
thought. She believed that the causes of reckless birth extended to
environmental causes. The most reckless lived in the poorest areas.
Improve the environment, offer the necessary information and birth
control equipment, and the families may act more responsibly and raise
healthier children. The approach was carried on by Frederick Osborn59
after the fall of the original eugenics crusade.
Despite her environmental qualifications, Sanger shared a
naturalistic bias with eugenicists. She linked the human race with its
animal past. This was the source of its strong instincts. The
following excerpt, a quotation by Dr. Edward Kempf
,
is typical of the
eugenicist's view of man in general:
Man arose from the ape and inherited his passions, which he can only
refine but dare not attempt to castrate unless he would destroy the
fountains of energy that maintain civilization and make life worth
living and the world worth beautifying. ... We do not have a
problem that is to be solved by making repressive laws and executing
them. Nothing will be more disastrous. Society must make life
worth the living and the refining for the individual by conditioning
him to love and to seek the love object in a manner that reflects a
constructive effect upon his fellow-men and by giving him suitable
opportunities. . . . The noblest and most difficult art of all is
the raising of human thoroughbreds.*^
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Sanger, working outside the eugenics movement, modernized its
theory and made it more practical and adaptable to related reform
efforts. She attacked the extreme threats to the race, but relied on
voluntary action and instinct to achieve her overall goals. She
recognized the role environmental practices have on heredity; she linked
her eugenic goals to social and economic reform. From within the
eugenics movement efforts began in the 193CTs to redirect its program in
the direction foreshadowed by Sanger's interlude within the eugenics
hysteria. Frederick Osborn, Secretary of the American Eugenics Society,
led this effort.
Frederick Osborn
Osborn's initial task was to free the eugenic idea from its
past. To this end, he needed to distinguish eugenics as an idea from
the practice of the earlier movement and to show the compatibility of
eugenics with American ideals. Osborn's strategy emphasized
voluntarism, democratic choices, and scientific (primarily medical)
legitimacy. He sought to make eugenics as inconspicuous as possible.
Rather than base his policy on the extremes— the feebleminded or
exceptional 01—or rely on coercive legislative strategies, Osborn turned
to the environment as a means of directing individual choices. He
sought eugenic goals through what appeared to be non-eugenic means.
Osborn believed that sterilization of the feebleminded provided
socially beneficial results, but sterilization and the policy of
positive eugenics which encourages strategic breeding affect only a
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segment of the population. Those most important to eugenic
concerns, the average and marginal, are left unaffected. Osborn
theorized that only by addressing average characteristics could eugenics
succeed. This approach expanded eugenic's scope while lowering its
public profile.
The new eugenics, like the old, was concerned with realizing and
promoting "inborn potentialities." It "[sought] to change the
distribution of births in a way which [would] improve the average
hereditary potential of human beings ." 62 Unlike the old, however, this
involved a shift from targeting groups to targeting individuals.
Leavening the population was the goal but the strategy addressed the
individual. On this point Osborn wrote: "There can be little doubt that
today natural selection operates mainly through the differential
fertility of individual couples and it is this kind of selection with
which the Eugenic Hypothesis is concerned ." 62 Rather than employing
means outside of the individual's life, this new approach sought to
change values: in particular those attached to the home and children. 6 ^
Osborn maintained the eugenicists' nationalist and social goals, but
they no longer comprised the central strategy nor were they used as a
means of pressuring individuals to conform.
The new strategy professed a political realism. Knowing the
damage done to the eugenic image by sterilization laws and racist
language, Osborn searched for means that were feasible and consistent
with American ideals and values. He settled on manipulation of the
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social environment. This revived the balance between heredity and
environment raised in Sanger's work:
Eugenics seeks also to improve physical qualities. The more serious
physical incapacities are the responsibility of the medical
profession and public health officers. ... At the same time,
eugenics is particularly interested in the psychological traits of
intelligence and personality because these traits are of major
importance to civilization. If there is justification for a broad
eugenics movement, it is chiefly in the part which heredity may play
in fixing limits to the psychological development of individuals .65
But within the parameters fixed by heredity, the environment plays a
major role affecting future generations. This position is not
surprising since Darwin defined "fitness" as the closeness of fit to
particular environmental conditions. Osborn returned to sound
evolutionary theory.
The environmental factors identified by Osborn spanned a wide
spectrum of daily life. The birth/death ratio was of particular
concern. Death played an important role in evolutionary theories
because death selected between the fit and unfit. Other factors
isolated by Osborn included living and public health conditions,
childhood and family recreation, family life, and education.
The nature of the American political system was one reason
Osborn chose the environment as his strategic lever. He sought to make
eugenic considerations a part of an individual s outlook toward life, to
become a way of life. He wrote:
In a democratic country there are great opportunities or developing
such conditions of society that the processes of eugenic selection
shall be voluntary and natural
.
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This reversed the elitism of earlier eugenicists. It also provided a
means to achieve eugenic ends subversively
;
it shielded the individual
from directly confronting the eugenic choice. In this approach, Osborn
foreshadowed the modern policy analyst who promotes public ends through
indirect market means.
The change Osborn desired was one where the social environment
made the choices or provided the stimuli needed to act along eugenic
lines. Implicit in this argument are some standards as to eugenically
desirable traits. Despite a significant technocratic moment to Osborn's
thought, he did not look solely to nature for the definitive
characteristics. He hoped they would develop from indigenous public
opinion. "Local aspirations" defined what the ideal traits were and
"the eugenist [sic] would be satisfied so long as public opinion
included a eugenic purpose as part of any environment to which it
aspired ."68
How this process would work is exemplified by Osborn's
discussion of family size. If the environment lacked the aspects that
would encourage an interest in large families, then those who follow
environmental stimuli would pursue other goals. By changing the
environment, one could create the situation where those most responsive
to its best influences would have large families and those least
responsive would have small ones. The result would find each new
generation increasing the number of people who fit the environment well
Darwin's definition of fitness. "The response would be voluntary, a
selection drawn out by the environment itself." 69
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While Osborn declined the responsibility of choosing (or
assigning) the traits, he maintained standards against which he could
evaluate the results. He wisely employed an evaluative system that did
not (with one exception) depend upon science's ability to identify those
possessing desirable or undesirable traits. He thus avoided a potential
trap resulting from scientific advances. For example, as genetic
research progresses, more genetic diseases can be identified and
treated. By not defining eugenic goals in terms of particular traits or
defects, the eugenic program need not be constantly redefined or revised
to match changes in genetic knowledge. Further, this approach allowed
Osborn to define its goals using terms and categories relevant to the
populace's everyday life. Where the goal is control over the body, as
is true of the eugenicist, leaving open the definition of the sound body
is a better approach than specifying in detail what constitutes the
body. In sum, this allowed for shifting standards. It defined eugenics
in terms of the phenotype rather than the genotype. This is necessary
given the role of the environment and a recognition of ambiguity or
uncertainty in genetic knowledge.
Osborn's standards cherished conformity. This is in marked
contrast to Sanger's emphasis on diversity and genius. Osborn's
community, from which the eugenic ideals emerged, consisted of the
upwardly mobile middle class . 711 His standards and ideals included:
above average physique and health, sociability, love of children, stable
marriage, and the ethic of sacrifice . 71 Families should be supportive,
together, and well-adjusted. 7 ^ They should also be energetic, looking
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for good and interesting work, and future-oriented. In other words,
Osborn's ideal environment would promote family-oriented couples who
adopt the industrial work-ethic and would encourage them to produce more
children than the less future-oriented and those less interested in
family values. These are reasonable standards: mainstream, if nothing
else. They are more cons iant with American values than Laughlin's
categories as defined in his sterilization law, detailed above.
As stated above, however, an exception to this culturally-based
presentation existed, Osborn recognized the role of genetics. The
characteristics of the environmental and genetic dimensions can be seen
in the following discussion of an individual's social value:
"Intelligence" as measured by psychological tests certainly has a
part in determining social value. The tests used are objective,
they can be applied to large groups of people, and psychologists
have had enough experience in their use to recognize many of the
limitations within which they must be interpreted. . . . Tests of
genetic fitness, such as may be made by studies of ancestry and near
kin, are especially important for determining not only defective
stocks, but those of superior ability. They are less applicable to
large groups of peoples' qualities directly and objectively.
Another, and indirect method, is to measure the accomplishment of
people in their daily lives. For this purpose, criteria must be
used which will reach the whole population.
Osborn relied on intelligence to evaluate social characteristics. His
comparisons among regions, occupations, and races were based on IQ
scores. These comparisons refuted the earlier eugenic theories which
ranked social groups according to the social prejudices of the
eugenicists. Genetic considerations, on the other hand, could only be
seen at the individual level. To this end, Osborn relied on heritage as
well as the use of genetic techniques, such as genetic counseling and
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screening
.
To overcome the onus of eugenics' past, he needed to make
intelligence a neutral and partially hidden concept. This he did by
relegating it to an evaluative role (evaluating eugenic progress) while
keeping it out of an explicit policy role. (He did not use IQ as a
social policy goal.) Genetics surfaced only indirectly through its
scientific and medical practice.
Osborn's Themes and Agenda
Osborn pursued typically eugenic themes. He embraced a
naturalistic argument and embedded it deeply into the social fabric. He
linked civilization's changes with the workings of the selection
process. The crucial change being increasing control over death. Death
serves as "the purifier of the higher qualities of the race." 7 ^ Osborn
explained
:
Man's rise from apelike form to Homo sapiens was the result of
eugenic selection. The preponderant factor in the selection was the
ability to escape an early death. Even in the earliest and hardest
days death was not always a blind accident. The man with the best
natural immunities was the most likely to survive disease. . . .
Many of man's finest qualities arose because those who cared for
their children saw them more often survive, and those who could best
7 f)
co-operate often saved their families where others failed.
Osborn drew a sharp distinction with other eugenic theories. He did not
accept the argument that the race was declining. "There is no clear
evidence that hereditary defects are on the increase ." 77 Rather, he
sought to continue the advancement of the race. He sought perfection.
He worked within the view that nature, in its normal state, provided for
7 ft
the species' slow and steady advance. Once death is removed as the
evolutionary mechanism, a substitute must be found in order to maintain
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evolutionary progress. He chose birth. Thus did Osborn introduce his
major policy concern: population policies and the birth/death ratio.
Low birthrates among the more advantaged join with the declining death
rate to create a eugenic problem. Where previously the unfit died off
before they could reproduce and the fit "had as many children as nature
brought them now the fit (not nature) determined the size of their
families and the unfit contributed more of their own.
Earlier, Sanger had addressed this issue. After rejecting the
belief that the advantaged (also thought of as the "fit") would
voluntarily increase their numbers, she recommended extending birth
control to the "unfit." Osborn accepted the second point, but only as a
part of his answer. A means had to be found to encourage the best to
reproduce in larger numbers. With this in mind, Osborn desired that
eugenics be linked to population policies—but only as a secondary
consideration— to ensure that these factors were included.
Osborn could pursue this passive eugenic approach only after
clearing away the taint of racism held over from the earlier eugenic
agenda. To this end, he undertook an extensive analysis of the relative
intelligence among different groupings (e.g., race, wealth, occupation,
urban/rural). He concluded that no significant differences existed
among the groups
:
Policies which would restrict births in some large groups and
encourage them in other large groups may be defended on the ground
that a certain culture will thereby be strengthened. ... In some
cases such policies might appear wise or necessary. But they should
not be proposed on biological grounds.
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Osborn's conclusion was a break of major importance. This broke
the eugenics movement from the logic behind the 1924 immigration reform
which targeted particular groups and instead substituted policies
targeted at the entire population. The eugenicist could now address
substantive issues believed to contribute to genetic growth (or
decline). If the new policies worked, resulting in the population
acting eugenically, the population would divide naturally along eugenic
lines: the best people increasing their number while the weaker
declined. Once race, ethnic origin, or class were eliminated as
indicators of genetic worth, and genetic defects (or virtues) were seen
as randomly spread throughout the population (what the geneticists
taught), then the best strategy was one focused on reproductive
practices
.
Osborn identified six aspects of a normal routine whose impact
on family life offered eugenicists opportunities to foster eugenic
values. These included: leisure activities, local nursing (especially
in rural areas), education, medicine, public opinion, and social and
political programs (especially those associated with the welfare state).
A seventh consideration was the ubiquitous sterilization. Four of these
directly effected environmental changes. Three, sterilization, nursing,
and medicine, recognized the genetic component and looked to science and
technique as necessary eugenic tools.
A brief review of the seven will help illustrate Osborn's
8
1
thinking. Leisure activities —by which Osborn meant non-commercial
recreation—served to teach co-operation, to integrate the sexes, and to
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provide for physical and emotional development. Family recreation must
be encouraged in order to promote the idea and unity of the family. It
would make the home a happy milieu.
Through education Osborn hoped to promote a sound body and
physique, a balanced personality, and normal attitudes toward family
life. These issues were not to play a role secondary to IQ or growth in
intellectual matters. Eugenics would be promoted through teaching an
elementary knowledge of genetics, heredity, and environment (especially
psychology) as well as population studies which would illustrate the
social and biological implications of changes in the birth rate.
Education became important to Osborn for two reasons. First was its
role in "inculcat [ ing ] the ideal of parenthood as fundamental in a well-
rounded philosophy of life."^ Education was also enlisted into the
process of weaving eugenic ideals into public opinion. Educating the
public on the nature/nurture issue and on the biological (read eugenic)
effect of population policy provided information which might eventually
influence some families' decisions on whether or not to use birth
control or have a large family. It might also influence those who offer
advice on the subject. But, and this is a typical Osborn theme, it
would introduce eugenic considerations indirectly.
Any political strategy based on indirection employs public
opinion. Osborn hoped to influence public opinion as a means to address
the marginal case—those not so badly off as to require sterilization or
segregation, rather those first on relief, least educated and skilled,
and reproductively most prolific. A properly formed public opinion
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would encourage these people to employ birth control measures (and may,
as the values become assimilated into the culture, allow others to
impose contraception on the most defective).
Implementing these ideas, however, requires some explicitly
eugenic actions. Not all defectives are easily identifiable as such
—
and this is especially true of the marginals. Therefore, some means of
identification is helpful. Many phenotypically healthy carry defective
genes and these people must be identified so that proper action can be
taken. This need is particularly acute given Osborn's rejection of
surrogate measures such as race, income, and class. For example, a
couple where one has type A positive blood and the mate type A negative
may wish to limit the number of children they have. On the other hand,
should they separate and remarry, this conflict may not occur and the
new couples may possess those characteristics that the eugenicists
promote and now they should have large families. Knowing the
individuals' status allows for the eugenically preferred actions under
all circumstances. Osborn's ideal was that those raised in the
environment of a eugenically informed public opinion would take these
steps voluntarily and routinely .
Finally, Osborn applauded the economic and social advances made
by the New Deal and developing welfare state. Any changes that improved
the home environment were desirable. Housing improvement, slum
clearance, extended social services, medical and child care services
that relieved child-bearing burdens were all important advances in that
they improved the image and conditions of childrearing. The scope of
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the services also provided institutional opportunities for targeting the
marginals and promoting birth control among the less fit.
The remaining areas for eugenic influence, medicine and nursing,
continued the themes found in the role of public opinion and social
services. Both medicine and nursing offered a means of identifying
those with eugenically undesirable traits. Most of Osborn's
environmental recommendations fall within the category of positive
eugenics. He relegated negative eugenics to the realm of medicine:
If ... we have urged a new and heavy responsibility on the medical
profession, it is because no other course seems possible. Only the
doctor carries that ultimate public confidence which is necessary if
public and patient alike are to follow advice on matters of
heredity. Only the doctor sees in intimate detail the interplay of
environment and heredity in which disease and defect may develop,
and therefore he alone is qualified to diagnose and interpret the
results
Not only does Osborn seek the legitimacy of the medical community, but
he relegated diseugenic hereditary characteristics to the category of
disease. In order to allow the established practices of medicine to
serve eugenic ends, Osborn needed to bring within the doctors' frame of
reference the eugenic implications of birthrate changes and stress the
socially deleterious effects of genetic defects.
Nursing referred to nurses visiting communities. Based on their
knowledge of the community, they could identify who should or should not
have large families. They could also act as an advisor on whether or
not a family should use birth control. Given this strategic position,
they became an obvious group for Osborn to target. Nurses had an added
advantage :
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In the hands of this group, eugenics seemed to lose its theoretical
and controversial aspects and to be something merely requiring the
application of experienced and practical good sense. 8 ^
Once again, professionalism aided the eugenic cause. Osborn also hinted
at a motivation that resembled Galton's scientific charity:
At present, the eugenic opportunities of nurses are restricted by
the time taken in caring for inadequates
,
which seems so hopeless
and fruitless a task. 8 ^
After assigning to medicine the eugenically interesting genetic defects,
Osborn now implies that medicine should direct its resources only to the
medically feasible. The individual, elevated to the center of
attention, now loses its individuality.
In regard to sterilization, Osborn offered little information.
He made reference to it as one means, along with segregation and birth
0/1
control, to control defectives. 00 He also noted that voluntary
sterilization was increasing which offered possibilities for eugenic
goals. 8 ^ Aside from these observations, in his theoretical works he
minimized this controversial practice.
In his later works, Osborn made more explicit the dual nature of
his strategy. 88 The first part, generally referring to the issues
previously discussed, was environmental. The second centered on the
scientific or clinical approach. His early works made reference to
these concerns ; he had never abandoned sterilization or birth control
for the disadvantaged. By 1968, however, his interest in science as a
eugenic tool had grown, due, in large part, to advances in genetics.
Genetic research on mutations and hidden defects focused attention on
deeper traits than could be measured by appearances and success in life
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This clinical strategy also exemplified the technocratic and scientific
side to eugenics. Osborn used science as one of the two pillars (the
other being democracy) upon which he attempted to rebuild eugenics.
Each tied directly into the American political culture. One
historically situated and the other growing in importance.
In brief, the clinical strategy sought to identify and then
reduce defects. To this end, Osborn advocated the use of heredity
clinics, "the first eugenic proposals that have been adopted in a
practical form and accepted by the public ." 89 He promoted institutional
care; though this was not a eugenically motivated activity, it served
eugenic ends in its segregation of defectives. Osborn placed birth
control into this strategy, with special emphasis on those with little
education and low economic status.
The tenor of Osborn's writing was one of conciliation and
moderation. The excesses of his predecessors' prevented anything else.
Clearly, Osborn desired that eugenic goals reflect community values and
he hoped that those views would exclude as undesirable the genetically
defective. He believed that the ideal would be achieved through
voluntary and independent action. The eugenics program was to be a
biproduct of routine actions.
There exists, however, an opening for a policy less benign than
Osborn offered. Despite his moderation, the darker side of eugenics
lurks underneath his standards. Especially suspect are genetic and
intelligence considerations. How are these to be identified? The
subtlety of Osborn's system is maintained by treating each case
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individually rather than as a broader campaign defined by explicit
characteristics of rightness in the manner of Laughlin's extreme
program. But even though they are not explicit, the standards of
rightness exist at the undebated level of social values.
Osborn's reliance on social characteristics worked under the
belief that social characteristics carried with them genetic traits,
even if the characteristics were not genetically caused. This view,
when pushed to its logical conclusions, raises disturbing policy
questions which Garrett Hardin illustrates . 9(9 Reviewing his analysis
illustrates how eugenic beliefs can influence policy analysis.
To begin, assume an economically stable population. Those who
live in poverty can "trace their lineage . . . through many generations
of impoverished ancestors. 7 Living under these conditions is normally
believed to cause hardships for the individuals. Hardin offered a
different twist: "It takes positive attributes to survive in
poverty. . . . The type of genetic toughness needed to survive in abject
poverty generations after generations is undoubtedly less common among
American suburbanites than it is among poor Indians [from Calcutta ]." 92
Thus the first policy consideration is the point of reference: "What
kind of world do we want to create ?" 7 If you first define how
civilization should be, then this choice will bring with it particular
genetic characteristics. However, if you change the environment, you
bring into the new environment people with traits best suited to the
old.
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It follows that if you choose the suburban life, you are not
promoting the genetic traits best suited to poverty. The fact that the
environment and genetic makeup grow to complement one another has
profound influences on policy and economic reform. Programs that
rapidly raise the level of the economically depressed to a position of
material comfort place upon these people the burden of living in the
civilized world with genetic characteristics developed in the poverty
stricken environment (this carrying of maladjusted genes is part of what
is called the genetic load^);
If we were to succeed in bringing instant cultural prosperity to a
population that was genetically adapted to poverty, by that very act
we would create a genetic load on the otherwise fortunate nouveaux
riches. If our reform stopped at this point and if, following the
fashion of the world before the welfare state, we permitted natural
selection to take its course, the genetic load would be rapidly
reduced. But those who work for economic reform also support the
welfare state. ^5
Hardin moved from this to portray the consequences of adopting
unmodified welfare state policies: creating rapid economic prosperity
among those poorly adapted to civilization. The eugenicist's concern
centers on whether or not the newly reformed will "tolerate the
necessity—or even the thought of—selective genetic change? Or will
they, perceiving the lack of fit between themselves and the corridors of
wealth . . . seek to pull down the structure of civilization, for their
comfort's sake?"^ if we accept the eugenic analysis, we should do
nothing dramatic to adjust gross poverty levels. Consistent with the
eugenic spirit, Hardin recommended a policy of economic advancement
coupled with one of population control, shifting the issue from economic
57
to population policy. Both the policy of benign neglect and population
control are preferred by eugenicists to the simple redistributive
policies because the former policies take seriously the population
question and the necessity of action only after learning how the changes
will effect genetic characteristics.
Hardin's analysis exemplified several characteristics of the new
eugenics. He showed that policy reduced to biological considerations
produced changes of kind in public policy (from economic to population
policy). His policy also discriminated among a large group of people by
their genes. He believed that some would be unable to adjust to the
demands of civilized society and he justified this claim by reference to
biological characteristics. Hardin also brought to the surface a social
bias in this approach. Along with Osborn, his standards were based upon
the American middle class, dominated by whites. One must ask whether
his assessment of the genes was biological or sociological.
Hardin's analysis is not completely consistent with Osborn's
theories. Osborn found advantages in the welfare state because it
created greater opportunity for those underprivileged and allowed for
the genetically strong among the poor to rise up and escape their
imprisonment. (This implies that the differences between Osborn and
Hardin may reside in different scientific analysis: the relationship of
genetics to poverty.) Where the two do agree is on the importance of
population policy and the relevance of genetics to public policy. They
each see the subtle relationship between environmental changes and
genetic traits, but disagree on how best to effect environmental change.
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The disagreement illustrates the differences between moderate eugenic
analysis (Osborn) and a new hardline analysis (Hardin), a potential
inherent in Osborn's approach.
In sum, Osborn worked to place eugenicists into the mainstream
of American society. He developed four major areas of attack: an
improved social environment (welfare state); effective methods of birth
control; a "psychological and cultural atmosphere [which] would tend to
encourage births among the parents most responsive to the possibilities
of their environment and diminish births among the least responsive ; "97
and he enlisted the medical community to identify and reduce genetic
defects (screening, counseling, and medicine). All of these depended
upon voluntary compliance achieved through an eugenically informed
public opinion.
Osborn followed the logic begun by Galton. Civilization had
interfered with natural selection. Social changes have genetic
implications and society has an obligation to the future of the human
race to take these consequences into consideration. The human race will
only continue to grow (the alternative being degeneration, not
stagnation) if our genes are well suited to our environment and this
requires selection. Therefore, these eugenic concerns must be a part of
our political and scientific agendas.
Osborn leaves us with one final, sobering thought. It
exemplifies his entire approach:
Eugenic goals are most likely to be attained under a name other than
eugenics
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Hermann J. Muller
Osborn's prediction of eugenics practiced through other means
finds partial fulfillment in genetics. In part, this is coincidence.
Eugenics and genetics share a concern over the public's genetic health.
[he scientists recommendations and research plans may cover ground
similar to the eugenicist but without his overarching plan and strategic
interests. But in other cases it is not coincidental. Hermann J.
Muller exemplified the latter perspective. He provided the genetic
grounding to justify eugenics.
Muller was no minor character among geneticists. In 1946, he
won the Nobel Prize in medicine and physiology for his work on radiation
and genetic mutations. His writings on our "load of mutations" was well
respected
.
Muller was also a politically interested scientist. In the
1920's and 1930's he professed socialist leanings. Between 1933-1937 he
was senior geneticist at the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow and
Leningrad. In 1937 he went to Spain as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil
War and thus was out of Moscow when Lysenko purged the ranks of Soviet
geneticists (including some of Muller's close friends and colleagues).
After that, Muller moved away from his support for the Soviet Union and
socialism. His later writings displayed occasional cold war rhetoric
but generally focused on such scientific issues as radiation s long term
impact on the race's genetic composition. Relating his work in genetics
to eugenics was a natural leap for one as politically interested as he.
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As a geneticist, Muller worked on Drosophila. This is the
research with which he achieved his awards. He used, however, many of
the genetic findings from his Drosophila work when he wrote on human
genetics. As a matter of fairness to Muller and to the field of human
genetics, it must be noted that he was not a specialist in it. The
following relies primarily upon his writing on human genetics and on
eugenics, which he wrote for a professional audience, but the lay as
well. The latter is best seen in his eugenic treatise, Out of the
Night : Pi Biologist s V iew of the Future^. Because his scientific
authority (and awards) derived from his Drosophila work, it is a little
unfair to present Muller simply as seen in this body of work. The
purpose of the following section, however, is not to present his genetic
thought, but rather to state the eugenic thinking of this geneticist.
Muller was a Darwinian. Evolutionary thought informed his
writings. There existed, however, some sloppiness in his thought,
especially in his popular works. Occasionally, he appeared to lapse
into the non-Darwinian rhetoric of progressive evolution:
It [evolution] should lend us support in our struggle for a freer
world, for it shows how the most essential properties of living
things have led to their perpetual reaching out, self-
transformation, and, for some of them, progression, and conquest of
the rest of nature, until from a slimy scum they have stood erect,
become aware of themselves, evolved social feelings and moral
principles, and striven toward the stars. It shows that this great
process is still at work and that we can carry it further.
Muller's argument is not so much incorrect as misleading. Darwin did
not define evolution in terms of ranking traits one against the other.
Rather, improvement was defined as against the environment, by how well
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a trait helped one live under certain environmental conditions. Thus
degeneration should be seen as a less efficient fit to the environment,
but not as a regression. Evolution develops through selection among
blind variations rather than a linear progression.
The importance of natural selection theory to Muller's work
warrants a brief summary of his views on the process. This also will
help tighten the sloppy reasoning he employed in his "political" work.
To Muller, natural selection (Darwin's contribution to evolutionary
thought) meant "heritable variation in different directions, . . .
followed by differential survival and multiplication of the
variants. Variation is an important part of the process. Survival
alone is not the key but survival by selection is. Muller joined
together Darwin and Malthus in arguing that a "struggle for existence"
takes place due to "differential multiplication" (some multiply, others
do not) within a finite space. The finite space creates the necessity
for "selective elimination" of those who, if no selection existed, would
stand in the way of the best. A relaxation of the selection process
results in a decay due to the fact that bad mutations out-number good
mutations. (Decay does not mean regression of the species, but may mean
a vulnerability eventually leading to extinction.) Eugenicists relied
upon Darwin's theories, but Darwin himself was unable to determine what
mechanism provided the necessary variation. This forced the
eugenicists to look for indirect means to achieve their goals since the
answer to the evolutionary process eluded them. Genetics answered this
question of heredity's mechanism; genes and mutations. Finally,
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mutations provide the means through which the necessary variation is
achieved. In nature, mutations occur constantly and when the mutations
produce a variation that better fits the environment, it is selected
for, while the remaining are selected against. In this regard,
mutations are necessary because diversity is essential to selection.
Muller turned to eugenics for reasons similar to Galton and his
followers. Civilization interfered with the process of natural
selection. Despite the hopes of some that the social struggle was
synonomous with the struggle for existence, Muller concluded that "it
now appears that the social struggle under our modern civilization does
not lend [itself] to the reproductive survival of the germ plasm most
useful to the species. "103 improvements in such things as medicine and
living conditions allow many to reproduce who otherwise "would have been
genetically proscribed Civilization's interference in the
selection process necessitates a corrective reaction. That is Muller's
understanding of eugenics' role: "the conscious social direction of
human biological evolution." 105 In his earlier eugenic thought,
capitalism was the major villain. He focused on two aspects of the
capitalist system. One was the extent to which economic inequality
masked an individual's true worth. Echoing Osborn, Muller argued that a
dominant class could hide their weak offspring or that the financial and
psychological costs of pregnancy may prevent some of the genetically
best endowed (but financially poor) from reproducing. To Muller, this
illustrated how the distribution of economic rewards could hide the
distribution of genetic value. Muller placed a high value on ensuring
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that all with "the more valuable genes" reproduced in increasing numbers
while the genetically inferior were limited. ^6
The economy was also faulted for creating an artificial view of
man. According to Muller (the socialist), man is naturally "a hunting
animal and he hunts in packs. Man is goal oriented and social; the
artificial economy made man individualistic and contentious. Rather
than joining into fairly large social groups, economic man joins smaller
conflicting groups (e.g., race and religion) that create
dissatisfaction. Promoting a eugenic effort aimed at directing
evolution within this system would be difficult. Eugenics would require
co-operation rather than conflict, and sacrifice would have to be a
social rather than a private (for self or family) concept.
Muller the scientist also outlined threats to evolution. Most of
his eugenic recommendations follow from this aspect of his critique.
The selection process should select against those mutations harmful to
the individual's survival. But even when it works correctly, each
individual will carry four to eight mutant genes—their genetic load
—
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which will be slightly detrimental. If all works properly, these
particular mutations should slowly work their way out of the system as
new ones take their place. Civilization's advances affect the process
at this point. By allowing those to reproduce who otherwise would have
died (or not reproduced), the genetic load is continued and even
extended. It is extended because new mutations occur and will be added
to those that should already have been eliminated. Compounding the
problem are new mutations artificially created by civilized life.
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Most of these mutant genes are recessive (in a heterozygous
state they do not determine the characteristics). But Muller contended
that this does not mean they are harmless. Most are "effectively
dominant" in that "most of their total damaging effect on the population
is exerted through their action while in heterozygous condition." ^9
Their effect accumulates within the population, diluting the gene pool.
This "effective domination," combined with the effect of medicine and
other of civilization's advances, makes the genetic load of interest to
eugenics. Three strategies are available to control this load: avoid
creating new mutations, promote the disproportional birth of those with
the best genetic qualities (and likewise limit the reproduction of the
others), or design our own genetic components.
Preventing artificially induced mutations in an industrial world
is not an easy task. Muller studied radiation's effect and warned
against extensive exposure to it. Even though its demonstrable effects
are negligible, the accumulated effect over several generations combined
with a natural mutational load would serve to increase our genetic load.
And "we already have more than enough for comfort." When we add the
relatively recently discovered threat from chemicals, the breadth of
this attack on our genes becomes apparent. Further, both radiation and
chemicals are central elements of our economy and defense strategies.
This fact alone makes significant alterations in our relationship with
these "threats" unlikely. Thus the first strategy may be both unwise
and impractical.
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The remaining two alternatives depend upon science.
Civilization in its current form is the source of our weaknesses.
Natural selection provides the standard against which we should judge
our current state and science provides the means to this end. Muller
wrote
:
For in this phase man, and man alone, is acquiring the eyes of
science wherewith to see the structure of nature and to guide his
inventive hands towards the intelligent control both of the bit of
cosmos immediately encompassing him and to that within himself.
Not only does science provide the tools through which we can consciously
direct our evolution, but science also is the guiding philosophy:
But the time is coming when the true literary man cannot afford to
remain aloof from the thought and knowledge of this age
[evolutionary theory]
,
else he will be unable to write of the real
world in which men of modern outlook think, dwell, and have their
11 ?being. He will develop into an acrobat amusing the ignorant. ^
Ironically, Muller argued that our only hope of overcoming
civilization's intrusions is through the great creation of civilization:
science! The petty feuding and repressions of our economic system must
yield to the authority of science's commands. As we see the natural
truth through science, so must we act. But the relationship between
science and nature is more complex. Muller saw nature as an object as
well as Truth. Science can remake nature; science will improve the
human condition beyond any hope offered by nature. "Nature in general
must be reconstructed by us for ourselves, on an ever grandeur
scale.
Use of our scientific knowledge to improve our life underlies
Muller's thought. We organize our society based on what we know to be
66
natural; we will reproduce based on science's evaluation of our
contribution to the future. Muller embraced positive eugenics.
Science also informed Muller's rejection of negative eugenics.
This approach sought to eliminate (or decrease) bad genes, but Muller
argued that mutations make this impossible. Traditional sterilization
programs cannot work against recessive genes. Against this caveat,
Muller outlined a modest negative program. By genetically identifying
the major carriers of defective genes, one could attack the defectives
with a higher probability of success than if the program was aimed at
the entire population. Even though defective genes remain, the most
genetically dangerous cases can be controlled. Once we know those with
a high proportion of mutant genes, we can reduce the level of mutations
by obtaining the individuals' abstention from reproduction. This
carries with it two problems. One is the definition of a bad gene.
Muller admitted that this depended upon one's point of view.^^ The
other is when good genes are present along with the bad. Since most
people are carriers of defective genes, this becomes a serious problem.
Consequently, Muller concluded that rather rhan relying on eliminating
defectives, we should concentrate on promoting admirable qualities.
This strategy first needed social reform to free the best to
surface and flourish. At this point he followed Osborn's social
theories. Next, however, Muller broke from Osborn and advocated planned
reproduction. The demands of evolution, not love, must dictate
reproduction. Aside from concern for economic equality and improvement
of the conditions for raising children, Muller proposed to regain the
67
social nature of man previously stripped away by the economic system.
Eugenics depends upon a social sense which would re-enforce eugenic
activity: it needed a context whereby it was possible to act for the
good of the general population. "Thus, socially as well as
individually, must ends tend to become means, and means ends." 11 ^ This
is similar to Osborn's eugenic dimension to society but Muller pushed
the practice far beyond Osborn's work. Muller's strategy attacked the
genetic load with a dual pronged weapon. He coupled the "ameliorative
techniques, such as medicine, with a rationally directed guidance of
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reproduction." ° This latter is included "as a necessary complement to
medicine, and to the other practices of civilization, if they are not to
defeat their own purposes ." 1 ^ Muller did not leave the defectives to
suffer, but at the same time he sought assurances against the care of
defectives becoming a means to their reproduction.
Muller's third alternative was the most daring and most
exploitive of scientific research. Here, Muller argued for planned
reproduction irrespective of marriage. The best men and women should be
sought out and joined, but through the use of artificial insemination
and egg transplants, this need not cause an undue intrusion into their
lives . 118 The genetic fix was in. Muller recognized this plan's effect
on social sensibilities:
Only social inertia and popular ignorance now hold us back from
putting into effect (at least in a limited and experimental way)
such a severance of the function of reproduction from the personal
love-life of the individual . 11
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This illustrates the pre-emptive role of science. Social
conventions must adapt to "natural" needs. Love, "a matter of
imperative emotion", does not by itself serve reproductive needs well.
In fact, it "degrades the germ plasm of future generations." But if you
"unyoke the two, sunder the fetters that from time immemorial have made
them so nearly inseparable,"^^ then you can maintain the bond of Love
and allow the race to develop rationally and free of civilization's
perverting influences.
Muller brought the genetic issue to the surface. He campaigned
to bring direction to the use of the new genetic techniques rather than
allow them to become a part of the unplanned, irresponsible health care
system. Echoing Osborn's claim that eugenics seeks to release innate
potential, Muller championed a population possessing "the innate quality
of such men as Lenin, Newton, Leonardo, Pasteur, ... or even to
possess their varied faculties combined. "^-21 un iik.e Osborn, Muller
promoted diversity, in the form of greatness, in his population,
although his standards paralleled Osborn's.
Had we adopted his plan (and assuming it worked), mutations,
while continuing to exist, would be in balance (at a tolerably low
level) and no longer be sustained by civilization's blind medical
practice. Furthermore, positive traits would be of higher quality and
in greater numbers than they would have been without human intervention.
In sum, Muller wanted to bypass natural selection based upon the belief
i 22
that man can do better.
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Muller worked within Osborn's environmental strategy but placed
greater emphasis on genetic considerations. He spoke with the authority
of the geneticist, expecting all to see the urgency of his message
because of its scientific foundation. His work, however, leaves us
questioning Leo Szilard s dictum^~^ that a scientist and politician
speak with different purposes: one truthfully, the other committed.
Conclusion
The new eugenics broke free from the racial and class based
excesses of its youthful practice. It accomplished this by moving away
from defending the "old guard" and instead integrated itself into the
mainstream of society, sharing the public's aspirations. No longer
elitist in tone or practice, eugenics encased itself in democratic
values and practices. It became thoroughly middle class.
The extent to which racist or classist charges can still be
levelled against eugenics, they reflect racism within the society.
Osborn attempted empirically to disprove the racist conclusions of his
predecessors. He displayed, however, an upwardly mobile middle class
bias which, in his time, included a white bias. At the risk of
splitting hairs, Gould's argument of scientists reflecting their
cultural context better describes current racial or class biases within
the eugenics movement than do comparisons to the earlier eugenicists'
prejudices
.
Along with integrating themselves into daily life, the
eugenicists sought to influence the medical community (defined to
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include genetic science). By becoming only a secondary part of this
highly respected profession, eugenicists hoped to find an effective
means to implement their agenda and a source to lend new legitimacy to
their issues. This is the side of modern eugenics that rightly has
received attention
.
124 The movements into the mainstream of society and
into the scientific community represent the two tools or strategies of
modern eugenics. Confronted with apparent genetic degeneration or
threats to future evolutionary development, eugenicists looked to either
environmental manipulation, genetic intervention (either through
regulating procreation or direct genetic intervention)
,
or a combination
of the two. Of course, other concerns may motivate the same actions.
This dual purpose is something Osborn hoped to exploit; it also makes
isolating eugenics difficult.
This presents the observer with a dilemma. The issue
confronting the contemporary student of eugenics is to decipher whether
or not the eugenics movement has moved so far away from explicit action
that events, even though they may produce eugenic results, cannot
legitimately be classified as eugenic. Another way of stating this
draws a parallel to the courts' efforts to deal with segregation. They
have had to determine whether conditions which produce segregated
results (de facto segregation), but are not the result of official
policy or acquiescence (de jure segregation), should be considered
segregation within the law. ^ in the case of modern eugenics, the
concern is over practices that have eugenically desirable results.
Osborn's politics should move eugenics from d£ j ure to d_e facto
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practices. It now becomes necessary to take the theories presented by
those who desired eugenic programs and determine whether or not a
coherent eugenic idea exists that can be distinguished from the tools
its proponents recommend.
Eugenic concerns can be discerned by reference to views of the
normal. Implicit is a belief that a standard (or standards) of human
development exist against which to measure the race as a whole. This is
grounded in a naturalistic interpretation of evolution and modern
civilization's relationship to evolution. "Defective" is defined in
reference to the ideal racial stock, not in terms of deviations from the
average human.
In a study on genetic engineering, the English philosopher
Jonathan Glover raised the issue of distinguishing eugenics from the
emerging genetic techniques . 126 An advocate of selective usage of
genetic engineering, he attempted to distinguish his position from
eugenics. First, he set forth the common agenda: altering "the genetic
composition of future generations." He suggested three strategies.
The first was environmental—tax policy, health care, poverty relief.
Next was eugenics, which he defined as "aimed at altering breeding
practices or patterns of survival of people with different genes."
Finally was genetic engineering: "[the use of] enzymes to add to or
l 9Q
subtract from a stretch of DNA." He then presented the following
explanation of his approach:
The main reason for casting the discussion in terms of genetic
engineering rather than eugenics is not a practical one. Many
eugenic policies are open to fairly straightforward moral
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objections, which hide the deeper theoretical issues [of geneticintervention]. Such policies as compulsory sterilization,
compulsory abortion, compelling people to pair off in certain ways,
or compelling people to have more or fewer children than they would
otherwise have, are all open to objection on grounds of overriding
people s autonomy. Some are open to objection on grounds of damage
to the institution of the family. And the use of discriminatory
tax- and child-benefit policies is an intolerable step towards a
society of different genetic castes.
His objection to eugenics, however, was not absolute. He
supported genetic screening and counseling which "are eugenic because
part of their point is to reduce the incidence of severe genetic
abnormality to the population." ^ i Eugenics, it seems, is acceptable
when used against a disease: as therapy. He adopted genetic engineering
as his preferred tool to affect future genetics. He framed the approach
in familiar language: the negative/positive distinction employed by
eugenicists
.
His analysis raises several questions, the answers to which may
help narrow down the meaning of eugenics today. Glover lumped the three
categories together as possible means to his broader goal of genetic
influence. But are the three comparable? In order to make them so,
Glover defined eugenics as a technique: simply breeding strategies.
Within the context of genetic manipulation, eugenics was reduced to a
status equal to that of tax policy or engineering. This is, at best, a
problematic understanding of eugenics. First, Glover mischaracterized
the eugenic approach. His emphasis on compulsory strategies is typical
of the way many view eugenics. Unfortunately, this characterization
follows from the early eugenic policies and misses the shift wrought by
Osborn and Muller. Muller's endorsement of artificial insemination
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(AID) represented an approach to reproduction different from eugenicists
before him. His genetic strategy offered a more direct form of human
intervention than either the environmental strategies or those aimed at
marriage. The leap from AID to surrogate parenting, in vitro birth,
embryo fusion, or cloning is small compared to the leap from traditional
reproductive strategies. The leap of the former is one of difference
and the latter of kind. Muller provided a strategy that was of the same
genus as previous eugenicists but verged on a new species. If Muller
did not actually adopt the techniques of the genetic engineer, the
distinction between the two lacks a meaningful difference.
Thus, the developing strategy of eugenics, which on its face
supports Glover, has begun to make the wall between genetic engineering
techniques and eugenics "even more warped and twisted than I
expected." Aside from this shift within eugenics, Glover confused a
technique (engineering) with a theory or strategy (eugenics). To argue
that something is eugenic is to say that it seeks to affect genes in
light of a preconceived ideal (e.g., sociability, IQ, physique).
Eugenics brings with it the dual theoretical foundation of evolutionary
theory and idealized man. It seems consistent with the logic of
eugenics—especially in light of Osborn's desire to promote eugenic ends
without explicitly using eugenic means— to include the use of genetic
techniques. The essential test is the context of their usage, not the
tool itself. It follows that genetic engineering should not stand alone
as a discreet strategy but rather is a means used by others to achieve
broader goals.
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A distinction between eugenics and genetic engineering can be
drawn. It revolves around, on the one hand, seeking the ideal man or,
on the other, therapeutically correcting deviations from the average
man. Some genetic techniques may be used, if research progresses this
far, to cure spina bifida or Down's Syndrome. These interventions, at
the individual level, are not eugenic; they are within the tradition of
curative medicine. They seek to bring the individual up to the level of
the average or typical body. To qualify as eugenic, they would have to
be done for breeding purposes in an attempt to affect the norm.
Simplistically stated, the therapeutic approach works on an empirical
view of normality while the eugenic embodies a normative or idealized
understanding
.
This distinction becomes complex when one considers Osborn's
writings. His desire to move eugenics from the social level to the
individual proved shrewd. If Osborn succeeded, a therapeutic or
contraceptive technique or practice may appear individually benign, but
serve, in the aggregate, eugenic ends. Eugenics practice moves to the
therapeutic level. Consequently, looking at the appearance of an action
may not reveal its full nature. Thus enters the slippery slope.
Aware of this, Amatai Etzioni offered a classif icatory scheme
that may help clarify these issues. He divided the genetic intervention
as to purpose (therapeutic or breeding) and as to client (individual or
social service) . The second he modified to include voluntary or
coercive social service. (See Table 1.) Assuming Osborn succeeded in
forming a eugenically sensitive public opinion, it can be seen how
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Table l
Genetics in Politics
individual
Service
Therapeutic Goals
1. e.g., abort deformed
fetuses on demand
[intervening to
correct congenital
genetic defect]
Breeding Goals
3. e.g., AID, parents'
choice of donor features
Societal
Service
Voluntary
2 . e.g., encourage
people to abort a
deformed fetus
4. e.g., urge people to use
sperm from donors who
have high IQ's
Societal
Service
Coercive
[ 5
. ] e.g., require
genetic test before
marriage license is
issued
[6.] e.g., prohibit feeble-
minded persons from
marrying
Source: Amitai Etzioni, The Genetic Fix: The Next Technological
Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, Colophon Books, 1973), p. 104.
easily these categories collapse into eugenics. The extent to which
eugenic goals have infiltrated into the society should increase the
likelihood that individuals would employ genetic techniques and employ
them in ways that would encourage eugenic ends. For example, a
eugenically aware couple of average intelligence but with some history
of mental illness in their past would be more prone to AID than the non-
eugenically aware. Furthermore, among couples who employ AID, the
eugenically aware would be more likely to shift from individual service
to societal service and take the donor with a higher IQ. This is what
is meant by acting in a way to encourage eugenic ends. The belief that
all six cells could be motivated by eugenic ideals (and especially the
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that the participants are unaware of the eugenic background to
their decisions) is one issue that draws attention to these
practices
.
A more optimistic position presents therapeutic goals as
offering the possibility of a genetic policy but not in themselves
implementing eugenics. The genetic test as a condition for marriage
provides a good example. This would provide the genetic information a
eugenicist would want in order to determine to what extent the couple's
offspring would contribute to their generation's genetic health. The
couple would then act accordingly. On the other hand, the information
may be used by the couple to determine their chances of producing an
abnormal child and they may then act based on their willingness and
ability to financially and psychologically care for such a child. The
fact that this child would continue a line of "bad" genes becomes
irrelevant. Concern over the future gene pool is not the same as
concern over the social cost of care for the handicapped. The former is
eugenic; the latter is economic.
By thinking of Etzioni's chart as simply an analytical tool, it
may survive the complexities introduced by Osborn's strategy. Speaking
broadly, eugenics is more concerned with breeding than therapeutics.
Because it attempts to use therapeutics to achieve breeding goals does
not diminish the sense to which breeding is involved. Eugenics is also
most interested in societal service. Where Osborn promoted individual
choice, he meant what Etzioni called voluntary societal service
(although the individual in Osborn's society did not always know the
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social basis behind his actions). The tendencies of this chart are such
that the genetic engineering approach Glover tried to place next to
eugenics can easily fit in any of the the six cells while eugenics tends
towards 3, 4, and 6. The chart also places the types of therapeutic
genetic interventions as would be involved in "gene therapy" in separate
cells than eugenics: 1 or 2 as opposed to 3, 4 or 6.
In the abstract, a distinction can be drawn between eugenics and
genetic therapeutic techniques. That distinction resides, in large
part, in the difference between Etzioni's therapeutic and breeding
goals. It is one of intent. This does not, however, answer the de
facto /de jure issue. In practice, intent may be impossible to
determine. The issues become ambiguous. The ambiguity results from the
joining of purpose between eugenics and genetics. Genetics searches for
an understanding of how genes work and how they can be manipulated. The
assumed purpose of manipulation is the remedy of current genetic defects
and the prevention of future ones. This is eugenics' purpose except
that eugenics justifies itself in terms of the idealized race while
genetics is within the medical category of disease. This distinction
becomes important when the two conflict: correcting the immediate
genetic defect but not sterilizing the patient in order to prevent its
transmission to future generations. To conclude: actions that fall
within Breeding Goals should be considered de jure eugenics. On the
other hand, therapeutic actions that lack a long-term impact fall within
a different social category, that of disease.
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Both eugenics and genetics may fall under a broader category,
one that speaks to the needs of the society's dominant power centers.
This view is reflected in the writings of Jeremy Rifkin.135 while
maintaining the genetic dimension, he argued that eugenics also served
economic goals, as he (over)stated
:
The new eugenics is commercial, not social. In place of the shrill
eugenic cries for racial purity, the new commercial eugenics talks
in pragmatic terms of increased economic efficiency, better
performance standards, and improvement in the quality of life. The
old eugenics was steeped in political ideology and motivated by fear
and hate. The new eugenics is grounded in economic considerations
and stimulated by utilitarianism and financial gain. 136
Rifkin dismissed too quickly the social nature of eugenics' goals. What
he did capture was the extent to which eugenics sought to minimize
deviance and impediments to social control. Already mentioned is how
Osborn's standards stress the extent to which people should be well
adapted to the work demands of an industrial order. Muller promoted
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physical well-being, social feeling, and high intellect. Sanger
often justified her position with the economic language of efficiency
and utility. In sum, the eugenicists sought to ensure that society was
populated by individuals who efficiently fit their environment which was
the current culture and economy.
To summarize, eugenics is distinguished from other attempts to
influence characteristics by its reliance on an idealized norm.
Premised on Darwinian evolutionary theory eugenics added the society as
creator of ideal characteristics toward which evolution should be
"encouraged" to move. The primary strategy has been to influence
reproductive practices on an individual and voluntary basis. However,
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the rapid growth of genetic technologies offers means capable of
attacking the genes directly and must now be included in the eugenic
arsenal. With these tools, society may now assume the task of directing
nature and adapting nature to the demands of the political economy.
What is wrong with eugenics? Why do supporters of the new
biology try to distinguish their techniques from eugenics and the new
biology's critics wrap eugenics around it? An obvious answer is the
mistaken belief that eugenics is synonymous with its despised past. The
force of this concern is seen in the American Eugenics Society changing
its name to the Study of Social Biology in 1972. There is truth in this
issue, but the concerns run deeper.
Another part of the answer lies in what goes along with calling
something eugenic. Eugenics not only implies, but asserts, a political
dimension to science. It presents a framework that transcends the
science within which the research proceeds. This violates the norm of
objective science. Questions are not being asked just because they are
intellectually interesting. Nor is science separate from its
technological application.
Other problems remain. Eugenics is premised on the belief that
our civilization's problems can be lessened through biological means.
This tends toward a biological reductionism. Glover illustrates this
issue
:
It is less easy to sympathize with opposition to the principle of
changing our nature. Preserving the human race as it is will seem
an acceptable option to all those who can watch the news on
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television and feel satisfied with the world. It will appeal to
those who can talk to their children about the history of the
twentieth century without wishing they could leave some things
out
.
i:5y
Unless you support the parade of horribles marching across our evening
newscasts, you should support efforts to biologically change our nature
which in turn will improve our world. In other words, poverty, war, and
violence are located in genes. Galton would have approved.
From this perspective, it is easy to slide into a form of
technological imperative. As this approach takes hold, issues
increasingly will be defined in biological terms and focused on the
individual (e.g., genetic screening in the workplace). Ironically, if
the technological imperative progresses far enough, it would usurp
political prerogatives and undermine eugenics which, at its base, is
political. If this is true, the world of biotechnology^^ would grow
irrespective of eugenic needs. In that case, the justifications for
using technologies would adjust to match the new capabilities of
technology. An example may be abortion. Abortion long served the
narrow role of protecting a mother's life. As newer, safer, and easier
methods of abortion developed, and related technologies developed which
could lead one to want an abortion (e.g., contraception and
amniocentesis), pro-abortion forces sought to "enlarge the concept of
what is therapeutic" and redefine the nature of the fetus.
A
political rationale had to adjust to accomodate the changing practices
resulting from the greater capabilities of the technique. The result
was first the reform laws of the 1960's and later the Supreme Court
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decision. On the other hand, we could argue that the eugenic
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environment encouraged the development of these techniques resulting in
political (i.e., eugenic) considerations co-opting
scientific/technological developments. In either case, the issues are
seen in biological terms and this is a manifestation of the
technological and naturalistic bias whereby we look to science to solve
our problems.
Returning to eugenics' flaws, another one flows from eugenics'
own base: Darwinian evolution. Basing any political philosophy on
scientific theories is a precarious act. As has been discovered in the
nuclear power/weapons field, scientific theories and interpretations
change and these changes may undermine the political beliefs supporting
the use of that science. American eugenics matured under the wing of
Darwinian evolution modified by Mendelian genetics. Today, Darwin's
theory is fiercely debated. Stephen Jay Gould, for example, argues that
Darwin correctly identified natural selection as the mechanism of
evolution but misunderstood the process. Rather than being a process of
slow and gradual change (an important element supporting eugenics),
evolution is, in fact, a series of "big bangs" followed by centuries of
no evolutionary change. Rather than being a slowly evolving variation
of a species, we represent a branch of a species from which a part
became isolated and then adapted to its new environment, creating a new
species that remains unchanged until another splinter breaks away. If
this is true, then the premise of eugenics is undermined.
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Another premise of contemporary eugenics, deleterious mutations,
has also been challenged. According to Rif kin, some now argue that the
mutation load is a means to preserve the species, not, as Muller argued,
a threat to survival. This new argument claims that mutations are the
mechanism by which a species fine tunes its relationship to the
environment in order to preserve its nature. Mutations do not change
the evolutionary nature of the species, rather they allow adjustments to
small environmental changes. Regardless of the final outcome of this
debate (the gadflies still compose a distinct minority of natural
historians) it illustrates the precarious nature of scientific theories.
Because many political positions sustain themselves by custom and
acceptance, the undermining of their theoretical underpinnings may not
"trickle up" to political practice.
Another problem, and one more serious, is the idea of normality
underlying eugenics. Darwin's work embodied a standard: "best fit".
The eugenicists turned "best" into a normative position reflecting where
we should be rather than the empirical where we are. All eugenicists
argue that as a society we must establish standards as to what we want
as the "best fit". This becomes the idealized norm. (This does not
preclude a certain amount of deviation around the norm.) Osborn sought
to legitimate this process by democratically (in the free market sense)
choosing the characteristics and he succeeded in shifting the debate to
this procedural issue, as Etzioni illustrates.
At issue is a public policy which welcomes certain biological
features over others—e.g., energetic over lethargic qualities.
This is rather similar in nature to our call for limiting the
family
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size. Some are influenced by it, others ignore it.
. . . In short,
1 no longer saw a contradiction between a genetic policy and a
democratic society.
This resolves the problem if the fundamental question concerns the
nature of an authority and what it chooses. It is hard to argue against
democratic choice. But, this form of democracy also embodies a coercive
dimension. The danger of the idealized norm—and this also applies to
the therapeutic medical interventions— lies in our perception of those
who fall outside the norm. They face stigmatization; in the extreme, a
status less than human: a freak..
Drawing upon his research on the social status of freaks, Leslie
Fiedler raised some important concerns regarding normality which provide
an important perspective on eugenics and conclusion to the Chapter. He
characterized our relationship to freaks as an "image of the secret
self."^^ We looked upon them with fear and wonderment, bringing them
into our religion and then our entertainment (e.g., carnival sideshows).
Both confer a moment of legitimacy on them. The development of
technology allowed us to move into a third stage and "repair" freaks.
The Greeks portrayal of their gods in "idealized human form" raised
"normal ... to its highest power. Today, the norm is not
expressed in our gods, but in ourselves. In the past, the "secret self"
could be confined to religious belief, the sideshow of a carnival, or
the movie screen. Today we can exorcise it with the genetic scalpel.
The belief that we can remove our secret self denies humanity s
complexity. "It is especially important [argues Fiedler] for us to
realize that finally there are no normals at a moment when we are
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striving desperately to eliminate Freaks, to normalize the world." 147
Our uncomfortable wonderment of freaks involved a recognition that they
were a part of us; that others viewed us as freaks. Who has not lived
through the insecurities resulting from perceived inadequacies and
deformities? They often occur at night and are controlled as we age,
but few can eliminate them completely. 148 The issue becomes compounded
by the shifting understanding of normal. Few wanted to be Black in the
1950's. Today, those who, in the 1950's, wore their whiteness proudly
look for Indian blood. The big busts of the 1960's (real or artificial)
gave way to the liberated bust of the 1970's. If they were alive today,
how would those "repaired" by sterilization early in the century feel
about our current view of normality?
Forgetting our self begets a dangerous kind of politics, as
Fiedler appropriately warned:
And I sympathize with [the dwarf's] stand [against being seen as
abnormal], insofar as the war against "abnormality" implies a
dangerous kind of politics which begins with a fear of difference
and eventuates in a tyranny of the normal. That tyranny, moreover,
is sustained by creating in those outside the norm shame and self-
hatred
—
particularly if they happen to suffer from that vast
majority of "deformities" which we still cannot prevent or cure.
And this is what Osborn sought to do. His campaign to turn public
opinion into a force to direct marriages along eugenic lines would
create the subtle force in society that leaves as illegitimate those
unfortunates who do not measure up to the ideal and damns those who do
not try.
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CHAPTER II
STERILIZATION
One of the eugenicist's strategies was to promote sterilization
policies. The last chapter noted that this strategy failed.
Sterilization, however, has continued. At present, most sterilizations
are for contraceptive purposes and are performed routinely without
controversy. As a technique, however, it remains embroiled in
controversy. Needless to say, those writing on the subject (especially,
but not exclusively, the critics) are quick, to recall its eugenic past;
the technique's defenders distinguish their support from the
eugenicists. The following recounts many of the complaints and explores
the contemporary basis for the controversy: is it eugenics revisited or
some other dimension of politics?
Historical Review
Sterilization is not a new technique to power: its cruder form,
castration, was used earlier in Europe as a penalty for rape. But these
were exceptional practices. Castration's extraordinary nature made it
awkward to use as a technique of general policy. Not until 1894 when a
Swede performed the first vasectomy and 1897 when a Swiss doctor
performed the first sterilization of a woman through the abdomen did a
technique offering a more precise means to control reproduction become
available. In 1899 an Indiana doctor named Harry Sharp performed the
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first eugenic sterilization in America.^- Some eugenicists, as was noted
in the last chapter, had grand plans for sterilization. They hoped to
sexually "kill" those who represented a biological threat to others.
The eugenicists' legislative strategy achieved their first
success in Pennsylvania in 1905. The governor, however, vetoed the bill
allowing Indiana, in 1907, the dubious honor of being the first state
with a eugenic sterilization law on its books. Table 2 presents a
chronology of early state laws. Those laws passed before World War I
tended to be punitive and loosely written. After World War I, the state
legislatures paid closer attention to procedural due process safeguards
and avoided the punitive dimension that had been disallowed by the
courts as cruel and unusual punishment.
The justifications employed by sterilization's proponents ranged
from individual freedom to protecting the state. Gosney and Popenoe
stressed the therapeutic rather than punitive nature of sterilization.
Sterilization "is a protection to the subject, to his family, to the
2
state, and to future generations." In their review of sterilization in
California, Gosney and Popenoe tried to present sterilization as a
moderate and responsible policy. They stressed that it was "merely an
adjunct to supervision of the defective or diseased."*^ They limited its
use to those whose mental disease or defect was a menace to the state;
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Table 2
Sterilization Laws
Year State
1907 Indiana
1909 California
Connecticut
Washington
1911 Iowa
New Jersey
1912 Nevada
New York
1913 Kansas
Michigan
North Dakota
Wisconsin
1915 Nebraska
1917 New Hampshire
Oregon
South Dakota
1919 Alabama
North Carolina
1923 Delaware
Montana
1924 Virginia
1925 Idaho
Maine
Minnesota
Utah
1928 Mississippi
1929 Arizona
West Virginia
1931 Oklahoma
Vermont
Source: Mark Haller, Eugenics: Hereditarian
Attitudes in American Thought (New Brunswick, N.J.
Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp. 133-137.
where the condition is perpetuated by heredity; and where sterilization
was the best means available to deal with all or part of the condition.^
Sterilization, although defended as a means to protect the
individual, actually was used to advance the states' interests.
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Sterilization's proponents were determined to define acceptable genetic
characteristics. For example, they argued that "no one [had] any right
to carry the gene of Huntington s chorea or hemophelia into another
family.
The negation of individual rights found even stronger support in
George Mangold, Head of the St. Louis School of Social Economics. He
"was angered by the appeal to 'individual liberty' as an objection to
eugenic measures. The price of such tender concern for the rights of
individuals, he warned, would be 'racial deterioration, stupid
citizenship and social disintegration. ® Thus Mangold linked together
all possible justifications: race, polity, and society.
Gosney and Popenoe continued the social theme. In a chapter
entitled "Sterilization For Eugenic Reasons"'7 they included three
subsections: "Cutting off Bad Heredity";® "Cutting off Carriers of
Defects";^ and "Cutting off Underprivileged Children."^ The first two
fit easily into the eugenic logic, but the third can only be explained
as a social goal. Under this heading sterilization is employed to
prevent the mentally deficient parent from raising children out of a
fear that the child "could not expect to have normal, healthy, happy
11 12lives." This applies even if the condition is not inherited. An
epileptic parent, for example, fell under this category. Sterilization
13
is the most cost effective means to handle these cases.
To summarize, the early sterilization movement purported to seek
the reduction of mental disease for biological purposes, but in fact it
also served the interest of the state and economic and social reformers.
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The movement was, however, more rhetoric than action. With the
exception of California and North Carolina, few states vigorously
exploited their sterilization authority. Even though most states did
not repeal the laws, sterilization became disgraced as a policy tool
along with the eugenics movement. What this controversy demonstrated,
however
,
was that the eugenics movement was more than an attempt to
apply science for the betterment of society; it also rested upon a
vision of the social order premised on a view of the normal.
Contemporary Sterilization Practices
Despite carrying the onus of eugenics, sterilization did not die
out as a practice. Voluntary sterilization has been a long standing
method of contraception and in recent years has become the most common
method of contraception.^
The rejection of the coercive eugenic approach has not abated
controversy over sterilization. The practice has been surrounded by
persistent debate centering around the issue of voluntary consent.
Principally, it involves three groups in society: women, those on
welfare, and the mentally ill.
Welfare, Women, and Coerced Sterilization
Reviewing sterilization practices and alleged abuses in the
modern context illustrates the difficulty of identifying eugenics after
Osborn. His theory was to make its practice as hidden as possible and
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rarely, if ever, under the name eugenics. Osborn's agenda included
issues only indirectly related to genetics, further complicating the
issue
.
Another complication is the extent to which sterilization has
become an accepted form of contraception. While controversial in some
cases, sterilization is a widely accepted technique and thus its
practice may represent nothing more controversial than extending the
best available technique to those unable to afford it on their own. If
this is eugenics, and it is not clear that it is, it is not the hard-
line practiced in the early twentieth century.
There is no shortage of allegations of abusive practices
inflicted on women and, in particular, women on welfare. Abuse has been
called "systematic and widespread." 16 The following will review the
nature of these alleged abuses and attempts to respond to the
allegations. Following this discussion, data will be examined in order
to evaluate the allegations.
The evidence supporting charges of abuse is circumstantial and
anecdotal. Many of the abuses are thought to result from the private
agenda of doctors and carried out within the context of the special
doctor-patient relationship. Suspicions about doctors' attitudes has
received some empirical support. In a survey of 105 doctors in an urban
southeastern United States community (80% of the local doctor
population) the doctors characterized those on public support as
insufficiently "reliable," "intelligent," or "motivated" to use oral
contraceptives. 16 The public patient was seen as "a person with limited
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education, who may not even be able to count, let alone sustain the
motivation for contraception over a long time." (The average education
of the woman on public support was ten years. 17
) As a consequence, the
doctors recommended the pill for 73% of their private patients, IUD for
15%, and sterilization for only 6%. In contrast, for only 24% of the
public patients was the pill preferred while the IUD was method of
choice for 58% of the public patients and sterilization for 14%. When
queried on their treatment of AFDC recipients who had at least three
illegitimate children, 40% believed contraception should be mandatory
(49% said voluntary) and among those recommending sterilization, 46%
desired compulsory (51% voluntary). Fifty-eight percent supported
withholding public assistance for additional children.^ "Compulsory
sterilization or the withholding of public support for additional
children was favored by 77%. " This was highest among those doctors born
south of the Mason-Dixon line (80% as compared to 47% from other
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regions)
.
Many opportunities occur during common medical practices for the
doctors to act on these beliefs. The best opportunities exist during
labor, the postpartum period, while the woman is sedated, or during an
abortion. 21 Other allegations include doctors refusing to perform
abortions unless they are able to sterilize the woman as well. Known
abuses include threatening the withdrawl of welfare benefits; failure to
inform the patient of alternative forms of birth control; not asking for
consent in the person's native language; or conditioning medical
22
services, welfare, or employment on becoming sterilized.
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But even granting the existence of these occurrences, it is not
clear that they were legally coercive or illegitimate. The case of Dr.
23Pierce illustrates the difficulty of such labels. Dr. Pierce was one
of three obstetricians in Aiken County, South Carolina, but he was the
only one taking on new patients. In 1972, Virgil Walker consulted him
for delivery of her fourth child. She relied on Medicaid to pay her
medical expenses. Pierce informed her that his policy was not to
deliver the third child of those unable to pay their own bills without
also sterilizing them. If she did not consent to this, she would have
to find a new doctor. This was a longstanding policy on Pierce's part.
Walker twice resisted his demand but finally consented, believing that
her further protests would be futile. By the time she was sterilized,
she had signed three consent forms.
A divided Fourth Circuit court did not find this to be coercive.
Decided in 1977 and announced by Senior Circuit Judge Bryan, the court
concluded that because Pierce had previously made known his position, he
could not be held in violation of any laws. Citing her signature on
three consent forms, the court concluded that "[a]t no time [was Dr.
0 /
Pierce] shown to have forced his view upon any mother;" this despite
25
her having twice refused to consent out of a desire to remain fertile.
Dissenting, Judge Butzner agreed that Pierce should be left
unrestricted on medical issues, but Butzner contended that Pierce's
motives were economic and social, not medical. This is the pivotal
issue. Doctors participating in the Medicaid program serve as the
representatives of the program but are to be left alone on medical
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issues. Thus if Pierce was acting on his professional judgment, he was
within his proper realm. However, if the actions represented social or
political values, then he fell under the color of state law and
abandoned the special position granted doctors. As evidence to support
his argument, Butzner related that Pierce had told one of the plaintiffs
(Brown) that his tax dollars paid for her to have children and that he
was tired of supporting them. 26 As a matter of policy, Pierce made no
sterilization demands on those privately paying for his services.
Butzner argued that this supported the claim that Pierce's policy
derived from economic rather than medical concerns. 22 The plaintiff
Brown had received no pressure from Pierce until he discovered that she
was not paying privately. Pierce then requested her consent for a
sterilization, she refused and he immediately released her from the
90
hospital . “°
Butzner also contended that Pierce was an integral part of a
government program, and thus fell under the color of state law. As a
matter of policy, Medicaid doctors interact with the patient unimpeded.
This freedom, contended, Butzner, anointed the doctors with an
administrative role. (The fact that Pierce based his policy on economic
considerations underlined the administrative character of his
position. 2^) Previously, Pierce had accepted $60,000 in Medicaid funds
30
(thus his involvement had not been minor) and had freely chosen to
accept medicaid patients. State law prohibited any coercive
sterilization. In other words, Butzner refused to draw a clear
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distinction between private practice and the public program. He wanted
to convict Pierce.
This case illustrates the difficulty of generalizing on these
issues. Pierce (or his policy) pressured the patient, but not so much
as to coerce, in a legal sense. A decentralized and somewhat ambiguous
program allowed protections against coerced sterilization to be defined
out of the case. The dissenter would have this be a case of
government ally coerced sterilization; the majority defined it as a
matter of private choice.
Less ambiguous public attempts have been made to sterilize those
on welfare. The efforts to tie sterilization to welfare have been
persistent. Julius Paul documents a sordid history of efforts along
these lines. He identified twelve states that in the 1960's expressed
"various degrees of interest in punitive sterilization."-^ Again none
of the proposals passed. Virginia and North Carolina, after attempts at
coercive legislation failed, passed voluntary sterilization laws in 1962
and 1963, respectively. Several states had one house pass a law only to
have it defeated in the other. Paul argued that these efforts
represented the beginning of the modern eugenics where eugenic and
economic goals merge:
Whereas the earlier eugenic efforts were aimed at cutting off the
'defective germ plasm' of the American population before it
'drowned' us, current efforts would be aimed at cutting off both the
defective germ plasm and welfare p^^ments in order to avoid economic
strangulation of the public purse.
In 1973, four states considered laws that would have linked
sterilization to the reception of AFDC benefits. In New Hampshire,
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legislation proposed a $1000 incentive to welfare recipients who
successfully applied to the welfare office for sterilization. The bill
was eventually killed. 33 in Tennessee a bill was introduced to deny
welfare payments to any female who became a mother of more than two
illegitimate children unless she submitted to sterilization. If she
refused, any further children would be considered orphans. This
received a favorable report from committee but died at adjournment. 3^
Two bills were proposed in Ohio. One would deny AFDC funds to those
with two or more illegitimate children. The other would sterilize any
father who failed to support his minor children. 33 Neither bill
received action. Finally, a legislator in Illinois introduced
legislation offering free sterilization and a $100 incentive to couples
who fulfilled certain residency, income, and family considerations. The
bill, after receiving an unfavorable committee report, died in the
O £
legislature. On the other hand, in 1974 Massachusetts passed a law
which prohibited tying sterilization to welfare benefits. The failure
of the bills seeking coercive sterilization bespeaks of an official
reluctance to employ coercive sterilization. It cannot be ignored that
the only one to pass prohibited coercion.
Relf v. Weinberger: The Federal Government Responds
The allegation of abuses reached a head with the federal
18
government in the 1973 case of the Relf sisters. Over the previous
four years
,
the federal government had been working on sterilization
regulations. 39 The Relf case resulted from the sterilizing of two black
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sisters Minnie (fourteen) and Mary (twelve and retarded) Relf. The
sterilization occurred at an 0E0 funded agency, the Montgomery County
(Alabama) Community Action Agency, on June 14, 1973. AFDC funds were
involved. The Relfs alleged that they were coerced into being
sterilized; the agency reported that their mother consented by marking
an "X" on a consent form.
In response to the publicity accompanying the sisters'
sterilization, HEW issued regulations to prevent further abuses in
federally funded programs. These regulations provided for written
consent, a review board for those under 18 years old, legally
incompetent minors must be given the above protections and in addition
the approval of a state court of competent jurisdiction, and, finally,
sterilization of mental incompetents of all ages receive approval of the
review board and a court, but they do not need to personally consent
—
the consent of their representative was considered suf f icient . ^ while
these regulations provided an improvement over the previous condition,
they were challenged in court by the National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO). The case was consolidated with that of Katie Relf,
the two sisters' mother.
NWRO challenged the regulations as inadequately protecting women
from pressure to be sterilized in order to maintain their welfare
benefits. The court found that "uncontroverted evidence [existed] in
the record that minors and other incompetents have been sterilized with
federal funds and that an indefinite number of poor people have been
improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation under the
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threat that various federally supported welfare benefits would be
withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible sterilization ."^ 1 The
court determined that the legislation establishing the relevant programs
required voluntary consent. The court proceeded to investigate as to
whether or not HEW's regulations assured voluntarism.
The court placed the issues into the context of reproductive
privacy
:
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the right of privacy
entails the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. . . .
Involuntary sterilizations directly threaten that right.
^
Within this context, "sterilizations are permissible only with the
voluntary, knowing and uncoerced consent of individuals competent to
give such consent." J In the absence of specific statutory guidance,
the court defined voluntary to mean the uncoerced exercise of free will
based upon information necessary to reach a decision by people of
sufficient mental competence to appreciate the significance of the
information.^^ Under this definition, the mentally incompetent is
unable to consent and the guardian should not be allowed to consent on
the incompetent's behalf This differs from the accepted practice of
a guardian consenting to surgery for an incompetent. The difference
between the procedures lay in sterilization's nature and permanence.
In regard to welfare abuses, the court ruled that the
regulations inadequately protected the woman. New regulations must
provide at the outset for the oral notification that no federal
benefits can be withdrawn because of a failure to accept
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sterilization."^ 6 This notification must also be displayed on the
consent form. The court also addressed sterilization's constitutional
status, concluding that sterilization of the mentally incompetent or
coerced welfare recipient constituted involuntary sterilization which
"invades rather than compliments the right to procreate."^ 7
In sum, the court concluded that HEW's procedures to assure
voluntary consent were adequate with two exceptions. First that the
mentally incompetent could not voluntarily consent and second that the
regulations inadequately protected against welfare abuses. Both of
these exceptions are important to the politics of sterilization.
Determining who can voluntarily grant consent became a central point of
contention in cases arising late in the 197CTs and into the 1980's. In
part this concern reflects sensitivity to the eugenic legacy haunting
sterilization. As the Relf court recognized, if one demands
voluntarism, consent cannot be granted in the case of the mentally
defective. Thus the difficult task of the defenders of sterilization of
the mentally defective is to finesse this dilemma and the Relf ruling.
The significance of the finding of welfare abuse points up the
social (welfare) side of sterilization. It should warn the government
that sterilization, even when it is not being used as a systematic and
coercive policy tool, is subject to abuse and must be monitored with
great care. On this point, the court warned:
The dividing line between family planning and eugenics is murky.
And yet the Secretary [of HEW], through the regulations at issue,
seeks to sanction one of the most drastic methods of population
control— the involuntary irreversible sterilization of men and
women. . . . Whatever might be the merits of limiting irresponsible
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reproduction ... it is for Congress and not individual social
workers and physicians to determine the manner in which federal
funds should be used to support such a program. We should not drift
into a policy which has unfathomed implications and which
permanently deprives unwilling or immature citizens of their ability
to procreate. °
Reflecting on the evidence so far, no apparent policy exists
promoting sterilization for eugenic purposes. On the contrary, the
government has acted to prevent abuse. On the other hand, these cases
of abuse, while not being systematic, are also not isolated. Their
location, in the medical community and welfare programs, provides a
structure that supports and hides their practice. Those who recommend
it as a means of birth control must recognize that legitimating it at
that level carries with it the real possibility of hidden abuse.
Although eugenics may not be at issue, sterilization remains
controversial for other reasons. Empirical studies have focused on two
concerns. One centers on discrimination, the other on contraception.
Illustrating the first position, a Note in the DePaul Law Review
presented the following indicators. The percentage of Black women
sterilized is almost three times that of white (32.5% to 11.6%); Black
and Latin American women's sterilization rate is almost two-thirds
higher than white women; non-white welfare recipients are twice as
likely to "elect" sterilization than are white welfare recipients;
welfare recipients (regardless of race) are twice as likely as non-
recipients to be sterilized To examine these contentions and the
relative merits of the contraception view of sterilization two sets of
data will be examined. The first is a survey by the National Center for
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Health Statistics (Tables 3-6) and the second is a National Survey of
Family Growth (Table 7).
Table 3
Choice of Contraceptive Method Among Currently Married Women
15-44 years old, 1973, 1976, 1982 (in percent)
Black Female White Female All Rac
1973
Sterilized 13.6 8.2 8.6
IUD 7.6 6 .
6
6.7
Pill 26.3 25.1 25.1
Diaphram 1.2 2.5 2.4
1976
Sterilized 10.9 9.6 9.5
IUD 6.2 6.3 6.3
Pill 22.2 22.6 22.5
Diaphram 1.8 3.0 2.9
1982
Sterilized 21.0 17.0 17.4
IUD 5.9 4.8 4.8
Pill 15.6 13.4 13.5
Diaphram 3.3 4.7 4.5
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Advancedata
(December 12, 1984) :3.
Examining first the data collected by NCHS, one finds reasonably
consistent evidence supporting the contraception explanation. The NCHS
data, however, contain a significant limitation. Based on surveys, most
of the studies are restricted to married women. By excluding single
women and thus also underrepresenting minorities, both prime targets for
the alleged abuses, the surveys build in a bias against the eugenic and
anti-welfare explanations. Nonetheless, this body of data is the best
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data base available and offers important information. It also Includes
one study including single women.
Based upon the NCHS data, sterilization is best explained by age
and parity (the number of live births)—both indicators of
contraception. Table 3 portrays a decade long movement away from the
pill toward sterilization. During this period, the change was most
pronounced among white women. The increased popularity of sterilization
among this group accounts for it becoming the most common form of
Table 4
Percent of Women 15-44 Years of Age Cont raceptively Sterile
Marital Status
and Parity Contraceptively Sterile
All women 17.4%
Parity 0
Parity >1
Never married
1.4
29.2
All parities
Parity 0
1.3
Parity >1
Currently married
7.9
All Parities 27.8
Parity 0
Parity >1
Formerly married
33.0
All parities
Parity 0
19.9
Parity >1 23.2
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Advancedata
(February 11, 1985):2.
Ill
birth control. Table 4 re-enforces the contraception explanation.
Those most likely to be sterilized are those married with at least two
live births. They have their family and no longer feel the need to
remain fecund. Breaking this data down by age confirms that increased
family size and age are central to explaining sterilization.
Nonsurgical contraception among the 30-44 years old group is 28.1% while
the comparable rate among the 15-29 years old is 43.2%. Sterilization,
on the other hand, ranges from 3.7% among the younger women to 22.6%
among their elders. Among the currently married, the 35-44 age group
weighs in with a 42.3% sterilization rate in 1982 compared to a 27.6%
rate in 1976. These figures are consistent with the contraception
explanation
.
Table 5
Choice of Contraception Among All Women 15-44 Years Old, 1982 (in
percent
)
Sterilized IUD Pill Diaphrara
Black Female 14.2 4.7 19.8 1.8
Black Male 0.7 — — —
White Female 11.6 3.8 15.1 5.0
White Male 6.7 — — —
All Blacks 15.0 — — —
All Whites 18.4 — — —
All Races 17.9 3.9 15.5 4.5
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Advancedata , no. 102
(December 12, 1984) :2.
On issues of race and welfare, the data fail to support
arguments of gross abuse. Tables 3 and 5 point to the greater power
of
contraception over race as explanatory variables. While some race
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differences exist they are not large. The races differ over the method
chosen and, generally, the blacks choose the most effective means (even
though, as a group, they are less likely to use contraception). 51 Table
6 offers the closest to direct support for welfare abuse. Two
qualifications, however, limit the significance of the findings. First,
the differences among the income levels are not large and, second, the
change in rate of sterilization from high to low income women is
greatest among the whites. The second point indicates that if these
findings reflect abuse it is directed at factors related to income, not
race
.
Table 6
Contraception by Income and Race Among Currently Married Women 15-44
years of Age (in percent)
Percent of Whites Blacks
poverty level Sterile Sterile
<100 18.9 26.6
100-149 19.0 25.9
150-199 13.1 24.0
200+ 10.0 20.3
Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National
Center for Health Statistics, 25 Monthly Vital Statistics Report 3
(October 4, 1976):14,16.
Further support for the contraception interpretation, but also
support for welfare biases, is found in a study by Thomas Shapiro. His
study drew from a 1976 National Survey of Family Growth. The sample
interviewed included women married, divorced, separated, widowed,
single, and living with their own children. Single women without
children were not included. Table 7 summarizes his findings. Again,
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race does not stand out as an explanation but welfare achieves a level
of significance absent in the NCHS data.
Table 7
Sterilization Rates (per 1,000) by Race and Welfare Status
Race Welfare Status
Minority White Recipient Nonrecipient
Number of live births
0 6 4 —
1 3 19 11 16
2 77 128 125 115
3 185 183 260 173
4+ 307 303 433 274
Race
White — — 220 130
Minority — — 160 130
Poverty status
<150% poverty 150 181 203 166
>150% poverty 86 96 133 120
Welfare status
Recipient 160 220 — —
Nonrecipient 110 130 — —
Age
15-24 25 27 42 43
25-34 128 117 224 125
>35 192 166 371 161
Source: Thomas Shapiro, Population Control Politics: Women,
Sterilization and Reproductive Choice (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1985), p. 98.
Interpreting the significance of these findings is more
difficult than identifying the pattern. Consistent with the NCHS,
Shapiro's data present a rapid increase in sterilization as the number
of births increase. It also presents large increases among welfare
recipients. As a matter of official policy, the government through its
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welfare program does not advocate sterilization. The data in Table 7,
however, cannot be explained simply as displaying a greater desire to
become sterilized. Shapiro presents other evidence isolating welfare as
a significant variable. He found welfare recipients planned to be
sterilized at a rate 38% greater than nonrecipients. They actually
became sterilized, however, at a 91% higher rate. 53 Some factor other
than voluntary contraception must be present. A reasonable inference is
that while no systematic effort to coerce the welfare/poor into
sterilization exists, greater pressure is often brought to bear on them
than nonrecipients. The data presented above is what one would expect
if the cases of Dr. Pierce and the Relf sisters fall into a gray zone
between isolated incidents and government policy. One can imagine
social workers or Medicaid doctors pushing for the most effective means
of contraception. Given that sterilization has gained in popularity
among the population as a whole and is clearly the preferred means of
fertility control among those desiring an end to fertility, recommending
it to clients need not appear to the counselor to be coercion or
irresponsible. In fact, it would be natural because it fits so well
into the contraception environment. Thus, as sterilization gains
acceptance within the mainstream of the American population, care must
be taken to ensure that its new found legitimacy does not carry over to
less acceptable policy agendas.
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Sterilization and the Workplace
While most attention has centered on public misuse of
sterilization, it has also been the center of controversy in the private
sector. On October 9, 1979, OSHA issued a citation against American
Cyanamid Corporation. At issue was the company's policy of removing
fertile women from jobs where they would be exposed to dangerous levels
of toxic substances (Female Protection Policy). OSHA believed this
amounted to forced sterilization and violated the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970. At issue was a policy shared by the major
chemical producers: Dow, Monsanto, DuPont, General Motors, Allied
Chemical, Bunker Hill Smelting Co., St. Joseph Zinc Co., Eastman Kodak,
and Firestone Tire and Rubber.
The company appealed the ruling and in Secretary of Labor v.
American Cyanamid Corporation -^ an administrative court rejected OSHA's
action. The court concluded that the Female Protection Policy fell
outside OSHA's regulatory authority. The judge argued that Congress
intended the agency to protect the worker against injury or ill-health
resulting from the work-place and in this case, neither the work process
nor work material altered the physical integrity of the employees.
Granted, the policy had an effect on the workers' decisions to be
surgically sterilized, but the court concluded the influence was
indirect. The direct causes were social and economic (and a desire, to
keep the job) and consequently outside the company's control. But in
fact the choice the company offered, job or surgical sterilization, is
comparable to the choice between job and exposure to sterilizing
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chemicals, which the Act covers. The company countered by noting that
they offered other employment, comparable in pay but not necessarily
comparable in quality. At present, the company has disbanded the policy
and the other companies cited in the case claim they do not require
sterilization.
Temporary Sterilization
Advances by science have expanded contraceptive options and
simultaneously widened the sterilization debate. Most notable has been
the increasing use of the drug Depo-provero . A form of contraception
where an occasional injection provides protection, this drug (along with
new chemical castrations) has raised concerns among feminists. One of
the major objections against traditional sterilization procedures was
its permanence. This objection can now be overcome without the
inconveniences of a daily pill. Unfortunately, the health side effects
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may be problematic, specifically some have questioned the chances of
pregnancy after ceasing to use the drug.
Of greater policy concern is the early signs that judges may
find the flexibility of these drugs useful in sentencing. Following the
pattern of earlier public practices involving sterilization, these
judicial practices are few and exceptional. A federal court in Georgia
did not specifically endorse sterilization but reacted to a conviction
for stealing by sentencing a woman to five years probation on the
condition that she "not birth any additional children. That was in
1979. Since then, a few judges have moved directly into the
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sterilization/Depo-provero controversy. In 1983, a South Carolina judge
sentenced a rapist to a thirty year minimum sentence or the option of
castration. Inititially, the judge preferred physical castration but
later relented and accepted chemical castration. 57 Joseph Frank Smith
of San Antonio, Texas, was the first to receive Depo—provero in a rape
case as part of a condition for a ten year probation. At The Johns
Hopkins University, one hundred—fifty men are currently undergoing
experimental court ordered therapy involving Depo-provero and
58counseling. Depo-provero is used to control the sex drive.
If these remain isolated practices, there will be little cause
for concern. These practices have, however, been the subject of debate.
In 1971, Nicholas Kittrie identified this movement as the "therapeutic
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state." This state "divests" certain practices from the normal
workings of the criminal justice system:
This process of divestment has not been motivated, on the whole, by
societal willingness to begin tolerating the conduct or condition
previously designated as criminal. Instead, divestment has most
frequently indicated a shift from criminal sanctions to a different
system of social controls. Thus divestment, carried out in the name
of the new social emphasis upon therapy, rehabilitation, and
prevention—as contrasted with criminal law's emphasis upon
retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence—has produced new types
of borderland proceedings and sanctions, lodged between the civil
and criminal law.*5 *5
At its heart, divestment denies individual responsibility. It
"suggest[s] that external conditions, while contributing to criminal
developments, are not controlling, but that an inner imbalance is a
prerequisite to crime.
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The therapeutic state moves from criminal to therapeutic; it
transforms legal issues into medical. Kittrie places science at the
foundation of this state. "It speaks not in terms of moral judgment
. . . but in concepts reputed to be descriptive and scientific
("mentally ill," "socially delinquent," "psychopathic," etc .)." 62 The
scientific basis ensures that our understanding of events will be
technical and descriptive because the issues behind those terms will be
treated in a scientific manner, in this case through the science of
medicine, and moral categories will not only fail to describe the
issues, but mislead the society as to the meaning of the issues.
Calling someone "good" or "evil" carries with it a different
understanding of how to deal with him than calling him "psychopathic."
In other words, the misnomer would result in practices either irrelevant
to, but probably inimical to, a proper and successful handling of the
person's problems. Neither the "criminal" nor society would be any
better off.
If punishment plays a lessened role, what then is the goal of
this system? According to Kittrie, it is "tinged with a lingering
desire to defend society by isolating and controlling socially dangerous
persons ." 63 Against this background, the Depo-provero programs and
sentencing option make perfect sense. Rape enters the therapeutic state
when defined as an abnormal sex drive (the language, not coincidentally,
is the same as Sanger's). Those committing the act cannot be held
personally responsible and the state's interest lies in correcting their
defects. Through a chemical treatment, their problem, and therefore
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their threat to society, can be controlled. Two problems with this
approach can be raised. One criticizes the releasing of those who
commit violent acts. If they are the animals that the act implies why
are we safe when they are released? The answer is that they are not
necessarily violent. Their violence stems from a chemical imbalance or
psychological disturbance. The other objection, more abstract than the
first, criticizes locating the corrective measures in the body. It is
as if we returned to the medieval practice of mutilation. This
criticism is met by the retort that the body is the appropriate target
because it is where the problem is located.
To date, the use of permanent or temporary sterilization in the
criminal justice system has been an exceptional practice. The
technology necessary for it, under the political framework suggested by
Kittrie, is now being developed. It remains an area worth watching in
the future and is quite possibly the next area of controversy involving
sterilization .64
Sterilization
,
The Courts, and Mental Incompetency
One area where the issues of the therapeutic state have long
been a subject of open debate is the sterilization of the mentally
incompetent. These practices are the direct descendents of eugenic
sterilization. The issues discussed in the previous sections question
the extension of eugenics to social welfare and the extent to which
abusive practices occur. Sterilization and mental illness, on the other
hand, has a long history of known abuse.
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The contemporary battleground has been the courts. Two cases by
the United States Supreme Court have set many of the issues, but most
cases remain in state courts and occasionally in the lower federal
courts. The issues have ranged from legal arguments over jurisdiction
to extending constitutional rights.
The first significant case on sterilization was Buck v. Bell . 65
Previous to this case, lower courts explored sterilization's
constitutionality against due process and cruel and unusual punishment
charges, but Buck is the case from which the current lineage descends.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes defended a Virginia
statute against procedural and substantive due process and equal
protection challenges. His opinion remains "good law," although it
ranks among the most disgraceful of the Court's pronouncements. Holmes'
defense of the law against procedural due process and equal protection
claims has remained relatively intact. It is his foray into the
substance of sterilization policy that continues to draw criticism.
The contested Virginia law allowed for sterilization of inmates
of state institutions for the mentally impaired after a special board of
directors approved a written request from the superintendent of the
institution. The inmate received notice, a guardian to defend her
interests, and an opportunity to attend the hearing. All evidence was
in writing and the proceedings subject to judicial appeal. Holmes
concluded that these procedures "most carefully considered" the rights
of the patient.
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The statute found sterilization to be in the interests of the
patient and welfare of society. The law presumed that the mental
deficiencies were based in heredity but "if [the inmate was rendered]
incapable of procreating [he or she] might be discharged with safety and
become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and society
The principal attack on the statute and the thrust of Holmes'
short opinion dealt with these substantive conclusions. Holmes wrote:
In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the
specific findings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of
law that the grounds do not exist and if they exist they justify the
result .6®
Given the politics of the Court in 1927, this was the liberal and
prudent response. While a conservative majority used the due process
clauses of the Constitution to render void state and national economic
legislation, Holmes deferred to legislative judgment if he believed a
(S9
reasonable man would uphold the legislation's reasonableness.
Despite his restrained finding, Holmes' dicta journeyed into
substantive issues. He made two claims for sterilization: social need
and social obligation. Under social need, Holmes placed society's right
to protect itself against the "menace of incompetency." "It is better
for all the world [Holmes wrote], if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind." Then, in the most infamous line in the opinion,
Holmes extended the argument by implying that heredity was at the root
of these problems: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
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Having accepted the eugenic claim of heredity, Holmes was able
to join sterilization and social obligation. Because the individual may
be a threat to the public welfare and the threat results from a flaw in
the individual's nature, then the society's right to preserve the social
welfare at the expense of the individual's freedom justifies imposing
sterilization on mental incompetents. Afterall, society asks people to
die for their country, can anyone argue that sterilization constitutes a
greater deprivation of liberty? When the state finds an important
social interest at stake, the individual's social obligations extend to
allowing the state to act on his/her body. In Holmes' words:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices. . . . The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes.
^
One must ask whether the social costs of "imbecility" are comparable to
7 2
those of war or even those of communicable disease (small pox). By
failing to require a demanding standard of proof that a serious social
threat existed and that sterilization was the only realistic remedy,
Holmes left the impression that a legislature need only find bodily
intrusions to be a reasonable policy in order to mandate sterilization.
Holmes legitimated sterilization but with two significant
qualifications. He deferred to legislative judgment and required
procedural safeguards. While Holme's embrace of eugenics taints the
case, his procedural arguments continue to dominate the issue and in
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fact have been made more stringent. Recent courts, however, have not
shared his deference to legislatures.
Since Holmes wrote, two significant changes in the issues as
defined by the courts have changed the debate. First, judges have
distanced themselves from eugenics. Holmes' reasonable man could uphold
the Virginia statute because of the eugenic rationale. Now the courts
focus on the well-being of the patient. The issue of defining and
obtaining voluntary consent has become the central issue while Holmes
disposed of the patient's right through the due process finding.
The second, and most complicating, development is the
introduction of the politics of rights. By placing sterilization within
the context of fundamental rights, the stakes of the debate are raised
and the issues become more complicated. This development can be traced
7 3
to Skinner v. Oklahoma
,
the next significant Supreme Court case.
Skinner involved the punishment of criminals, not eugenic
sterilization of the mentally defective. Procedurally correct, the
legislation failed a narrow equal protection claim because it punished
those who had been twice convicted of a felony involving moral terpitude
but did not punish those whose non-felonious crime was of equal
magnitude (e.g., embezzlement). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
found this created an "invidious discrimination" between intrinsically
equal offenses. Douglas wrote:
We are dealing with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race. . . . Ln evil or
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reckless hands it [sterilization] can cause races or types which areinimical to the dominant groups to wither and disappear.
.
[ S ] trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential. ^
This argument foreshadowed his creation of the privacy right in Griswold
v * Connecticut and its later expansion in the birth control and abortion
cases. 75 Even though Douglas decided the case on narrow grounds, he
raised the stakes sufficiently to make sterilization hard to achieve. A
right to procreate severely constrains the legitimacy of forcing
sterilization on those unable to voluntarily consent. 75
During the next twenty years, no major cases surfaced. In the
early 1960's, however, sterilization returned to the policy agenda. 77
in 1962, an Ohio probate court approved sterilization for a mentally
incompetent eighteen year old woman. 0 No legislation supported the
decision. The judge justified his action on two grounds: to protect
Nora Ann Simpson from further pregnancies and to avoid "additional
79burdens upon the county and state welfare departments."
In 1965 and 1966, three California cases, and in 1966 another in
Ohio, joined with Simpson in establishing a small trend toward promoting
80
sterilization. Two California cases offered sterilization as a
condition for probation and the second Ohio case resembled Simpson . All
five cases relied on a social interest in sterilization.
By 1970, however, the trend among the courts on this issue had
shifted to extending deference to legislative action (generally meaning
legislative inaction). In 1968, the Nebraska Supreme Court voted to
sustain a law requiring sterilization before leaving an institution for
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the mentally impaired. 81 Although agreeing that mental deficiency
accentuates sexual, impulses," the Court concluded that the issue
belonged in the legislature.
The Nebraska court worked with the benefit of a statute.
Between 1969 and 1979, courts drawn into the controversy without a
statutory grounding declined jurisdiction. 82 The reasoning ranged from
treating sterilization as extraordinary medical treatment requiring
explicit policy support, to concerns over the legality of sterilization
( again needing legislative resolution) to fears that in the absence of a
statutory base the judges would be denied judicial immunity. All of the
courts were concerned about judicially imposing sterilization on one
unable to voluntarily consent.
In 1978, the tone of these decisions began to change. The
following passage from Guardianship of Tulley illustrate how the
jurisdictional concern was brought together with a new constitutional
right:
Whether in absence of statute the court is authorized to order the
involuntary sterilization of a mentally incompetent ward when, as
here, the guardian consents to such an operation, and the procedure
is justified both medically and socially. . . . The awesome power to
deprive a human being of his or her fundamental right to bear or
beget offspring must be founded on the explicit authorization of the
legislature. . . .
This court did not want to hide the compulsory nature of sterilizing a
mentally incompetent. But the reasons go beyond the extraordinary
nature of sterilization: they touch upon a fundamental right. All
infringements on this right were suspect and must be accompanied by
strict scrutiny. In this case, a statute authorized sterilization for
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those institutionalized. The court refused to use this as justification
for someone not institutionalized. The next year, in Hudson v. Hudson,
the Alabama Supreme Court refused to authorize sterilization because of
the "profound constitutional and social issues." It singled out the
right of marriage and procreation enunciated by Douglas in Skinner. 8 ^
While these courts were refusing to act, the Federal courts sent
a different, albeit mixed, message. Relf v. Weinberger, discussed
above, required strict guidelines and excluded the mentally incompetent.
Three other cases, on the other hand, greatly expanded the availability
of sterilization. In Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital 8 ^ the First
Circuit Court of Appeals prohibited a municipal hospital from denying
voluntary sterilization while offering other comparable non-therapeutic
surgery. The court relied on Roe v. Wade° ° and Doe v. Bolton0 in
establishing a fundamental interest in procreation and required a
compelling rationale to permit some surgery and deny others without
88
significant differences in risk or cost. The court concluded that
this violated equal protection guarantees. The case did not involve a
mental incompetent, but it did assert a judicial role in a state with no
statute and it asserted sterilization as a positive right.
The second case proved to be more assertive and daring. Ruby v.
Massey^ involved mentally incompetent minors whose parents sought their
sterilization. Ruby continued the constitutional theme found in Tulley
and Hudson. But now, the right was an affirmative one involving choice,
the exercise of which the courts must safeguard . After making reference
to Relf, the court argued that the choice must be voluntary.
ReU did
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require voluntary choice, but for that reason excluded the incompetent.
The Ruby court ignored this last point and looked for an acceptable
mechanism to achieve choice. After rejecting the parents, the court
concluded that the courts represented the answer. They reasoned that
given the fundamental rights involved, only the courts could ensure
^ ^ 6 consent. At this point, the court noted that the Connecticut
statute inadequately distinguished between those institutionalized and
those not and concluded the case by applying to both groups the
requirements found in the statute.
In 1976, a three judge federal panel in North Carolina addressed
the constitutionality of involuntary sterilization. 90 North Carolina
required a director of a state institution or the county director of
social services to institute sterilization procedures under the
following conditions:
(1) when he feels that sterilization is in the best interests of
the mental, moral or physical improvement of the retarded person,
(2) when he feels that sterilization is in the best interests of
the public at large,
(3) when, in his opinion, the retarded person "would be likely,
unless, sterilized, to procreate a child or children who would have
a tendency to serious physical, mental, or nervous disease or
deficiency; or, because of a physical, mental, or nervous disease or
deficiency which is not likely to materially improve, the person
would be unable to care for a child or children." 9 *
The court upheld the constitutionality of the law. Despite the court's
92
attempt to distinguish itself from eugenics, point three is clearly
eugenic. In fact it closely approximates Osborn's position and verges
on the goals of the early eugenicists. The result was validating
involuntary sterilization and genetic rationales. Few courts, however,
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have used this as precedent and none for eugenic purposes. On the other
hand, no court has repudiated it.
Hathaway and Ruby transformed the sterilization issue from
procedural arguments over jurisdiction into a debate over constitutional
rights and the courts' role in protecting them. By 1980, the state
courts had begun to follow this lead and actively debated the
substantive issues.
The Matter of the Guardianship of Hayes, 93 decided by the
Washington State Supreme Court in 1980, set the tone and direction of
the new set of cases. Rejecting self-restraint, the court disposed of
these precedents as merely expressing a preference for the legislature
over the courts. Placing itself as the guardian of the incompetent's
interests, the court detailed strict guidelines to be met before any
sterilization could be approved. Finally, the court entered into the
scientific thicket. The court turned to science for assurances that
sterilization was the least intrusive strategy and would remain that way
for the foreseeable future. Specifically, it asked science for
assurances that no new treatments or relevant contraceptive techniques
were imminent
.
This point was not unanimously accepted. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Stafford concluded that the court's reliance on the
state of science was too demanding. "It is too much to ask the moving
party, the alleged mentally ill person or the judiciary to litigate such
nebulous eventualities of science."
9
^ But the telling commentary came
from Justice Roselini in dissent. He argued that the majority falsely
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assumed that the person affected was indifferent to the operation. By
this, Roselini meant that the court imposed its own policy preferences
on the individual since it lacked any standard derived from the person's
own evaluation of her position. The court tried to meet this objection
by requiring the lower court judges (it is in the lower courts where
these decisions were to be made) to assess the individual's attitude
toward sterilization. But the problem with this is that the reason the
case was in the courts in the first place was because she was mentally
incapable of making a meaningful statement on the issue of consent. The
dissenter painted the court as part of the imperial judiciary: entering
on its own into a controversial area without first obtaining legislative
guidance and acting in such a way as to permanently alter a person for
whom the court purports to speak.
Q c:
While Hayes broke the barrier, In re Grady^ has received the
attention. In Grady, the New Jersey Supreme Court sought to resolve the
elusive issue of consent. The court reasoned that the situation was not
the equivalent of compulsory sterilization (that involves her
resistance), nor was it voluntary because she cannot consent. The court
proceeded to create a third category of neither voluntary nor compulsory
sterilization. Having created this, it sought to give it content by
defining the issue as one of constitutional right. They reasoned that
the constitutional right of privacy extended to voluntary sterilization.
On the other hand, one also had a right to procreate not to be
involuntarily sterilized. "Implicit in both these complementary
liberties [wrote the court] is the right to make a meaningful choice
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between them. The court recognized that Grady herself couLd not make
the choice, but they believed that a court could approximate what she
would have done, working on the assumption that she would have acted in
her own best interests. In fact, the court believed that they must act
I
because her disability should not serve to limit her constitutional
i
rights. "To preserve that right and the benefits that a meaningful
l
decision would bring to her life, it may be necessary to assert it on
her behalf ." 97
The extent to which this actively brought the court into the
substance of the issue can be seen in the following. The court
i
acknowledged that most precedents worked against its ruling but argued
i
that Grady's constitutional right of privacy was paramount; only her
ability to exercise it was lacking. The court became the neutral
i
guarantor of that right, acting benevolently on behalf of her interests:
i
We do not pretend that the choice of her parents, her guardian ad
litem, or a court is her own choice. But it is a genuine choice
nevertheless—one designed to further the same interests she might
pursue had she the ability to decide herself. . . . Our Court should
accept the responsibility of providing her with a choice to
compensate for her inability to exercise personally an important
constitutional right.
I
But wait, from where did the right to be sterilized materialize?
The court traced this right to two sources. The first root lay in the
99
United States Supreme Court's right of privacy. This right grew out
of cases ensuring one the right to prevent or terminate pregnancy. The
specific right to be sterilized, the second root, was developed in the
lower federal courts, including Hathaway and Ruby .
100
131
The leap by the court is not entirely appropriate. Does the
right to prevent conception necessarily include all means to that end
including a positive guarantee that the right will be exercised? The
following excerpt from a 1977 United States Supreme Court case confirms
the New Jersey court's characterization of the issue as a matter of
reproductive choice. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan wrote in
Carey v. Population Services International:
. . . the underlying premise of these decisions [Griswold v.
Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird] that the Constitution protects
"the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into . . . the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." . . . Eisenstadt v. Baird, holding that the
protection is not limited to married couples, characterized the
protected right as the "decision whether to bear or beget a
child." . . . Similarly, Roe v. Wade, held that the Constitution
protects a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. . . . "Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State."
But sterilization differs in kind from the contraceptive methods
involved in the privacy cases and the facts in Grady differ in the
nature and degree of the government's involvement. In the cases
establishing the privacy right, the technique allowed for future choice,
including a choice opposite to that made at the time of the case.
(Obviously this does not apply to the abortion decisions when viewed
from the fetus' perspective.) Sterilization, on the other hand, in its
present state precludes future choice. It would appear that the
courts expanded the right to include sterilization because sterilization
was the most effective means to prevent pregnancy. In doing this, the
court reflected the movement in society toward sterilization as the
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preferred means of contraception. Reflecting current social practice,
however, is no substitute for sound constitutional reasoning. Does the
decision mean that all new scientific breakthroughs would/should be
granted similar status? What if the legislature sought to regulate the
contraceptive techniques out of a fear for a patient's health or because
it understood the technique's effectiveness differently from the court?
At what point does a technique reach the stage where a court can anoint
it with this exhaulted status?
The state courts have divided on this issue. The most direct
response to the Grady case came from the Wisconsin Supreme Court in The
Matter of Guardianship of Eberhardy. This court commented:
The fault we find in the New Jersey case is the ratio decidendi of
first concluding, correctly we believe, that the right to
sterilization is a personal choice, but then equating a decision by
others with the choice of the person to be sterilized. It clearly
is not a personal choice, and no amount of legal legerdemain can
make it so.^^
The court then proceeded to the central issue:
Any governmentally sanctioned (or ordered) procedure to sterilize a
person who is incapable of giving consent must be demonstrated for
what it is, that is, the state's intrusion into the determination of
whether or not a person who makes no choice shall be allowed to
procreate j^^The public policy of the state is inevitably
involved
.
This raises a two part criticism of the Grady decision. First,
the decision effectively denies the political branches a substantive
role. Relying on a fundamental right precludes the state legislature
from addressing the policy issues except at the margins. To further
complicate the matter, the court included the interpretation of
scientific knowledge in the creation of the right and in its particular
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application. In Eberhardy
,
the Wisconsin court expressed concern over a
court's competence to deal with these technical issues. Specifically,
the court questioned the depth of any court's understanding of
contraception, about the retarded s ability to raise a family, as well
as the relationship of the sterilization policy to other policies
dealing with the mentally retarded. ^ A court, factually limited to
those parties presenting briefs, cannot obtain the well-rounded
understanding of the issue that the legislature can. In effect, the
court froze out from political consideration several sensitive and
integral issues.
Secondly, accepting for the moment sterilization as a right,
what governmental action prompted the court's intervention? Brennan's
summary of the privacy cases concluded that they protected against
"unjustified intrusions by the state." But, as Eberhardy observed, the
only governmental intrusion here was by the court. Nature, not the
state, deprived Grady of the right to act. This is a significant
difference and cannot be seen as a logical and minor extension of the
privacy right. Paradoxically, the New Jersey court's decision allowed
for one to sterilize another in order to protect the latter's privacy!
In its desire to make this right effective, the court acted prematurely.
Another issue within the Grady opinion focuses on the standards
used to protect the interests of the incompetent. In this area, the
Grady court pursued a course of "strict moderation." As was already
noted, the goal was the best interests of the incompetent and the court
required a moderate evidentiary test: the evidence, taken as <1 whole ,
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must be clear and compelling. Most courts have followed this or a
similar approach (although requiring the evidence taken individually to
be clear and compelling). Others have required medical necessity and
still others required substituted judgment combined with a preponderance
of evidence standard. ^6
In determining the patient's best interest, the Grady court saw
itself as a facilitator, authorizing but not compelling sterilization.
In future cases, the probate court, involved because of the existence of
an individual right, would review the facts of the patient's condition
and life situation, determine whether or not these conditions provide
clear and compelling reasons for sterilization and, if so, approve the
sterilization request. To this end, the court considers: the likelihood
of exposure to sexual activity, the availability and feasibility of
alternative contraception, the possibility of serious trauma or
psychological danger from pregnancy, and the incompetent's ability to
care for a child or the possibility of a future marriage to someone who
could provide adequate child care. The court also reviews scientific
and medical considerations, specifically: permanence of a person's
(in)ability to understand reproduction and contraception, future changes
in feasibility of alternative contraception, and evidence that
scientific or medical advances may occur within the foreseeable future
to improve the patient's medical condition or contraceptive
alternatives
.
The court provided several safeguards to avoid abusive
sterilization. They include a guardian ad litem to argue the case
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sterilization and to cross-examine witnesses, independent
medical and psychological evaluation, and, while the incompetent need
not be present for the hearing, the judge should meet with the patient
(not necessarily formally) and attempt to ascertain the person's views
on sterilization
.
1011
Aside from the court's need to divine the future of science,
these are difficult standards to meet. But the court believed them
necessary given the potential conflict in interest between the guardian
and patient and to prevent judicial abuse. These standards have been
criticized as too restrictive by legal scholars and the Massachusetts
1 09Supreme Judicial Court. In the latter case, the court required
protective standards similar to those listed above (with less emphasis
on future scientific discoveries) but lowered the standard of evidence
required to that of preponderance of evidence. The court also replaced
the best interests test with the doctrine of substituted judgment.
Rather than the court paternalistically determining the best decision,
the court decides what the patient would decide if he or she were
competent. This drew the charge from the dissenter that "the court
today has decided that the probate judge has the power to divine the
wishes of a severely mentally retarded woman ." 110 Consequently, the
process of divining has been moved from science qua medicine to
psychology.
Returning to the Wisconsin case, an opening exists through which
to raise general questions about this line of cases. Working from its
base of legislative deference, this court faulted the best interests
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test as inappropriate. In practice, this test works from experience—
both through experience gained from other cases and adjusting to
experience in current application. Based on fact-finding, the court
determines the best interest of the individual but reserves the option
of second thoughts" and the opportunity to correct errors. But in the
case of sterilization, this is not possible. No judicial method exists
to correct the errors. Given a court's limited understanding of the
technical issues, the difficulty in obtaining a thorough presentation of
all issues and interests, and the permanence of the procedure, the court
concluded that judicial action "unguided by well thought-out policy
determination reflecting the interests of society, as well as the person
to be sterilized, are hazardous, indeed."^2
The Wisconsin court's underlying criticism of this line of cases
(articulated as a criticism of the Grady case in particular) is that
they ignore the social dimension and interest that must be present given
the role of social institutions in the decision to sterilize. This
concern cuts in several directions. First, the existence of social
interests suggests legislative action before judicial intervention; or
at least the court prompting the legislature to act, as the Wisconsin
court did. Second, the interests of the individual must be protected
against coercive state interests. The fact that the court accepted
jurisdiction in this case (it simply declined to exercise it) signifies
its recognition of a judicial role in this matter. But the court also
believed that the legislature—learning the issues from the multiple
advocate groups involved—could provide better guidelines protecting the
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individual than could the courts. The court, afterall, could reject the
legislature's actions.
These criticisms reflect disagreement over the proper role of
the courts and which institutions should possess primary responsibility
for setting sterilization policy. A criticism of greater importance to
this work links the issues of these cases to issues of science policy.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Coffey discussed how social biases
could enter through expert testimony and distort the issues of the case.
In his opinion, Justice Coffey made an argument on the influence of
social ideas on science. His argument on the sterilization issue's
inexorable link to social value deserves to be quoted at length:
It is my belief that this decision is a most difficult one and
should never be made by courts alone as it involves a value judgment
central to the constituent fabric of our society. We all ought to
be involved in making this decision whether we participate as a
litigant, judge, attorney, physician or as an American citizen,
voting for elective representatives. In an age when the courts are
for the first time declaring retarded individuals to be of equal
worth with other individuals in our society and under our
constitution, mandating equal educational and training
opportunities, it seems anomalous that equal justice is being
threatened. This is a decision on a subject matter which our
society will be grappling with for years to come.
I question the physician's judgment in this case based on the
court record presented for review and wonder if it is an attempt to
substitute the quality of life ethic for what should be the sanctity
of life ethic in medicine. In this case, it is most important to
examine the rationalization involved in this medical management
decision in order to understand the implications of this recent
development in medical ethics and its significance for the
profession and society as a whole. The rationale is easy to
understand in relation to the new quality of life ethic so
eloquently propounded by the social engineers of the Twentieth
Century. Two questions are presented: Should a group of doctors [,]
whose only basis for this fundamental and irreversible medical,
surgical procedure according to this record is the guardian s
request based upon a fear that this young retarded adult may in the
future have sexual contact with a man[ , ] in the absence of statutory
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guidelines and authority be allowed to substitute their judgment for
society and assume complete control over the individual and
subordinate her to their own ideas of what is good for her well-
being? Does any court ever have direct power over the body of a
living person in the absence of showing that the life of the person
is in jeopardy requiring medical attention? I think not. 11 ^
Coffey questions the court s right to regulate the incompetent's life.
Of course, he does not deny the state's right to do so, he simply
questions the institutional location of that regulation.
These cases do not represent sterilization abuse of the same
sort discussed in the previous sections. For all their faults, the
courts' decisions demonstrated an understanding of the promises and
dangers of sterilization. While the culmination of the line of cases
was to approve sterilization under narrowly specified circumstances, it
did not represent the resurrection of the old eugenics. Osborn would
probably approve of this resolution as it has the virtue of producing
eugenic outcomes while being justified on other grounds (birth control).
Coincidentally converging with eugenic goals, however, is not
sufficient grounds for labeling something eugenic. Osborn recommended
striving for eugenic goals through other means but he also desired a
tacit public consensus on eugenic ends. This clearly was not the case
here. With the exception of the Buck, court and the federal court in
North Carolina, the courts distanced themselves from eugenics and,
instead, relied upon the technological fix. The courts sought neutral
and technical solutions; the virtue of sterilization was its simplicity,
precision, and permanence. Through an array of procedural safeguards,
the individual was protected against abuse while science entered through
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expert testimony on the state of scientific knowledge and on the
condition of the patient. All issues were reduced to legal and
scientific terms.
The problem with this approach is that the issues are not simply
legal and technical. At stake are societal decisions on the quality and
sanctity of life. Who makes a fit parent? What rights do those
institutionalized for mental reasons have? How should care for these
patients be organized? These are among the issues at dispute behind the
decision to sterilize, not just the narrower issues of the patient's
health. The questions are first and foremost legislative.
The necessity of emphasizing the failure to employ the
democratic political channels is due to the nature of technocratic
solutions: they bypass the political realm but embody within them
political values because of the context of its practice (e.g.,
alternatives foregone). In this case, the solution places the burden on
the patient: she must be sterilized. It is the ideal solution in times
of scarcity since most alternatives would be labor intensive. The
Wisconsin court recognized the limited benefit of technical solutions.
It refused to take this approach without first pressing the political
issues to the attention of the political branches. Social theories, new
medical ethics, and political values belong in this discussion; the
sterilization issue belongs in the give and take of pluralist politics.
140
NOTES
1. Paul Popenoe
,
"The Progress of Eugenic Sterilization," Journal ofHeredity 25 ( 1934 ) : 19 -
2. E. S. Gosney and Paul Popenoe, Sterilization For Human Betterment(New York: The MacMillan Co., 1929)
.
3. Gosney and Popenoe, p. 59.
4. Gosney and Popenoe, p. 116.
5. Gosney and Popenoe, p. 119.
6. Rudolph Vecoli, "Sterilization: A Progressive Measure?" Wisconsin
Magazine of History 43 ( 1960) : 199
7. Gosney and Popenoe
,
pp. 116-135.
8. Gosney and Popenoe P* 116.
9. Gosney and Popenoe P* 126.
10. Gosney and Popenoe
,
P- 128.
11
.
Gosney and Popenoe P* 128.
12. Gosney and Popenoe
, P* 129.
13. Gosney and Popenoe
, P* 129.
14. According to the American Society for Voluntary Sterilization's
data
.
15. Barbara Caress, "Sterilization: Women Fit To Be Tied," Health/PAC
Bulletin no. 62 (January/February 1975), p. 1.
16. Anthony R. Measham, Robert A. Hatcher, and Charles B. Arnold,
"Physicians and Contraception: A study of Perceptions and
Practices in an Urban Southeastern United States Community,"
Southern Medical Journal 64 (April 1971) : 50 1
.
17. Measham, Hatcher, and Arnold.
18. Measham, Hatcher, and Arnold, p. 500.
141
19. Measham, Hatcher, and Arnold.
20. Measham, Hatcher, and Arnold, p. 501.
21. Note, Sterilization Abuse: A Proposed Regulatory Scheme," DePaul
Law Review 28 ( 1979 ): 733-734 ; also see Caress for further
examples
.
22. Note, " Sterilization Abuse: A Proposed Regulatory Scheme," p. 736.
23. Walker v. Pierce, 560 F. 2d 609 (4th Cir., 1977).
24. Walker v. Pierce, p. 613.
25. Walker v. Pierce, p. 611.
26. Walker v. Pierce, p. 614.
27 . Walker v. Pierce, p. 614.
28. Walker v. Pierce, p. 615.
29. Walker v. Pierce, p. 615.
30. Walker v. Pierce, p. 612.
31. Julius Paul, "The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals:
Current Attacks on Illegitimacy and the AFDC Program" Law and
Society Review 3 ( 1968) : 79-99 .
32. Paul, p. 101.
33. Family Planning/Population Reporter 2 (June 1973) :65.
34. Family Planning/Population Reporter 2 (June 197 3) : 65
.
35. Family Planning/Population Reporter 2 (August 1973) :87 , 98.
36. Family Planning/Population Reporter 2 (June 1973) :65.
37. Family Planning/ Population Reporter 3 (April 1974) :42.
38. Relf v. Weinberger .
39. Thomas Shapiro, Population Control Politics: Women, Sterilization
and Reproductive Choice (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1%5), p. 113-115“
40. Relf v. Weinberger, p. 1198.
142
Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1199.41
.
42. Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1201.
43. Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1201.
44. Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1202.
45. Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1202.
46. Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1203.
47. Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1203.
48. Relf v. Weinberger
,
p. 1204.
49. Note, "Sterilization Abuse: A Proposed Regulatory Scheme," p. 732.
I
50. National Center for Health Statistics, Advancedata (February 11,
1985) : 3
.
i
51. National Center for Health Statistics, Advancedata (December 4,
1984) : 1 .
i
52. Shapiro, p. 95.
I
53. Shapiro, p. 102.
54. 9 OSHC 1596 (1981).
i
i
55. For a good statement of women's concerns over the use of Depo-
provero, see Helen B. Holmes, Betty B. Hoskins, and Michael Gross,
eds. Birth Control and Controlling Birth: Women-Centered
Perspectives (Clifton, N.J.: The Humana Press, 1980), pp. 97-116.
56. Family Planning/Population Reporter (August 1979) p. 49.
57. New York Times, November 23, 1983, p. 9.
58. New York Times, November 23, 1983, p. 9.
59. Nicholas
Therapy
,
Kittrie, The Right to be Different: Deviance and Enforced
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
60. Kittrie p. 5.
61
.
Kittrie p. 32.
62. Kittrie
,
p. 39.
143
63. Kittrie, p. 42.
64. See James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985) for an exampleTf~S
discussion of crime and human nature without falling into the
logic of the therapeutic state. This debate is not yet resolved.
65. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
66. Buck v.Bell, p. 207.
67. Buck v.Bell, p. 206.
O' 00 . Buck v.Bell
,
207
.
69. See Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
70. Buck v. Bell, p. 207.
71
.
Buck v. Bell, p. 207.
72. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 ( 1905) .
73. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
74. Skinner v. Oklahoma, p. 541.
75. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
married couples; Eisenstadt v. Baird,
control for singles; Roe v. Wade, 410
Bolton, 410 U.S. 197 (1973) abortion.
(1965) birth control for
405 U.S. 438 (1972) birth
U.S. 113 ( 1973) and Doe v.
76. On this point Justice Jackson wrote in Skinner:
There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively
represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a
minority—even those who have been guilty of what the majority
defines as crimes, (p. 546)
This is the most substantive statement on this issue by any
Supreme Court justice and hints at future rejection of
sterilization
.
77. See Paul.
78. In re Simpson, 180 N.E. 2d 206 (Ohio, 1962).
79. In re Simpson, p. 208.
144
80 .
81
.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86 .
87.
88 .
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
See Elyce Zenoff berster, "Eliminating
the Answer?" Ohio State Law Journal 27
the Unfit— Is Sterilization
( 1966) :609-613.
_tn re Cavitt, 157 N.W. 2d 171 (Neb., 1968). The vote was four todeclare the law unconstitutional and three in support of the act
The state constitution requires five votes to declare a law
unconstitutional and thus the act was sustained by the majority
vote of three.
See: Frazier v. Levi, 440 SW 2d 393 (Tx, 1969); Holmes v. Powers,
439 SW 2d 579 (Ky., 1969); A.L. v. G.R.H.
,
325 NE 2d 501 (Tn^
197 5 ) • Guardianship of Kemp
,
118 Cal Rpt r 64 (1974); Guardianship
Tulley
,
146 Cal Rptr 266 ( 1978); Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So . "M
310 (Ala., 1979).
t he Ma t ter o f t he Guardianship of Tulley, p. 268 (emphasis
added )
.
Hudson
,
p. 312.
475 F. 2d 701 (1st Cir., 1973).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 197 (1973).
Doe v. Bolton, p. 705.
452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn., 1978).
North Carolina Association For Retarded Children v. State of North
Carolina
,
420 F. Supp. 451 (1976).
North Carolina Association For Retarded Children v. State of North
Carolina, p. 455.
North Carolina Association For Retarded Children v. State of North
Carolina, p. 454. The opinion reads on this point: "Most
competent geneticists now reject social Darwinism and doubt the
premise implicit in Mr. Justice Holmes' incantation that
'.
. . three generations of imbeciles is enough.'"
The Matter of the Guardianship of Hayes
,
608 P. 2d 635 (1980).
The Matter of the Guardianship of Hayes , p. 643.
In re Grady, 426 A 2d 467 (N.J., 1981).
In re Grady, p. 474 (emphasis added).
145
97. In re Grady, p. 475.
98. _Iji £e Grady, p. 481.
99. See Griswold v. Connecticut
,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v . Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and
Doe v. Bolton
,
410 U.S. 197 (1973).
100. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hos pital; Ruby v. Massey; Peck v.
Calif ano
,
452 F. Supp. 484 (D. Utah, 1977); Ponter v.“Poster, 342
A 2d 574 (Ch. Div., 1975).
101. 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977); emphasis Brennan's.
102. Matter of the Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W. 2d 881, 896
(Wise., 1981).
103. Matter of the Guardianship of Eberhardy, p. 892.
4
Matter of the Guardianship of Eberhardy, p. 892.
105.
Matter of the Guardianship of Eberhardy, p. 895.
106. Application of Eichner
,
423 NYS 2d 580 (1979) (Substituted
Judgment); In the Matter of Moe
,
432 NE 2d 712 (Ma, 1982)
(Substituted Judgment and preponderance of evidence); North
Carolina Association For Retarded Children v. State of North
Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451 (1976) (Medical/Biological basis);
Matter of the Guardinship of Hayes, 608 P 2d 635 (Wash., 1980); In
re PerrTT 4l4 A 2d (NH, 1980); In the Matter of C.D.M., 627 P 2d
_
607 (Ak, 1981); Motes v. Hall County Department of Family and
Children Services, 306 SE 2d 260 (Ga., 1983) (Clear and Compelling
Evidence); Matter of A.W.
,
637 P 2d 366 (Co., 1981) (Clear and
Compelling Evidence with Medical Necessity).
107. In re Grady
,
pp. 481-486.
108. In re Grady, pp. 482-483. This last one is a curious requirement
given that the patient is, by definition, unable to make an
informed decision
109. In the Matter of Moe.
110.
In the Matter of Moe, p. 724.
11
Matter of the Guardianship of Eberhardy
,
p. 894.
112.
Matter of the Guardianship of Eberhardy, p. 895.
146
113. Matter of the Guardianship of Eberhardy, p. 905.
114. North Carolina Association For Retarded Children v. State of North
Carolina
,
420 F. Supp. 451 (1976).
|
I
I
147
t
CHAPTER ILL
GENETIC SCREENING
While sterilization practice has moved from eugenics to welfare
genetic screening has remained embroiled in the politics of
genetics. This practice, varying widely in method, purpose, and
effectiveness, has proven to be the most successful legacy of the
eugenics movement and epitomizes the strategic concerns outlined by
Osborn and Muller. Specifically, it operates under the rubric of two
respected professions—medicine and genetics—and thus successfully
hides its eugenic origins.
Genetic screening, as compared to other forms of screening,
focuses on an unrealized risk for an individual or his/her offspring.
It is :
[a] systematic search in a population for persons of certain
genotypes. The usual purpose is to detect persons who themselves
are at risk or whose offspring are at risk for genetic diseases or
genetically determined susceptibilities to environmental agents.
^
Conventional screening (e.g., for german measles or venereal diseases)
ordinarily deals with those whose physical proximity to the screened-for
disease places them at risk. Genetic screening, on the other hand,
focuses on factors within the person: his/her genes or the fetus' genes.
In this respect
,
it resembles such developing genetic techniques as gene
therapy and gene recombination. All act upon the individual per se
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rather than the environment. This, of coarse, was the direction in
which Osborn's thought evolved and where Muller's began.
As is true for most tools, genetic screening is most interesting
for the consequences resulting from its use (and it will be in these
consequences where the proof of the eugenic pudding will be found).
They are varied and often controversial. It offers apparent benefits
for future generations ("potential people") who, without screening,
would include many carrying debilitating defects "diluting" the gene
pool
,
but now will be aborted or not conceived or whose doctors will
know their condition and be able to offer treatment at a crucial moment
(e.g., PKU babies) or, at a minimum, offer support to the parents.
These are "apparent" benefits because treating them as benefits assumes
a social, but potentially contestable, understanding of what is normal
and presumes that a particular deviation from this norm is undesirable
and justifies acting on the body up to and including death.
Screening represents a technical fix. The tests can identify
the condition of a fetus for many disorders and thus relieve parental
anxiety over the future child's health or allow a parent to abort the
fetus and avoid the trauma of a handicapped child. The principal
alternatives available to one after screening are abortion or doing
nothing. Eventually, alternative actions, which are now exceptional,
will become more routine. Fetal surgery or therapy will allow doctors
to repair the defective fetus. These, however, are not available to
most people screened or for most impairments.
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The consequences of this practice lead in two directions. First
is into the politics of abortion. Even though the genetic information
provides no moral basis to justify abortion (this would rest upon a
qualitative argument regarding acceptable physical states), an
imperative toward abortion exists. Abortion becomes reduced to a
therapeutic technique, stripped of its moral overtones despite the
failure to establish that the genetic defects uncovered are
abnormalities requiring therapy as opposed to unfortunate acts of
nature. In fact, this carries over to other types of screening as well
and is neatly represented by the expected chain of events laid out in
the following statement by two genetic counselors:
[A] combination of screening for carrier status, amniocentesis, and
selective abortion of a defective fetus enables a couple to achieve
desired normal biological parenthood, provided the couple at risk
monitors each pregnancy. Thus, by following these procedures the
couple has neither to relinquish socially approved biological
parenthood nor to give birth to a defective child."
This statement hints at the second political aspect. Even though it is
essentially a technical answer it works in a particular direction:
eugenic. A risk is that the logic justifying narrow health care can
extend to social concerns. The extent to which screening and
"therapeutic" actions resulting from the screening become accepted as
health issues, other issues, less clearly related to health, may become
invested with this instrumental reasoning. In other words, anything
that is within the reach of screening's gaze assumes the public health
classification. This would allow abortion, the extent to which it can
even be thought of simply as a technique, to reach to a broader range
of
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Issues under the protective shield of health care. This would be Ideal
from Che eugenicists's perspective because it hides the controversial
eugenic element
.
What the discussion of these issues will illustrate is the
extent to which modern genetics fits into the modern eugenic hypothesis;
the extent to which institutional settings affect the value of a
technique; how technical developments push politics; and the political
consequences of extended capabilities. Not all types of genetic
screening have the same political implications. Prenatal screening, for
example, is more closely associated with abortion than is neonatal.
Consequently, it is necessary to examine each separately and through
that analysis search for threads of commonality.
Prenatal Screening
Prenatal diagnosis involves examining a fetus when certain
characteristics of the parents indicate a high risk of an inborn defect.
It explores the possibility of hereditary disease or congenital defects.
Prenatal diagnosis primarily employs five techniques. Amniocentesis
involves removing a sample of the amniotic fluid. The test evaluates
fetal chromosomes and therefore excludes testing for specialized cell
diseases such as sickle-cell anemia. A second technique is fetoscopy.
This allows the researcher to view the fetus and placenta. It can also
aid in drawing out fetal blood or in fetal skin biopsies. This is one
means to diagnose hemoglobinopathies and is used in fetal surgery.
However, it has a higher miscarriage rate than amniocentesis.
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Ultrasonography provides a means to examine the physical condition of
the fetus and its age without having to invade the amniotic sac. Use of
ultrasound can aid in diagnosing neural tube defects and such
correctable defects as cleft palate. Neural tube defects are also
tested for through measuring the alpha fetoprotein's in the maternal
blood. This, however, must be conducted in conjunction with
ultrasonography and amniocentesis since the gestational age of the fetus
is important and amniocentesis provides a more accurate analysis of the
alpha fetoprotein levels. A final and promising technique is still in
the development stages. Chorionic villus sampling involves inserting a
catheter "trascervically under sonographic guidance to a location within
the villus of the chorion frondosum."^ This technique is seen as an
alternative to amniocentesis during the first trimester. Like
amniocentesis, it is confined to chromosomal analysis. It suffers from
a higher miscarriage rate but is undertaken approximately four weeks
earlier. Another problem of concern to researchers is a 1.7% rate of
error between the test and the actual state of the fetus.
Prenatal diagnosis offers the parents few options. Fetal
therapy and surgery are not yet well developed and can be relegated to
the background at this point. Before doing so, however, it must be
observed that in the long run, they will become meaningful alternatives
which will operate along the same lines as the following discussion but
in a more subtle way. The screening techniques developed before these
therapeutic possibilities were developed and the only realistic option
was abortion. Thus the context within which these techniques were
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introduced was one of eugenic abortion, not strictly therapeutic
medicine
.
Putting aside, for the moment, festering political controversies
(s«g», abortion)
,
prenatal screening is well within the modern health
and family care paradigm. This includes a search for information on a
patient's condition and their treatment as allowed by the state of
medicine. Prenatal screening is a powerful information gathering tool.
It can identify approximately ninety conditions
.
6
In this sense, it is
just one more technique in our search for control over our health and
body. In sum, it is part of a technical fix (technically repairing
damage)
.
Unfortunately, it cannot be removed from its political context.
That context is health care including the option of abortion and the
pressure of normality as a norm influencing our actions. To the extent
that the issues of abortion and normality influence the reception of
this new technique— it illustrates how new technologies become
politically contentious when introduced into unprepared institutional
and intellectual contexts.
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Wrongful life and wrongful birth cases are the most enduring
political response to the introduction of this technique. They allow an
examination of how this particular technique has affected society and to
draw generalizations about science/ technology s introduction into a
political context. The issues in this legal controversy were framed in
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the 1967 New Jersey Supreme Court case Gleitman v. Cosgrove . 7 Although
screening techniques were not at issue in this case, the issues remain
the same in the subsequent cases involving amniocentesis and Tay-Sachs
screening. Gleitman involved a woman who contracted german measles
early in her pregnancy and whose doctor failed to inform her of the
possible adverse effects of this disease on a fetus. She contended that
had she known, she would have aborted the fetus. Her child had the
predicted defects. The Gleitmans brought two causes of action. First
the child sued to collect for damages resulting from his birth. The
mother sued for similar damages. Both causes were rejected by the
court. The plaintiffs did not allege that the doctor caused the defects
but rather that the doctor's negligence was the proximate cause of the
birth of an impaired child. The fact of birth (or life in the infant's
cause) was the injury. If the doctor had practiced properly, the
parents would have possessed the information upon which they could have
prevented the birth. Therefore, the argument concluded, the doctor was
a proximate cause of an injury.
In rejecting this claim, the court followed two lines of
argument. First it rejected the claim because of the nature of tort
law. Tort law measures compensatory damages; it compares the injured
state to what would have been had no negligence occurred. The court
defined the choice as follows: "the infant plaintiff is therefore
g
required to say ... that he should not have been born at all. In
other words, comparing life to nonlife. The consequence of this
position was that no legally cognizable question existed.
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The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between
his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it
is impossible to make such a determination. This Court cannot weigh
the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life
itself. By asserting that he should not have been born, the infant
plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his
alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the
comparison required by compensatory remedies.
^
Secondly, the court added that a policy issue was at stake: the right to
life. The court concluded that "it is basic to the human condition to
seek life and hold onto it however heavily burdened ." 10 While most of
the court's opinion placed the issue into the context of the competence
of a court to handle the issue of compensation, in fact the court's
opinion reflected a reluctance to enter into a sensitive area of public
policy.
The court correctly interpreted the issue as one similar to the
issues surrounding eugenic abortion. But the eugenic position was
rejected because it contained an instrumental view of life: "The
sanctity of the single human life is the decisive factor in this suit in
tort. Eugenic considerations are not controlling. We are not talking
here about the breeding of prize cattle ." 11 Although eugenics is not
strictly applicable because the condition is not genetically based, in
the subsequent cases involving genetic disease it will be. What the
court has identified is the desire for "normal" children. The stand of
this court became the issues around which later arguments were waged.
Is this a policy appropriate for a court? Is it even a public policy?
If an abortion can be obtained legally (which all courts, including the
Gleitman court, conceded), is it the place of a court in tort law to
155
prevent abortions just because they are eugenic? The court's reluctance
to enter into this area denied one legal avenue to eugenic child birth.
The New Jersey Court, valuing life as an end, rejected the invitation to
set standards to guide the instrumental manipulation of life.
Dissenters challenged the court's policy stance and rejection of
the parents' suit. No one dissented in support of the infant's cause.
Justice Jacobs argued that measurable damages existed. Granting the
legality of abortion, the issue to Jacobs became compensating the
parents for expenses due to the "abnormal" child. The injuries were
actionable because their manifestation (but not cause) resulted from
poor medical advice that precluded abortion. The extra costs are
measurable and, presto, the suit is justiciable . ^ Jacobs dismissed the
policy issue by denying its existence in this context.
But there is no policy favoring the breach of duty here or its
immunization. Nor is there any dispute that the Gleitmans could
have terminated the pregnancy lawfully outside New Jersey. i
Jacobs proceeded to review the abortion law and concluded that it did
14
not preclude abortion in this case. Consequently, no explicit policy
impediments existed. The majority, on the other hand, rested its
decision on a societal consideration favoring life over nonlife: "The
right to life is inalienable in our society ." 15
The difference is significant. Aside from raising questions of
judicial legislation, the social values are what the abortion and,
later, the screening technologies challenge. The effectiveness of this
challenge, combined with persistence by those wishing to change the law
so as to take advantage of the advancing techniques, culminated in Roe
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v. Wade 16 and its constellation of reverberations throughout the legal
system. In the wrongful birth and wrongful life cases, Roe^s influence
was to provide the wedge that broke the grip of the Gleitman decision.
Roe not only removed the controversy over the legality of abortion, but
it also undermined the position of those claiming an unqualified policy
supporting life. This changed attitude was reflected as early as 1975
in cases which dealt with pre-Roe events. In that year the Texas and
Wisconsin Supreme Courts both accepted the wrongful birth arguments and
granted the parents the possibility of extraordinary expenses. 1 ^
Although both of these cases involved German measles, they promote an
environment favorable toward prenatal screening. The courts relied upon
extraordinary expenses as a means of circumventing the problem of
measuring life against nonlife. In reaching its conclusion, the
Wisconsin Court relied upon the argument that the mother had been denied
the opportunity to receive an abortion and this constituted an injury.
This, however, does not adequately address the life versus
nonlife issue. The Texas court finessed this by changing the calculus:
Previous Texas cases have indicated this distinction between the
cause of action which seeks damages for wrongful birth or life and
the cause of action seeking re^gvery of those expenditures required
because the child is deformed.
The previous cases granted cause when the birth resulted in a deformed
child and denied it in those cases where the child was healthy. Thus
the court can measure normal versus deformed life and need not consider
the option of no life. This, of course, is the distinction motivating
those undergoing prenatal screening. This distinction also places into
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two different categories dealing with deviations from perfection due to
deformity and those where the deviation is a matter of preference (e.g.
eye color or sex). The former is given a special position, while the
latter is accorded no support under the color of law. Thus perfection
is meant in terms of the biological or medical average. In Jacobs, the
court not only supported the abortion right but also eugenic abortion.
If the deformity is what is important, then it is imperative that the
health care system offer all opportunities to avoid it if the parents so
desire
.
Unfortunately for the eugenicists, this position was not
universally accepted. While in New Jersey and Washington^ the wrongful
birth claims were accepted, courts in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, and
20New York rejected the argument that a child has the right to be born
free from deformity. But in dismissing the claims the Alabama and
Illinois courts, and a dissenter in New York, raise important issues
which address concerns underlying all of the cases. Briefly, they focus
on the extent to which technology brings with it new rights (including a
right to the technology) and raise a concern over the sorts of questions
the application of this technology imposes on the political system. One
argument, raised in dissent, claimed that technology, once developed,
should be accessible to individuals. When it is denied them and the
denial causes harm, the denial should be actionable. Judge Cook argued.
Certain facts of life of the 1970's must be recognized and accepted
at the outset. One such fact is the legal right of a mother to
abort a pregnancy .... Another is the developments and
application of tests to identify carriers of Tay-Sachs disease^nd
the occurrence of that disease in their yet unborn offspring.
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In other words, the law must accept technological developments as
entitlements for those who desire their use. If it is not the
technology that the person is entitled to, then it is the right to birth
a physically normal child. The conflict between the court and its
dissenter appears to reflect the difficulty a new technology faces as it
enters into the existing setting. The new technologies offer new
possibilities but their status remains in doubt.
The Alabama court took a slightly different approach:
We are not unaware of the rapid progress made in medical science in
recent years. Many mysteries of the how and why of human
development have succumbed to medical knowledge. However, we do not
understand that the state of the art in the medical profession is
such that it can be said that no child need be born deformed. c
The implication is that by extending our capabilities we extend our
rights; if the "state of the art" assured that "no child need be
deformed" then the court would have granted the cause. The right to
23
exploit our extended capabilities appears to be what the Grady court
found. There the most efficient technology was extended as a matter of
right. Although non-voluntary sterilization is socially controversial,
the interest in controlling the mentally impaired and extending access
to technology overrode the controversy. In this case, however, abortion
is, at present, too controversial. Although the moral issues raised by
abortion have limited the extent to which prenatal screening is extended
as a matter of right, the trend among the courts appears to favor its
extension. It will be worth looking again at this issue to determine
whether the lure of technique triumphs. If they do continue to extend
access, the courts may find themselves on a slippery slope. Since
the
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justification used to extend access is to prevent deformed children, the
courts would find themselves confronting the difficult issue of
determining by whut stendnrd und by whom would perfection be
defined?" This would open up the possibility (more likely a
probability) that the understanding of perfection would move from the
medically expected to the desirable. This is most likely if abortion
becomes widely accepted. Under these conditions, it becomes harder to
justify denying some parents relief while granting it to others. In
other words, the distinction between different deviations from
perfection raised by the Texas court will collapse.
To what extent should the courts build technological
developments into their decisions? Is it proper for others to decide on
the child's behalf what it means to be a "whole functional human?" Does
a child have a right not to be born? The wrongful birth cases struggled
with this issue and have slowly moved toward accepting the imperative of
technology. The wrongful life cases have begun to pick up on these
questions but with a different resolution. The courts answered these
questions by rejecting the children's claims but accepting, sub
• ? s
silentio, much of the argument. In the 1982 case, Turpin v. Sorting,
the California Supreme Court granted the infant a cause of action in
regard to extraordinary expenses incurred because of the infirmity.
Denying general damages (the central wrongful life position), the court
claimed that it was not accepting the wrongful life argument. But, it
reasoned, if the parents can collect special damages why not the infant
who will continue to have expenses after the parents are no longer
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responsible and why should the infant depend upon parents to sue for the
damages? Lhe court reached this compromise because it wanted to
support the child's claim but found measuring life versus nonlife an
impossible framework but extraordinary expenses were a manageable figure
27to calculate . ~ Thus the court was abLe to give the infant somethi
without having to deviate explicitly from the precedents which denied
the possibility of wrongful life. Politically, the wrongful life
compromise may make sense— it extends the principle into a new area
without enlarging the principle itself. The Texas court's recognition
of the normal versus abnormal trade-off, on the other hand, is the most
accurate reflection of the Issues.
These cases represent pressure placed upon the political system
to incorporate Into law the advantages of new technologies. The courts
incorporated these screening techniques into the requirement that
physicians and Laboratories provide accurate and complete professional
services. While these are not unreasonable goals in themselves, when
placed into the context of the alternatives available after their use,
they produce politically sensitive and not entirely salutary results.
The Logic of the cases is that the doctor's negligence resulted in an
impaired child who otherwise would not have been born. The doctor is
liable for damages resulting from the birth. This places onto the
doctor the responsibility to inform the patient of tests available to
them. It aLso provides an incentive for the doctor to promote abortion.
That underlying these cases is a model of normality can be seen
by the reason they exist. They are brought by parents who want children
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but do not want "defective” children. The courts distinguished these
cases from accidental birth wrongful birth suits (e.g., failed abortion
or sterilization). At issue in the defectives' cases is whether the
parents should be able to determine the nature of their children. This
is a qualitative step beyond Roe which allowed parents to determine the
fact of their children. When the courts finally relented and allowed a
cause of action against physicians, it was because the courts accepted
this eugenic goal: determining the children's nature.
The dialogue among the judges as the courts worked out the legal
contours of this position approached eugenic issues. Part of the modern
eugenic movement was an attempt to blend together genetic and
environmental issues. The following excerpt illustrates how the courts
approached this:
The Court proceeds on the notion that the claims of the
infant plaintiff are based on her "wrongful life". "[T]he gist of
the infant's complaint is that had defendants informed her mother of
the availability of amniocentesis, Sharon would never have come into
existence" .... It is acknowledged by the majority that this
thesis—injury consisting of a wrongful life
—
poses insuperable
analytical problems in admeasuring damages. "[P] lacing a value upon
non-life is not simply difficult—it is humanly impossible." . . .
Nevertheless, the Court does not rest its rejection of the infant's
claim upon the inordinate difficulty of measuring damages for her
"wrongful life", as did the Court in Gleitman. Rather, the Court
now says: "[As a matter of law,] Sharon has not suffered any damage
cognizable [in] law by being brought into existence." . . . Sharon,
the Court states, has been given life and even with a handicap it
"is more precious than non-life." . . .
An adequate comprehension of the infant's claims under these
circumstances starts with the realization that the infant has come
into this world and is here, encumbered by an injury attributable to
the malpractice of the doctors. That injury does not consist of the
child's afflicted condition. . . . Rather, the injury consists of a
diminished childhood in being born of parents kept ignorant of her
defective state while unborn and who, on that account ^were less fit
to accept and assume their parental responsibilities.
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Osborn's eugenic hypothesis posited that eugenics could best be achieved
by working it through conventional practices such as medicine and family
life/ planning
. He sought to imbue the middle class life with a healthy
environment which favored the fit over the unfit and supported those
best able to produce the fit. Consequently, public policy consistent
with that goal would have to promote wholesome family settings and the
freedom of the fit to reproduce (thus the welfare state). Handler
objected to the majority opinion because it posited, as a matter of
public policy, that life, regardless of its quality, is sacred.
Handler, on the other hand, started with Osborn's quality of life
position and sought to provide the institutional conditions whereby the
ideal or normal would take precedence over even life itself. in other
words, Handler desired to write into law both halves of Osborn's thesis:
the rejection of genetic flaws and the promotion of a eugenic
environment. The court accepted only the first.
The courts have not accepted as such the arguments in favor of
wrongful life, but in their acceptance of the parents' position, they
have come close. What several courts have established is the parents'
right not to have defective children and that this carries a duty to the
medical community. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, stated
that because of the advances in medicine, "parents have a right to
prevent the birth of a defective child and health care providers a duty
correlative to that right ." 30 Consequently, screening has become a part
of the medical process and, from the physician s perspective, is now a
component of normal medical care. Politically, it has increased the
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feasibility of eugenic family planning, although when assigning it this
exhaulted position, the courts did not do it for eugenic reasons,
but rather in the name of normality and parental choice.
Politics
The politics of prenatal screening falls into two contexts. The
first is family health care; the second is abortion. Approaching
prenatal screening through the wrongful birth and wrongful life cases
aids in identifying how the two link together. The court cases grew out
of a health care concern over identifying the status of the fetus in
order to ensure that parents had as much choice in the family planning
decision as was legally possible. Thus the health care component
depended on the diagnostic ability of the medical practitioner.
The principal consequence of correct identification was
abortion based on parental assumptions about quality of life
considerations (both their's and the infants"). The failure to offer
this possibility led to malpractice charges. Into this setting entered
the screening techniques. They offered greater precision and power in
identifying genetic defects. But this extended capability increased the
opportunities for abortion. (It also offered information which might
prevent abortion.) Thus the pressure of malpractice and the goals of
family health both provide pressures toward recommending prenatal
screening
.
By itself, the technique simply offers information. It is
neutral and, for most tests, effective. But no technology exists in a
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vacuum divorced from social institutions. It is the social context
disclosed in the court cases that makes the clinically effective
technique of questionable social efficiency
.
31
In practice, two
contestable practices are enhanced, abortion and quality of life
32considerations. Evaluation of the technique cannot be separated from
these consequences (as well as an improved health of infants that may
result )
.
The politics of prenatal screening in the context of these cases
illustrates two factors inherent to technology in general. One is a
social push toward the technology, the second the technology's push on
society. At the first level, the political institutions applied
pressures to introduce and expand the use of the technique. This
pressure resulted from the malpractice cases where the doctors, in order
to protect themselves, are under pressure to provide their patients with
as much information (or inform them of the availability of the means to
obtain that information) as is possible. An example of this is the
action of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
recommending to its members that they inform their patients about an
alpha fetoprotein (AFP) prenatal screening test even though the College
did not endorse the test. California has also promoted the use of the
technique in its AFP screening program. By setting-up a program making
the test widely available, it has placed the physicians in the position
33
of facing malpractice if they do not inform their patients.
The other consequence is the force of the technique's push on
the political system. In this case, the principal push is on the
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abortion controversy. But it works in two ways. Although not a latent
controversy to begin with, prenatal screening increases the relevance of
abortion to family planning. Expanding the availability of the
technique increases the number for whom abortion may become a live
option. It may also prevent unnecessary abortions. However,
identifying soon to be aborted fetuses is the part that causes
controversy among the antiabortionists. 34 (it is the killing of any
fetus, not net lives saved that concerns them.) Because abortion is the
principal remedy, it is of necessity a part of screening. Pressure,
however, is also on the antiabortionists to compromise. Although the
screening in no way legitimizes abortion per se
,
opposition to abortion
used to avoid the suffering of an infant's death (e.g., lay Sachs) may
seem unnecessarily restrictive.
Against this background falls the California AFP screening
program. Under the California program, all who provide prenatal care
must distribute a brochure (written at a sixth grade reading level) to
each patient. The patient is asked to sign a form indicating consent or
refusal to consent to the blood test. This is to re-enforce that the
program is voluntary but also to protect the doctors against malpractice
suits. Most insurance covers the forty dollars cost of the testing.
The two principal diseases uncovered are neural tube defects (about 80%
35
of the serious cases) and Down's syndrome (20% of the cases). This is
potentially significant because spina bifida, one of the NTD's, may be
treatable so as to allow the individual to live a normal life.
Successfully identifying those afflicted may allow for improved neonatal
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care. While many states offer prenatal screening, this program is the
only systematic AFP program. It is also the first major use of the AFP
blood screening technology in the United States; the technique receives
wider use in Europe.^
Despite clearly benefiting many children, the program remains
controversial. One element of the controversy reflects issues running
through the malpractice cases: the conflict between abortion and the
pressure to offer screening. California made a careful attempt to
distance the program from abortion: it included the necessary follow-up
testing (amniocentesis and ultrasonography) in the initial fee, but
excluded payment for abortion and ensured that the failure to abort did
not preclude other forms of state assistance. Despite these efforts,
abortion remains an issue. In defending the program against this
concern, the argument made by the chief of California's Department of
Health genetic disease branch, Dr. George Cunningham, is telling:
It is not a question of offering abortion. It is a question of
offering a test that offers information about the state of a
pregnan^. What a person does about this depends on her own set of
values
.
This defense fails. When the options, as was noted above, are abortion
or neonatal care, then the provider of the information is not innocently
providing information. The state can reasonably expect that many will
terminate their pregnancy—in fact this is a goal because they hope to
reduce the costs of health care. It is blinking at reality to then
argue that the state bears no responsibility for the actions it made
possible. At this point the pressure of malpractice enters. Doctors
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opposed in principle to abortion and who, because of their beliefs do
not desire to participate, must confront the possibility of being sued
for failing to offer their patients the information. Barring statutory
action removing prenatal screening from malpractice claims, an unlikely
event indeed, the doctor's moral dilemma cannot be solved by abstaining
from the program. Thus, the program forces upon unwilling participants
involvement in activities to which they object in principle and for an
end (abortion) that lacks a powerful moral defense that other socially
controversial and mandatory programs, such as desegregation, possess.
Finally, controversy surrounds this form of screening. The
blood test does not provide definitive information, and is, in fact,
OO
subject to error because it depends upon the date of conception. ° The
second battery of tests will provide answers by the twenty-fourth week
of a pregnancy, late in terms of abortion. The program depends upon
counseling to help the mothers who receive a positive blood test draw
the appropriate conclusions. This is an important part of the program
because it is crucial if unnecessary abortions of normal fetuses are to
be avoided. Concern over the possibility that women will not accept or
understand this procedure and insist on a possibly premature abortion
has been a part of the controversy over this program. It only re-
enforces the critical link between prenatal screening and abortion.
Concerns over how successfully the testing could be carried out given
the two stage (and potentially very misleading initial test) process led
the FDA to delay approving the test from 1980 to 1983 and has
39
contributed to its slow acceptance since its approval.
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To summarize, prenatal screening, conceived within the
preventive medicine rubric, is part damage control (alerting the medical
providers to the special needs of the neonate) and part the struggle for
normality. It also highlights a theme of science in politics: extended
capability coupled with extended responsibility imposing a pressure to
act where no pressure previously existed. The techniques have extended
our ability to know the nature of our children. This potential,
however, created within the political and health care system a pressure
to exploit it. After the wrongful birth cases blossomed, the pressure
carried with it the force of law. This response was not the only one
available. The extended capability could have carried with it the
responsibility to apply the technique prudently: fully aware of the
moral, religious, and philosophical implications of legislating and
acting on visions of normality. To a certain extent this concern was
present (often noted in the early court opinions), but it was, at best,
secondary. The direction of the response reflected a belief in the
value of technological advances and the belief that their application
improves our well-being. The veracity of this belief in this case
cannot be denied. But it is too narrow. It misses the pressures placed
upon the political system by expanding the abortion debate. It ignores
the extent to which even the technical application of the technology
revitalizes the eugenic strain in American society. With extended
capabilities comes extended responsibility, but initially this
responsibility is seen only in technical terms, almost as if the
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technology brought with it a set of blinders to obscure problems
residing outside the logic and framework of the technology.
Newborn Screening
Newborn screening examines inborn errors of metabolism.^ The
most widely practiced form of screening^ it encompasses diseases such
as: Tay-Sachs, Sickle Cell Anemia, and phenylketonuria (PKU) disease. A
A 21986 survey z found that thirty-eight states mandated a neonatal
screening program and five had no mandatory program but a good
compliance rate in their voluntary programs. Thirty-eight states
required screening for at least one other defect and sixteen states
three or more (including: Hypothyroidism, Homocystinuria
,
Maple Syrup
Urine Disease, Galactosemia, Tyrosinemia, or Sickle Cell Anemia). The
remaining five offered at least one other test.
The most common form of screening is PKU. PKU is a defect in
the enzyme phenylalanine used to transform the amino acid phenylalanine
into tyrosine. If untreated it results in severe mental retardation.
Treatment consists of a special diet low in phenylalanine but it must be
started at infancy. An inexpensive diagnostic test became available in
1961 when Robert Guthrie developed a simple, yet sufficiently reliable,
blood test for the disease. The test involves removing a drop of blood
from an infant's foot and measuring the amount of phenylalanine
present.^ In 1962, Massachusetts began a voluntary PKU screening
program and made it mandatory the following year. During the 1960 s
several states joined Massachusetts in programs, 43 by 1973 and 48 by
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Some objected that the early programs were premature; that they
began before PKU
,
the Guthrie test, and the treatment were fully
understood. The programs, however, proved benef icial
,
4
-*
Although accepted as an ideal preventive health program" 4 ^ and
"a model for screening programs ," 47 controversy still follows the
program. Most states test when the infant is three days old and at this
young age, many false positives occur. Under these conditions the need
for a follow-up test is important. 4 ^ The specific dietary strategy has
been questioned, 4 ^ although at present this is not seen as a limiting
factor on the program. Some variation exists among types of PKU and the
screening program and the normal PKU diet do not cover all variations.
While this does not threaten the integrity of the program, it
illustrates how illusive a comprehensive screening program can be.^O
Another problem with PKU programs follows from their success.
Those diagnosed early and successfully treated are usually assured of
the possibility of marriage and parenthood. Many choose to reproduce.
Unfortunately, many of their children suffer from retardation. This
results from maternal PKU which produces retardation from elevated
levels of phenylalanine in the maternal plasma, not a metabolic problem
of the offspring. To alleviate this problem, it is necessary to
identify "PKU mothers" and counsel them on the implications of their
condition and the need for a special diet while pregnant. Quebec,
Canada, undertook a genetic registry program including all people known
to have PKU. The latter were "recalled" at twelve years and counseled
on reproduction and PKU.'*^ This has been advocated by the American
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Journal of Public Health for the United States. 52 Based on the 1986
survey, 37 of the 43 states responding, had (34) or were developing (3)
some form of follow-up on those treated in infancy for PKU.
In this case, "improving" the public health resulted in
deleterious unintended consequences. New institutional arrangements
were needed to identify the new "target" population and arrange for
treatment (when possible). Again, extended capabilities extended
responsibility. This, however, brings to the surface the extent to
which screening may invade privacy. A genetic registry may provide a
means to identify and then treat PKU mothers but it also increases the
extent to which society possesses a centralized control over
individuals' genetic information. The trade-off is fraught with traps
which cannot be avoided as long as we extend our technological control
over life. Most technological advances bring with them the need for
human management of the new environment—management otherwise provided
by nature—and this control and management ultimately centralizes access
to the information relevant to the new environment.
On balance, newborn screening offers a major opportunity to
improve public health. The principal dangers lie in adopting programs
before the testing techniques and treatment are fully developed and in
the extended responsibility thrust upon the health care system to meet
the new challenges created by the successful use of the technology. The
former may result in false expectations which could undermine the
legitimacy of these programs or, in the extreme cases, severe damage to
the child due to faulty diagnosis or treatment. The second danger
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speaks to the political concerns of privacy, freedom, and social
responsibility
.
Carrier Screening
Neonatal screening and, with advances in fetal care, prenatal
screening address the condition of the living. Carrier screening aims
at future generations by identifying the genetic health of prospective
parents. The emphasis behind this form of screening is to allow for
more informed reproductive decisions. Of all three forms of testing,
this one is the most intrusive into a person's life. It also has been
the most politicized.
Perhaps because it is removed from the here and now, the
politics of carrier screening has been less a part of public health and
family planning than a part of interest group politics. The
contentiousness and controversy surrounding this form of screening is
rooted in programs whose origin, as well as transformation, resulted
from interest group politics.
Currently, the main value of carrier screening is as a tool
guiding reproduction. If the prospective parents know which deleterious
genes they carry, then they can estimate the probability of a child
suffering from a disease. Combined with prenatal screening (where you
can determine if the worst case materialized, then abort) this can be a
powerful means to assure a "successful" birth. If no prenatal tests
exist, the couple faced with two carriers must judge whether the risk is
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acceptable and, if not, consider adoption, AID (Artificial Insemination
by Donor), or no children.
This information properly applied could result in a reduction in
the number of children born with genetically transmitted diseases. It
would simultaneously lessen the burden on families and the health care
system; both motives of those promoting carrier screening.
Paradoxically it could have the effect of increasing the number of the
deleterious genes in the pool. Without the prenatal screening, a couple
would have to determine whether or not the risk was acceptable. Many
would opt out, ending their gene line. Now, a variety of techniques
exist which allow the genes to be passed on. For example, the couple
could conceive and then prenatally evaluate the outcome, aborting if
necessary. Alternatively, they could use AID if the donor was not a
carrier. In a similar vein, they could hire a surrogate mother, again
assuming she was not a carrier. Prenatal screening results in a 50%
chance that the recessive gene is passed on (assuming they abort an
affected fetus); both AID and surrogate parenting carry a 25%
probability that the gene is transmitted. To the eugenicist this is a
disaster because the eugenicist strives to eliminate or limit the genes
in our genetic load.
The controversy over carrier screening, however, has not focused
on its diseugenic potential but instead on its political consequences.
Intended as a good faith means of improving family planning, it has
instead been bombarded with controversy centering around questions of
privacy, stigmatization, and racial bias. This practice highlights one
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of the troubling aspects of information: it is not a tangible and
discrete item. The testing provides information about me the use of
which 1 cannot always control. One concern is dishonesty. The
information is supposed to be confidential but the records are not
totally under my control and the information may be released without ray
permission or knowledge. Another concern is that once the information
is known, it cannot be withdrawn. Others will know something about me.
They are free to make judgments and take action accordingly. Of course,
this is also possible with tangible items. If I own a new BMW many may
peg me as a yuppie. To some, this is an undesirable stigma. If I
desire, however, I may be able to eliminate or mitigate the stigma. I
can sell my BMW and otherwise make clear that what others perceived as a
yuppie life was either a case of mistaken identity or a brief fall from
grace. At present, I cannot change ray genes. Information cannot be
traded or withdrawn in the same fashion as tangible goods and
consequently may create conditions outside of my control.
Adding to the problems associated with the transfer of
information is the substance of this information. Screening identifies
a person's genetic essence, not substances invading the body. The
information describes me; how people (including me) interpret the
information is also how, in part, they understand me. This concern
breaks into two parts. First is confusing the identified trait (sickle
cell trait) with the disease (sickle cell anemia disease) and second is
a stigma attached to the carrier as a result of the confusion. The
trait means you carry the recessive gene (are heterozygous for the
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trait) but you do not have the disease and the heterozygous state may
not carry any deleterious symptoms. The only concern is over
reproduction. The disease is self-evident: you are homozygous for the
condition and therefore have the disease. Unless this distinction is
clear in peoples' minds (and experience with sickle cell screening
demonstrated that it was not) being identified as carrying the trait can
easily be interpreted as having the disease. Since for sickle cell
anemia that can mean extended hospitalization and possibly a shortened
life span, potential employers or insurers may (and did) discriminate
against those carrying the trait in order to avoid the hardships the
disease's symptoms impose on an employer (lost work time, sick pay) and
S3
an insurer (payments). If the trait is identified early enough, it
may affect parental or a teacher's expectations toward the child or even
the child's self-understanding. It may also affect the extent to which
others see the person as a desirable marriage partner.
The concern over stigmatization distinguishes carrier from
neonatal and prenatal screening. It does not negate the value of
screening but does dictate prudence in implementation. Prudence,
however, has not always characterized these programs. Tay-Sachs and
Sickle Cell Anemia screening have been the leading programs. Tay-Sachs
began in 1970 and Sickle Cell Anemia shortly thereafter. Both programs
have been recounted in detail elsewhere and only the key lessons will be
54discussed here.
The Tay-Sachs program is considered a success and Sickle Cell
Anemia a failure. Tay-Sachs began as a pilot program in the Washington-
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Baltimore area. It was organized through the community involving
community leaders—including churches and schools. "Fourteen months of
planning, leadership training, personnel development, and public
education preceded the Baltimore-Washington pilot program." 55 After a
successful pilot, the program expanded so that by 1980 only 13 children
were born with Tay-Sachs in North America, down from the previous
average of 50-100. (Although how much of this can be attributed to
screening may be debatable given that only 10% of the eligible
population is reported to have been reached by the screening
programs
.) 5 ^ Participation was voluntary.
Sickle cell anemia screening started because state governments
were petitioned by the Black community concerned about sickle cell
anemia but believing that governments were not responding. Tabitha
Powledge's observation, which to a lesser degree applies to the later
federal legislation as well, captures the failure of this early
movement
:
It has become increasingly clear that the arguments in favor of
sickle cell screening have had more to do with politicians' desires
to do something dramatic (and comparatively inexpensive) for a
neglected population, and doctors' desires to encourage black
interest in health in general, than with the medical wisdom of a
current program of carrier screening per se. J
In fact, reading the congressional testimony as these programs developed
and were later revised, confirms Powledge's observations. Three points
jump out. First, Democrats were using this as a vehicle to criticize a
Republican Administration's agenda; second, the representatives were
straightforward about the program's purpose as serving a neglected
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group; and finally, the concern for the neglected group overshadowed
concerns over stigmatization, the absence of a cure, and care in
planning the program .
^
in their haste to respond, the states' programs were sloppy and
not carefully planned. Some of the sins included: inadequate
involvement of the community in planning and insufficient attention to
educating the community to the nature and goals of the programs. Some
states punished those failing to screen: four states levied fines and
five either withheld marriage licenses or school attendance. (The
latter being a sanction irrelevant to the condition.) Inadequate
counseling left many who carried the trait confused as to their status
and options. Finally, the lack of confidentiality (by 1974 only four
states provided for confidentiality in their statutes) and a
misunderstanding over the meaning of carrier status caused some
employers to dismiss carriers and insurance companies to refuse
coverage. At this point, the black community not only rejected the
programs but many believed them to be an attempt to limit their
(SOpopulation.
The lessons that have been drawn from this program center on
management and planning. Many states mandated the screening but failed
to adequately educate the target population as to the nature and value
of the program. Consequently, many felt threatened or misunderstood the
meaning of the test results. Closely related to this was the failure to
draw people into genetic counseling, due in part to inadequate resources
when the program was begun. Unclear before entering the program as
to
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its value and procedures, many who tested positive for the trait left
believing they had the disease or that their value as a parent was
diminished. The advantage the Tay-Sachs program had on these issues
were community involvement in establishing the program and an extensive
educational effort designed to explain the nature of the condition, what
the testing would provide, and the counseling services available to work
through the findings.
The recommendations follow easily: firmly ground the programs in
the community; ensure extensive education (including tertiary actors,
such as employers and insurance companies) before beginning the testing;
provide genetic counseling as a continuous part of the program; and keep
the testing voluntary. These recommendations would alleviate most of
the problems uncovered in the Sickle Cell experience. A solid genetic
education (note that Osborn, too, advocated this) and genetic counseling
are the best remedies to the problems that Sickle Cell Anemia programs
encountered. Other valuable conditions include strict confidentiality
of the results, a prenatal test expanding the choices available to two
carriers, and a clearly identifiable population to whom a program can be
addressed. From this base, carrier screening could be extended to
Thalassemia (population of Mediterranean descent) or identifying those
at risk for hyperlipoproteinemia (coronary artery disease) or alpha-1
antitrypsin deficiency (susceptible to lung and liver disease).
In fact, this has been the direction of national carrier
screening policy. The political response to the controversy over sickle
cell was not to stop the screening but to reform and enlarge it by
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bringing carrier screening under the public health cover. In 1972
Congress passed the Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act. 61 This Act was
broadened in 1976 to encompass Sickle Cell, Cooley's Anemia, and Tay-
Sachs. Amendments in 1978° J provided for basic and applied research,
training, testing, counseling, information, and education for a wider
range of diseases. In 1979 and 1980, 34 state genetic service programs
received funds through the National Genetic Diseases Act. 64 The next
significant change occurred during the 1981 budget reconciliation
process. The funds for genetic programs were folded in with public
health monies in the Maternal-Child Health block grant. 65 The
controversy resulting from Sickle Cell did not repudiate carrier
screening, only sloppily designed programs.
Reflecting upon the outcome of these controversies, a narrowly
conceived screening program is reasonable. The screening programs are a
technical approach to a genetically based condition. Regardless of
debates over social definitions of disease, sickle cell anemia is
painful and causes suffering. Tay-Sachs kills. These conditions occur
because of nature (with society's intervention confined to the act of
conception). Furthermore, this has an advantage over prenatal screening
in that a remedy may involve not having children rather than abortion.
This eliminates the question which haunts the abortion decision: can
someone with sickle cell anemia live a happy and normal life? (Many
can.) In this context, offering screening to those whose family history
indicates a need seems reasonable. This does not, however, justify
broad or mandatory programs. Mandating neonatal screening for treatable
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conditions can be justified under the health provision of a staters
police powers. But in the diseases screened for here, treatment is not
possible and mandating screening risks stigmatization, decimating some
people's self-image, and invading privacy. The only state interest that
could justify mandating the screening would be to limit the number of
carrier couples. Seeking to achieve this goal through mandatory
screening is not too far removed from prohibiting marriage between two
carriers. At present, that remains unacceptable. But if society is
unwilling to do the latter, it should not undertake the former.
In the case of screening for genetic diseases (or traits),
society and science's interests join easily and comfortably. For
science, the social focus on the genetic dimension provides
justification for research into the basic causes. It also increases its
authority over the society as the definitive interpreter and principal
implementor of its knowledge. For the society, it has the opportunity
to improve its health. The working assumption is that the best way to
attack disease is at its most fundamental point. That, too, is the goal
of the research: to gain total control over the workings of genetics
(albeit, piece by piece).
The bargain struck between science and society (some call it
Faustian for both) reflects the technical nature of health care.
Nature— the body— is reduced to an object to be addressed technically.
All moral meanings attached to the being are stripped away; the being
becomes the body. This is why the fact that the screening has dealt
with genetically based disease is important. Screening approaches the
181
condition from a narrow and technical perspective; this limits the scope
of what it can find. Its definition of the situation will be in terms
of genetics which, fortunately, is also the source of the problem and
the key element in any solution. At this point, the danger of
stigmatization becomes clear. What this involves is transferring the
technically defined problem (that person x deviates from the average
genetic condition) into a moral one. Social evaluations of the person
should not turn on the technical identification per se but rather on
societal (political, economic, moral) considerations. The point behind
genetic identification is that the knowledge should empower the
individual, not the society over the individual.
While offering power to the individual, this recommendation does
have limitations. Principal among them is its reliance on the medical
system. Not everyone has equal access to it. Trust in health
providers, a regular relationship with the system, and resources to
enter into it fully differ across income, occupation, and region.
Another concern centers on questions of power. Focusing on the genetic
dimension re-enforces the relationship between a doctor and patient: the
doctor acting on the patient. In fact, it places the patient in an even
more passive position since his role in relating symptoms can be
replaced by a sample of his blood. Of course the fact that as a society
we generally accept this authority of doctors helps legitimize the
genetic approach.
In relation to genetic disease, therefore, carrier screening can
be appropriate although not without limitations. Enthusiasm for the
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technique, however, is not confined to disease. For example, according
to James and Margaret Thompson, "It is theoretically possible to screen
adult populations to identify members who are at risk for one of several
kinds of disorders that could be forestalled by diet, by avoidance of
smoking, or by other health-promoting measures that are matters of life-
style rather than of medicine. it has already been used in the
workplace to identify those susceptible to exposure to certain hazardous
substances and has been suggested as a means to improve AID. In these
cases, screening is being extended to events which have genetic aspects
but which become actuated by societal or human intervention. In other
words, the blame for any illness can no longer rest principally on the
gene. This key change limits the force of the argument for a technical
explanation and solution to the problem.
The practice of screening in the workplace has been limited and
controversial. It operates on the premise that carriers of a trait, who
under ordinary circumstances would not suffer from the condition, may be
at risk if certain environmental insults were to trigger the condition.
For example, some fear that the sickle cell trait could interfere with
the blood's oxygen carrying capacity and this might be a problem for
those exposed to oxidizing chemicals. The idea of screening is to
identify those with such hypersensitive conditions and assign them to
less threatening jobs. While sickle cell is not a good prospect for
screening (the connection between workplace insults and adverse
ft 7
reactions has not been shown), glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase
deficiency ( G6PD) and serum alpha-1 antitrypsin (SAT) were considered
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viable. The former, which disproportionately affects black males and
Mediterranean Jews, can predispose carriers to anemia due to a lack of
oxygen. The latter may produce lung disorders. 68
This form of screening has never been widely practiced and has
declined over the past dozen years. According to an Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) study, seventeen companies have tested and
only five continue.
A
survey of nine chemical companies conducted by
the author confirms the general conclusion of the OTA report.^ 0 Seven
report no current screening, one screens for sickle cell trait at the
request of black employees but does not use the results for placement.
The five who commented on the issue portray application of the technique
as premature. Two left open the possibility of future screening if
scientific developments warrant. OTA reported 53 considering future
screening.^ In communication with the author, one company reported
abandoning screening because "the tests were not shown to be helpful in
providing a safe and healthful workplace." Controversy exists, however,
over the reasons testing was abandoned, raising the possibility that the
7 2
company was selective or misleading in relating its findings. in sum,
the use of screening is not a significant part of employment practices
but remains a viable long-term option.
As a result of at least an intellectual acceptance of this
technique, the issues surrounding and logic behind it deserve
discussion. Workplace screening differs in at least one important
respect from the disease screening previously discussed. In the latter
programs, simply being a carrier of the trait was not considered a
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problem for the carrier. But in the workplace, it is the problem. This
raises the problem of stigmatization in its most naked form. This fact
alone has proved controversial and raises one of the many objections to
this practice. First, the tests risk shifting the burden of a safe
workplace from the employer to the employee. If a means exists to
identify any who apparently are at risk, then the pressure to eliminate
the harmful substances diminishes. Certainly this fails because it is
so dependent on current knowledge. How certain are we that others do
not possess unknown conditions which places them at risk? If the
workplace can be cleaned up enough to diminish general risk, are not
these better odds to play? If later discoveries demonstrate that they
were at risk all along, they have good reason to claim preventable
negligence. It also smacks of blaming the victim. It is one thing to
focus on the victim when nature victimizes him (disease) but it is
inappropriate when environmental conditions, within social control,
precipitate the problem.
Another concern highlighted here is ethnic bias. Two of the
three tests stated above are disproportionately ethnically linked. Even
though the genetic condition is real, should only some groups
systematically have to bear the largest burden in remedying the problems
of workplace safety? Especially when alternative policies exist? This
problem is magnified (but not created) when those groups have a history
of being stigmatized in the general society.
Finally, while evidence exists to suggest a genetic
predisposition to susceptibility to chemical insults the science of this
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field is still developing. The conclusion by the OTA on the state of
the science of workplace screening is illuminating:
The biological foundations of the concept of genetic screening to
identify predispositions to occupational disease are sound. In
addition, most of the well-studied traits are reliably identified by
easy and inexpensive tests. It should be recognized that other
biological variables such as age, nutritional status, preexisting
diseases, and lifestyle also affect the body's susceptibility to a
variety of environmental insults. The study of factors affecting
susceptibility to occupational diseases, therefore, should not stop
with a quantification of genetic influences, as important as they
may be, but also should incorporate the other biological
variables
First, given the state of the art it would be inappropriate to screen
for job related purposes. The ambiguity of the situation leaves serious
doubts as to what the hazard threshold level should be and provides no
clear ground to claim that those whose screening identifies possible
susceptibilities are significantly more at risk than those whose
genetics are "better" but whose "other biological variables" are the
same or worse. More generally, the OTA conclusion raises the slippery
slope question. If it is legitimate to control the workplace by
limiting workers' job options based on their genes, then it also could
be appropriate to control other "biological variables," several of which
involve personal choices (lifestyles). Once the logic of approaching
risks in the workplace through the individual is accepted, then it is a
small step to expand that regulation to other relevant factors. These
might include such factors as lifestyles which affect the quality of
work (alcoholism) or conditions involving third persons (pregnancy).
But even in these cases the problem remains that by focusing on the
individual may eliminate the imperative to improve the work conditions.
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As scientific understanding advances, the scope of relevant factors with
a biological element grows; the scope of surveillance and control may
grow as well.
The slippery slope alone is not an adequate reason to dismiss
this approach. Making difficult discriminations is the nature of
policy-making. What is troubling about this approach is the apparent
transferring of a technical model to concerns that extend beyond the
merely technical. Focusing on the biological dimension implies that the
problem is a health problem. In part it is. But to accept that as the
overriding problem is to confine solutions to the isolation of
environmental insults to individuals as the insults become known. In
other words, the problem can be addressed adequately by identifying the
person's biological status. This ignores the risks others face because
the tests only demonstrate risk, not safety.
While the relevance of a person's body is undeniable, focusing
on the body is an attempt to reduce the issue to a level amenable to
scientific investigation. The promise of science in this case is to
improve the employers ability to fine tune the workplace. Most of the
occupational health issues that triggered the interest in screening grew
out of our exploitation of scientific advances. Pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and plastics are all components of science driven progress.
Science provided these advances through its ability to control nature,
to exploit the workings of nature consistent with our priorities. While
many benefits result from this, so do unintended costs. That is the
tradeoff behind the chemical company's slogan: "Without chemicals,
life
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itself would be impossible." Three options exist in response to these
externalities. First, we could abandon the scientific advances. Few
accept this modern day Ludditism. Second, we could simply "write-off"
the consequences. What are a few extra cancer cases compared to a great
advance? Obviously this is unacceptable as a general rule. Finally
(and coincidentally most reasonably), science could be marshalled to
explain and remedy the consequences resulting from our exploitation of
its earlier advances. Scientific advances often create new scientific
problems. Where nature once provided the balance and counterbalance, an
artificial world demands artificial balance.
The consequence is that science is called upon to expand its
control in such a manner that the previous gains can be retained. Man
must be made to adapt to the new environment. The lure of genetics is
that it opens up the body as a means to that end. This was the insight
of the eugenics movement and it is part of the modern interest in
genetics. Science/technology once adopted tends to perpetuate itself.
Since scientific knowledge is by definition incomplete (the goal, not
the reality, is perfect knowledge), each advance points toward new
questions. For society, the imperfect knowledge manifests itself in
these unintended costs which provides the opening for further research
and advancement on the part of science, which is then adapted and so on.
This is the arms race; it is also referred to as a technological
imperative. This should not be confused with determinism. Rather, the
imperative is to progress along a certain path because of the initial
investment in that approach. It is scientific incrementalism. The urge
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to screen workers follows this pattern. Confronted with the need to
respond to workplace hazards and a growing social interest In the
developing screening technology, the logic pointing toward extending its
application to a new area is compelling. What better way to adapt to
the new environment than through man's essence. The fact that the
relevant "science is truly in its infancy ," 24 is only a temporary set-
back. Research continues in the area and the idea remains viable.
The logic of this argument should be familiar. The eugenicists
argued that advances in medicine disrupted the evolutionary adaptive
process and necessitated human intervention to take nature's place.
Workplace screening is economic eugenics. Mankind changed the
environment and now must ensure a good fit. This could be achieved by
changing the environment, but that would mean giving up many advances
that most of society wants to keep. For the present, direct
manipulation of the body (e.g., changing genetic vulnerability to
environmental insult) is unachievable. That leaves identifying the
genetic characteristics and assigning people to the environment for
which they are most suited.
Does this fit with the screening for disease? Common to all
forms of carrier screening are eugenic goals. All seek to minimize the
damage that may result from "our genetic load. In one case the damage
results from nature, prompted by human procreation, and in the other
through more forceful human intervention triggering an otherwise latent
condition. Workplace screening was described as part of a search to
improve the fit between man and his environment. Is that true for
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disease screening as well? Essentially, it is. In this case best fit
is defined as no genetic disease. Given the advances in medicine,
whatever side benefits may accrue to carrier status can be taken over by
medicine (e.g., someone with sickle cell trait is more resistent to
malaria than others). The implicit argument is that everyone is better
off without it: the child, the parents, and the society. What is normal
(no "disease") is what is good and what is good is what is desirable.
It is, however, the goal of normality rather than the evolutionary laden
eugenics that guides this practice.
190
NOTES
1. Peter T. Rowley, "Genetic Screening: Marvel or Menace," Science
225 ( 13 July 1984) : 138
.
2. Regina Kenen and Robert Schmidt, "Stigmatization of Carrier
Status: Social Implications of Heterozygote Genetic Screening
Programs," American Journal of Public Health 68 ( 1978) : 1118.
3. U.S. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Screening and
Counseling for Genetic Conditions
:
A Report on the Ethical,
Social, and Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, Counseling,
and Education Programs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1983), pp. 27-31. (hereafter referred to as President's
Commission )
.
4. W.A. Hogge
,
S.A. Schonberg, and M.S. Golbus
,
"Chorionic Villus
Sampling: Experience of the First 1000 Cases," America Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynecology 154 (June 1986): 1249.
5. Hogge, Schonberg, and Golbus, p. 1250.
6. Michael K. McCormick, "Screening for Genetic Traits and Disease,"
American Family Physician ( 1981) : 158.
7. Gleitman v. Cosgrove , 227 A 2d 689 (1967).
8. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, p. 692.
9. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, p. 692.
10. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, p. 693.
11
.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, p. 693.
12. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, p. 704.
13. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, p. 704.
14. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, pp. 704-6.
15. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, p. 693.
16
.
Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
191
17 .
18.
19.
20
21 .
22 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 SW 2d 846 (Tx, 1975); Dumer v. St.Michaels Hospital
,
233 NW 2d 372 (Wise, 1 9 7 5")^
Jacobs v. Theimer
,
p. 849.
Berman v * Allan, 404 A 2d 8 ( NJ , 1979) and Dumer v.
Hospital
,
233 NW 2d 372 (Wise, 1975 ).
St. Michael's
Mliot v * Irown > 361 So 2d 546 (Ala, 1978); Becker v. Schwartz,
386 NE 2d 807 (NY, 1978); Strohmaier v. Associates of Obstetrics
and Gynecology
,
332 NW 2d 432 (Mich, 19827; GoldberFbFIHd
through Goldberg v. Ruskin
,
471 NE 2d 530 (111, 1984)"
Howard v. Leichner, 366 NE 2d 64, 67.
Elliot v. Brown, p. 548.
In re Grady
,
426 A 2d 467 (NJ, 1981).
Goldberg by and through Goldberg v. Ruskin
,
p. 534.
Tur Pin Sortini, 643 P 2d 954 (Calif, 1982) and in Procanik by
Procanik v. Cillo
,
478 A 2d 755 (NJ, 1984) the New Jersey Supr^e
Court accepted the extraordinary expenses argument on behalf of
the infant.
Turpin v. Sortini, p. 965.
Turpin v. Sortini
,
p. 965.
Berman v. Allan, p. 19.
A specific recommendation that Osborn would probably have
rej ected
.
Harbeson v. Park-Davis, 656 P 2d 483, 491.
Giandomenic Majone, "Technological Assessment in a Dialectic Key,"
Public Administration Review 38 (January 1978 ) : 52—58 . In his
article, Majone distinguished between the laboratory state and the
social application of a technology. Once a technology is thrust
into the institutions of the society and the skills of those
operating it, a technology which works in a laboratory (effective
technology) may fail in the social context (inefficient). Majone
concluded that it is necessary to assess institutions as well as
technologies
.
192
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41
.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
This is what the Eberhardy court warned against. The social
ilCanT,!e eliminated from the application of a technology.
_^^latter ^ the Guardianship of Eberhardy
, 307 NW 2d 881 (Wise,
Robert Steinbrook, "In California, Voluntary Mass Prenatal
Screening," The Hasting Center Report 16 (October 1986) : 5—7
.
Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1984), p. 236 ~.
Steinbrook, p. 6.
Steinbrook, p. 5
Steinbrook, p. 7.
Presidents Commission, pp. 27-31.
Steinbrook, p. 5.
Normal human functioning depends upon the co-ordinated activities
of many enzymes and other proteins necessary for proper cellular
activity and structure. Thus, a mutation that results in the
absence or abnormality of an enzyme or other protein interrupts
this co-ordination and can lead to a metabolic disorder."
Presidents Commission
,
p. 12.
Rowley, p. 139.
In a survey conducted by the author for this work, forty-three of
those surveyed responded.
Presidents Commission
, pp. 12-13.
Presidents Commission, pp. 13-15.
U.S. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council
Committee for the Study of Inborn Errors of Metabolism, Genetic
Screening: Programs, Principles, and Research, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 23 (hereafter referred to as
Genetic Screening: Programs, Principles, and Research)
President's Commission, p. 14.
Robert H. Blank, Redefining Human Lif e : Reproductive Technology
and Social Policy (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1984), p. 60.
President's Commission, p. 14.
193
49. President's Commission
,
p. 14; Blank, p. 60.
50. Rowley, p. 139.
51. Harvey Levy, "Editorial," American Journal of Public Health 72
( 1982 ) : 1320 .
52. Levy, p. 1320.
53. See Tabitha Powledge
,
"Genetic Screening as a Political and Social
Development ," in Ethical, Social and Legal Dimensions of Screening
f or Human Genetic Disease
,
ed
. Daniel Bersma (New York: Stratton
Intercontinental Medical Book Corporation, 1974) and Genetic
Screening : Programs
,
Principles
,
and Research.
54.
Genetic Screening : Programs
,
Principles
,
and Research.
55. President's Commission, p. 19.
56. President's Commission, p. 19.
57. Rowley, p. 141.
58. National Foundation p. 37.
59. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Research, Treatment and Prevention of Sickle Cell
Anemia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Health, 92nd
Cong., 1st sess., 1971 and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Labor and Welfare, Amendments to Revise Programs for Sickle Cell
Anemia and other Genetic Diseases, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.
60.
Genetic Screening: Programs, Principles, and Research, pp. 120-3.
61. PL 92-294, 86 Stat . 136 (1972).
62. National Genetic Diseases Act, PL 94-278, 90 Stat. 407 (1976).
63. PL 95-626, 92 Stat. 3583 (1978).
64. President's Commission , pp. 31-34.
65. PL 97-35, 95 Stat 357 (1981).
66. James S. Thompson and Margaret W. Thompson, Genetics in Medicine ,
3rd Edition. (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Co., 1980), p. 336.
194
67. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, The Role of Genetic Testing
in the Prevention of Occupational Disease (Washington, D. cT!
Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 91; (hereafter referred to
as OTA)
•
68. OTA, pp. 90-1 and 93-4.
69. OTA, pp. 34-5.
70. The nine companies are: Mobil Oil Corporation, Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Monsanto
Company, Atlantic Richfield Company, Dow Chemical USA, Eastman
Kodak. Company, Exxon Corporation, and American Cyanamid Company.
71. OTA, p. 35.
72. Deborah Schechter, "Genetic Screening in the Workplace: Though
Becoming More Prevelent, These Tests Raise Legal, Scientific and
Ethical Problems Which Remain Unresolved," Occupational Health and
Safety 52 (April 1983) : 9- 12
.
73. OTA, p. 99.
74. OTA, p. 98.
195
CHAPTER IV
THE BODY POLITIC
The eugenic legacy, although not dominant, is important. It
kept alive an interest in shaping and controlling the nature of future
generations and focused concerns on deviations from a genetically normal
body (either physical or mental normality). But what both case studies
present is the greater importance of science and technology in shaping
the events. This occurred in several ways. First, science provided a
more exact understanding of the eugenicist's concerns. Genetic
knowledge illuminated the nature and root of the frailties (enabling a
eugenicist to discriminate meaningfully between a condition capable of
being passed on to offspring (and thus important to the eugenicist) and
one specific to the individual (theoretically of no eugenic importance))
and also provided tools of identification and action that made this
knowledge of practical importance. But this led to another influence of
science where the application of science changed the issue. This took
two forms in this study. First, eugenics became buried in genetics.
This was part of the Osborn/Muller strategy . 1 As a result eugenics can
only be de facto, no longer an explicit policy. This accounts for some
genetic screening programs' diseugenic consequences (i.e., permitting
the passing on of defective genes). The genetic research and
application were defended in terms of science's social value:
paralleling the logic used to defend the application of physics, tor
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this reason, the wrongful birth court cases 2 could extend the most
successful eugenic recommendation (genetic screening) while denying the
eugenic dimension. The consequence was that political controversies
were fought on noneugenic terms. The resolutions to these conflicts,
too, were not eugenically based. Slowly, then, the association with
science transformed the eugenic programs into ones dominated by the
politics of technology: applying the fruits of science and then coping
with the results.
This transformation is the change reflected in the movement from
eugenic sterilization to the politics of genetic screening and the
technocratic use of sterilization. This became the political
battleground: the means to attain social goals and the reason for the
nature of the political reaction. The means side of the equation is
reflected in the modest trend toward the use of sterilization as a tool
to maintain control over the mentally impaired as their legal status
changed. It is also reflected in prenatal screening and the response to
the interest group pressure that brought about the carrier screening
programs. The political reaction centered on the degree and permanence
of the intervention in the sterilization cases; the status of abortion;
and concerns over stigmatization based upon the fact that genetic
screening provides such constitutive knowledge of an individual s
biological being. In general, these would not be controversial to the
eugenicist, attesting to the extent eugenics has been removed from the
calculus
.
197
This political science that developed contains several elements.
Tirst is the eugenic background. Second is the increased
responsibilities placed on the social system as a result of the use of
its increased capabilities. Third, the programs together provide an
institutional context within which politics occurs and which will shape
future decisions, in particular those over which new technologies to
employ. Finally present is reductionist tendencies.
I
The hopes of Osborn and the modern eugenicists of a eugenic
revival or culture has not been demonstrated in the preceding two
chapters. What is demonstrated is the urge to control and the search
for the most effective means of control. Beginning with sterilization,
the most significant aspects were the state court cases extending
sterilization to the mentally impaired and the developments in the area
of reversible sterilization. The former represents the growing
legitimacy of the use of sterilization to control, even in cases when
voluntary consent is not possible. This last point is important because
voluntary consent has been a central issue and, as the federal court in
the Relf 5 case illustrated, a key obstacle to eugenic sterilization.
The Grady^ court went to great lengths to hide the fact of state imposed
sterilization, but this charade failed. Significantly, the strong
dissent by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
5 did not oppose the policy, per
se
,
only the location of the decision, namely in the courts. These
developments suggest rather than proclaim a trend, but the suggestion
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seems plausible given the 1960's legislative interest in linking
sterilization to welfare and the abuse of sterilization within the
welfare system.
The anecdotal and statistical evidence pointing toward
sterilization abuse directed against those on welfare is serious yet
does not constitute the new economic eugenics Julius Paul envisioned.^
Rather, it was used for social (in this case largely economic) purposes.
The fact that sterilization was chosen illustrates two factors working
together, which in turn create a third. First, in many cases the issue
was reproduction, and sterilization provided the easiest solution (the
"technical fix"). A second factor, relevant in the Relf and Grady
cases, was the eugenic legacy which provided precedent for using
sterilization in the case of mental defectives. These two blended
together to create a third, "politics place[ing our] existence as a
living being in question. In other words, the increasingly
sophisticated technology joined with the eugenic focus on genes to
create a willingness to treat the body as an object of political
activity to the degree of shaping the development of future generations,
in this case by denying someone the ability to contribute to it. This
argument does not imply that sterilization was inevitable, only that it
was available and a socially accepted technique (independent of
contextual acceptance).
The line of court cases^ on sterilizing the mentally impaired
embodied the technocratic focus of sterilization's rejuvenation and
served to ratify its status. How else can one explain granting
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sterilization constitutional status and, even more absurdly, as part of
the privacy right? For all its reasonableness as a policy compromise,
the Grady decision represents the legitimation of using biological means
to address political questions. The key is not the status granted
sterilization, but the fact that the court concluded that it must aid
Grady in exercising that right. The court granted the political system
permission to exercise surveillance over and possibly act upon Grady's
biological life. The sleight of hand contained in the "best interests"
position is that her interests and the state's converge. Of all the
abuses or misuses of sterilization discussed, this is the worst because
it is a lie. In an attempt to make available for public policy a
technique, the courts resorted to subterfuge. It accepted a political
practice by denying its political nature. This sleight of hand reveals
the difference between technocratic politics which denies politics and
eugenic politics which accepts politics.
In the area of sterilization, then, one finds two trends
converging. First is the revitalized interest in sterilization as a
formal (Grady) or informal (welfare abuse) policy tool and second is the
growing acceptance of sterilization as a means of contraception.
Certainly the growing acceptance of the technique's routine use will re-
enforce its legitimacy as a policy tool. What threatens to make this
trend a matter of concern is the improvements in reversible
sterilization. This offers the possibility of precise and effective
control. If a reversible sterilization technology develops with fewer
problems than Depo provero, then the use of sterilization could easily
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be extended on a routine basis to rapists or welfare clients (especially
informally by the doctors). Although each of these could be defended on
its own terms, by viewing sterilization as a technique of power, the
different practices become linked. They share the strategy of using the
body to achieve social goals. In the case of both rape and the family
life of the mentally impaired, a biological dimension exists to the
problem but not one that demands a biological approach to its solution.
The virtue of the body as the means to address these issues, however, is
that it is administratively neater and the predictable outcome is more
certain than social or even psychological remedies.
In sum, sterilization has, for the moment, become a part of
political issues and battles greater than eugenics. Its value is seen
in its ability to be a technical fix. While its crude edge has been
blunted, it remains a part of and illustrates those political battles
which are waged on and through the body.
What emerged from the study of sterilization was that eugenics
and the politics of technology work together. The product of this
relationship is making the body the object of politics. This
partnership becomes more evident in the material on genetic screening.
What develops is the outlines of a system through which an increasingly
exacting control over the body becomes possible.
The family planning function common to the three types of
screening raises an important issue: the extent to which the technique s
ability to extend our capabilities also extends our choices and
responsibilities. Prenatal screening enables us to know characteristics
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of our children early in their development, which in turn offers more
choices than previously existed. These choices, however, bring with
them new responsibilities. On the one hand the doctors must now offer
the advantages of the techniques; on the other hand, this information
enhances an ability to act on the revealed fetus. The status of the
fetus becomes our active responsibility.
This form of screening exemplifies the processes that Osborn
hoped would materialize. The patients undertook the screening in order
to determine the status of the fetus. Many would abort if the fetus did
not fit their desires. While the parents act out of quality of life
concerns (including the inability to bear the extraordinary expenses
that an impaired infant requires) their actions also serve eugenic ends.
Eugenic goals "under a name other than eugenics. But this controversy
is not eugenic. Social problems (the care and treatment of the mentally
and physically impaired; the quality of family life) are being addressed
medically. The controversy is over the appropriateness of this strategy
and its current manifestation, abortion. Concern over deleterious genes
receives scant attention. In this case, the responsibilities carried
with the extended choice transform the issue into a debate over the
moral dimension of the form of action following from the technique's
application. At present this is abortion, but generally it centers on
the enhanced ability provided by the technique to define and act on
quality of life concerns. The issue itself is part of a strategy which
seeks to achieve social goals through the instrumental treatment of
life. Eugenics is but a subset of this approach.
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While prenatal screening produces eugenic outcomes, neonatal
screening is diseugenic. This results from its assistance in the
passing on of deleterious genes onto future generations. Begun as a
routine public health program the consequences of its success, however,
placed upon the government an expanding role in genetic management.
This took three forms. First, the success of the PKU program encouraged
the expansion of neonatal screening to other diseases. Second, because
not all diseases have cures (e.g., sickle cell anemia), the program
extends to research as well as public health. Finally, the programs
extend into the adult lives of those screened. The infants successfully
treated for PKU, must be monitored and then counseled when they reach
reproductive age. Most of the states have or are developing programs to
collect and maintain this information. In sum, the responsibilities
extended relate to an enhanced ability to identify, record, and monitor
individuals' genetic status. This sounds more sinister than it has been
in practice. But what is important is the extent to which it increases
the state's focus on genetic matters and provides an institutional
capacity to act.
Carrier screening is the form of screening with the most
potential to aid in the eugenic approach to reproduction. It can
identify the genetic quality of surrogate mothers or AID donors. It
would certainly be employed in the Buck Rogers world of cloning. But
when it was put into a systematic program, it was in response to ethnic
interest group politics. Since the capability existed to identify those
who might produce a child suffering from an ethnic specific disease, the
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reasoning went, then there existed a public responsibility to use it.
As was the case for neonatal screening, this is not particularly
remarkable other than its break from strict eugenics. These diseases
are genetically based and can be best addressed genetically. Carrier
screening, however, has been extended beyond this level to the workplace
and the ability to address biologically other social concerns (e.g., the
link between smoking and disease) is rapidly developing. This expansion
betrays an interest in the technique growing out of a willingness to
achieve social goals by acting upon the body. In sum, this technique is
developing in two ways. First, following its eugenic heritage, it
provides a vehicle and partial administrative structure to promote
eugenic reproduction, although instituted for noneugenic reasons. Next,
its technocratic dimension offers an ability to exercise exacting
control over individuals as they relate to various social concerns
(e.g., workplace insults, drinking, smoking, drugs).
Hastily developed programs that crept beyond their original
scope characterized neonatal screening as well. PKU screening was
introduced before it had been proven effective and before the diet was
fully tested. But the importance of that form of screening includes the
legitimacy it helped confer on neonatal screening, the role for public
health in that area, and its extension into maternal PKU programs. In
other words, even though the screening is narrowly applicable in its
early stages, lessons learned from its use, consequences resulting from
its successes, and scientific developments around it combine to
transform the program. Carrier screening also exemplifies this.
204
Beginning as a means to identify blacks or Jews at risk, early programs
evolved into part research, part public health programs. The technique
is now considered for use in the workplace to provide a more detailed
portrait of job candidates and as a means to improve AID through
examining the donor s genetic make-up. Introduced in one context it not
only transformed that but also expanded into new areas. What holds them
all together is focusing attention at the level of genes.
The fact that a technical system was in place made it easier to
use the same approach to expand into new areas. In fact, this
exemplifies a central issue in the study of technology's political role.
According to one student of technological politics, political theorist
Langdon Winner, the lasting political importance of technology is not
its original adoption, but rather the context it enters and helps to
create. He stated this as follows:
I would not deny that there are any number of factors that go into
the original and continued employment of these technical ensembles.
... My question is, however, In what technological context do such
systems themselves operate and what imperatives do they feel obliged
to obey? .... That one employs something at all far outweighs
(and often obliterates) the matter of how one employs it.
Genetic screening provides an institutional setting within which the
genetic knowledge can be identified, transmitted to the public, and
used. In this process, the status of the body becomes important. No
longer are we simply manipulating atoms or other inert objects; now the
object of our attention is living and within us: in fact in one sense it
defines us. The body, the natural laboratory, is the subject of
scientific investigation in the same way that an atom is in physics. By
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defining the body clinically and instrumentally in order to bring it
under the powerful gaze of science, shaping or repairing people to serve
a variety of interests becomes possible.
Of course, science's gaze produces many benefits. From the
individual s perspective, living as a PKU mother is preferable to the
retardation that results from failing to treat her as an infant. No one
would suggest withdrawing into the Luddite's worldview. But the too
ready acceptance of these techniques may produce unintended problems.
One is the tendency to reduce issues to scientific or technical terms.
The danger inherent in genetic technologies involves explaining disease
or birth defects simply in scientific or medical terms which implies a
scientific or medical response. Marc Lappe elaborates:
I would not attempt to deny scientific or genetically verified
realities. ... It is the social institutions that we develop to
respond to those realities when they are verified that I'm concerned
with. The rapid appropriation of a genetic model for which the
first solution might be sterilization of carriers may not be the
most moral way of approaching a problem of a carrier status for a
significant gene.^
Concerns regarding workplace screening stem partly from this factor.
Defining the risk of workplace insults in terms of the body's reaction
to chemicals reduces the issue to one of science, then genetic therapy
or social exclusion makes sense. If the companies had maintained the
issue at this level of understanding (which all claim they did not) this
would be an example of the genetic model at its purest. While employers
have not yet reduced policy to the level of genes, the courts have. The
wrongful birth cases have required the option of genetic testing in
12
order that all technical remedies are available. The Gleitman court s
206
reliance on a policy favoring life is a rejection of the genetic model
but the legalizing of abortion and the subsequent developments in tort
law guaranteeing the genetic option have enhanced the model's stature.
Of course it is not accepted without qualification, but its imperatives
are ascending.
The issue of eugenics cannot be dropped too easily. Winner, in
fact, does provide grounds for dismissing a deterministic eugenics
argument but not eugenics entirely. Genetic screening is of eugenic
origin and often works to promote eugenic ends. But, in practice, it
has become a technological issue subsuming its eugenic dimension to that
of genetics. The fact of deployment has been important in that the
institutional context transcended the eugenic dimension.
Once the technique is introduced to solve one problem, it
expands to deal with new ones. The dangers this brings with it are of
losing sight of broader social issues and reducing the subject to a
technical issue and, once that is accomplished, falling prey to the
narrowing blinders of a technology. Within the technical world of
prenatal screening, abortion should not be a problem. Abortion's
controversy is social. But it carries over to the screening. The
problem occurs because of the context, health care, within which the
techniques are used. It is presented as a part of public health (and
the doctors pressured into making it available) while the leading remedy
to an identified problem is a deeply politicized issue that some may
consider murder. The two practices cannot be completely separated yet
within the world of health care, the politicized world of abortion makes
207
no sense. This is the same trap waiting to be sprung in the workplace.
Why should it be controversial to identify those whose genes predispose
them to risk? Is not this to their advantage? If the issue is simply
technical, the answer is yes. The technical focus blinds its
participants to those considerations outside of which the technique is
programmed to handle. At the same time, its power is also obvious and
its potential applications wide (e.g., Tay-Sachs, AID, workplace). The
imperative that Winner questioned is to identify even more precisely
more characteristics of our genes that are relevant in the modern
( post ) industrial world. That is reductionism, and moral values exist at
which we may have to blink in order to expand the technique.
II
Although the application of scientific advances is rarely
denied, it is worth proceeding as if denial were possible. The current
focus on regulation and the prudent introduction of new techniques is
responsible public policy and beneficial at the important level of the
individual, but it obscures broader consequences and misses the
contextual concern raised by Winner.
After minimizing the direct influence of eugenics on recent
events, it must be acknowledged that one of Muller's strategies is
rapidly developing. He hoped to promote eugenic reproduction and
13
recognized that this would mean separating love and reproduction.
Although this is not the necessary result of a systematic and expanded
use of genetic screening, it is likely. Muller wanted to make the break
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in order to plan birth, but today that is not the sole motivation.
Instead it grows from the frustration of infertility as well as from
those carrying deleterious genes, such as Tay-Sachs.
Changes along these lines are already apparent. Surrogate
parenting has grown in acceptance and, as the Baby M case 14 confirmed,
the definition of a parent has changed. The natural mother was denied
her child at birth. Certainly "parent" is a socially constituted term
and it appears that as technology becomes more effective, pressure is
applied to redefine the term. In this case, love and reproduction were
disconnected. Love and birth remained, but the act of reproduction was
clinical. If the fertility problem resides with the male, AID is a
possible remedy. This too breaks the love-reproduction relationship,
but little else. In both cases, genetic screening would make the
techniques more effective, in the sense of avoiding error.
Liberal societies usually encourage the application of
technologies when, as in these situations, they appear to respond to a
social need (where social need is defined as the sum of individual
needs). But what distinguishes these techniques from others—nuclear
power, automobiles— is that they act on and through the person. By
opening up the body too completely to science, society risks promoting
an instrumental understanding of the human: treating the person as a
machine. This is the technical context into which new techniques—or
refinements of old ones—enter. In the case of PKU screening it is
appropriate. But the controversies surrounding abortion, surrogate
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parenting, and non-voluntary sterilization indicate that it is not
always appropriate or acceptable.
At stake is society's conception of its children and the family.
The promotion of genetic technology rests on the desire to ensure the
best quality of life possible for children and their families. This
motivation is not entirely unselfish. Concern over expenses involved in
raising someone impaired, the psychological trauma felt by parents which
may interfere with their ability to be a good parent are all part of
this concern. In fact, they are the reasons the courts began to move
toward the wrongful birth position. But the approach developing in
order to fulfill this responsibility urges that we do all that is
technically and humanly feasible to ensure the good life. Careful
planning, which would include screening and maybe even the use of
donors, is a logical extension of this and offers a more precise vehicle
to the desired end. This is not a world without love, but it is one
willing to break the love-reproduction bond. This perspective has been
accepted by many of the courts, usually in the name of quality of life
considerations. It supports the Grady decision, the acceptance of
wrongful birth cases, and the initial Baby M decision. It is also
consistent with (although not derived from) Osborn's quality of life
concerns .
^
But the instrumental view of life this view contains can extend
beyond its quality of life concerns. Once instrumental manipulation is
accepted in order to minimize natural suffering or hardship, the
practices gain social acceptance. This is the importance of the
210
technical context. If their use to eliminate natural handicaps is
legitimate, why not social ones, especiu. j.y those with significant
biological dimensions?
Present here is a difficult dilemma raised by these issues.
Unquestionably many of the screening programs help individuals. Many
would live longer and happier lives if they knew what dangers their
lifestyle might increase. But the step from naturally caused problems
to matters of lifestyle expands the aspects of life that are reduced to
technical issues. Given the nature of these technologies, it also
focuses responsibility on the individual. It allows for more exacting
control. This is a problematic approach for the conditions triggered by
lifestyle or social practices. The clear health benefits run up against
the instrumental, technical perspective the practices spread in their
wake
.
1
The Catholic Church, in its Instruction on Bioethics,
recognized the extent to which the instrumental treatment of the person
was spreading throughout society. In this document, the Church confined
its analysis to reproductive issues. Although it is not a useful policy
document, the Instruction does identify several important issues at
stake. Briefly, it discusses issues of control, spirit, and standards.
The Church argues that the technological approach to reproduction shifts
control from God and the family to scientists and technology. It
transforms a human issue into a technical one. For example:
Homologous [in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer] is brought
about outside
-
the bodies of the couple through actions of third
parties whose competence and technical activity determine the
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success of the procedure. Such fertilization entrusts the life and
identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists and
establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny
of the human person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself
contrary to the dignity and equality that must be common to parents
and children . L
The Church objects to two aspects of the process. First, the
doctors must determine which embryos are strongest and should be
implanted. The remainder are destroyed. By what standards are these
decisions to be made? What special competence does a doctor possess
that empowers him in this case? According to the Instruction, "No
biologist or doctor can reasonably claim, by virtue of his scientific
competence, to be able to decide about people's origin and destiny."^
Second, it warns about the dehumanizing effect of these techniques. The
instrumental treatment of the body means the instrumental treatment of
the person. According to the Church:
Thus, in the body and through the body, one touches the person
himself in his concrete reality. To respect the dignity of man
consequently amounts to safeguarding this identity of the man
corpore et anima unus.^
Even after excepting the Church's position and accepting the legitimacy
of the reproductive technologies, this concern is real. Science,
investigating the body, treats the person as an object of nature,
removing any soul (secularly or sectarianly understood). The purpose of
science is to solve the mysteries of nature: in this case, demystifying
the human animal. Thus, to accept the legitimacy of these techniques is
to confer on this endeavor the legitimacy of science. In other words,
accepting the strategy of addressing an issue through a technical means
(e.g., screening) lends credence to understanding the problem as
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technical, meaning amenable to science. If it can be technically
addressed, it should be. The loss of control found here is spiritual
(from the Church's perspective) or human (in the secular view).
Control carries with it another meaning. The Church focused on
technical imperatives (and technologists) replacing either God's or
Man's ability to shape human destiny. But increasing the scope of the
issues which can be addressed through an individual's body increases the
ability of those in power (public or private power) to adapt man to the
social environment. This means that the social and economic
infrastructure does not need to be changed, rather people can be forced
to adapt to it. Again, this is the issue at stake in workplace
screening and any proposals to extend screening to identify those
susceptible to hazards resulting from lifestyle. But it is also
applicable to the reproductive technologies. At present the concern of
those promoting carrier screening or seeking prenatal screening are
genetically linked diseases. It is not a great leap, however, to shift
the concern to include other genetically identifiable problems. Now
control would occur at two stages. One would be in adult life—carrier
screening to identify a person's susceptibilities to hazards. Added to
this would be a reproductive strategy to promote the gene lines most
resistant to environmental insults. This could be achieved through
fine-tuned reproduction using AID, surrogates, in vitro fertilization,
and embryo transfers. Both donors and recipients' genetic
characteristics would be examined and matched. Ideally, these decisions
would be made routinely with individuals responding to social norms.
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These sorts of environmental developments could be attempted through tax
incentives, different fee structures for health care packages, or
public education programs identifying the problems, stating why they are
undesirable, and then offering the genetic services.
The purpose of speculation is not to raise fears but to try and
draw the contours of the developing technological context. To
summarize, it is characterized by a technical understanding of the body
and its instrumental treatment. While developing out of legitimate
public health considerations and a search for an improved quality of
life for both parents and children, its successful implementation
changes social norms and carries with it the need to establish
standards. It focuses on the individual which risks shifting attention
away from social factors to the isolated individual. Finally, against
the technical expertise of science, the individual is in a weakened
position to question the appropriateness of the strategy. This
discussion does not resolve the dilemma, but raises it. In a liberal
democracy, that is all one can ask.
Ill
The preceding section brought to the surface concerns over the
lingering and indirect implications of genetic techniques. This
reflects the same concerns over the slippery slope between therapy and
breeding raised at the end of Chapter One. Pushed to their extreme, the
concerns over the new techniques could lead to a neo-ludditism. This
response is not justified by events to date. More importantly, it is an
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impractical response given the American culture. On the other hand, a
utilitarian or technocratic acceptance of technology misses the
cautionary tales focusing on the extended capabilities and
responsibilities brought on by the techniques. A technology introduced
as a solution to a present problem may extend to situations unforseen
when it was first introduced. To this extent, it helps shape events.
To the practically minded person who recognizes the truth in
each position, but is unwilling to withdraw in despair, it is necessary
to find a path through the technical minefield. To help chart the
course, it may help to focus on the decision-makers and how different
decision-makers bring a different bias to the issues.
Leaving the decision to use and when to use present and
developing techniques at the level of the individual involves two sets
of actors. First is the doctor-patient tandem. They blend together a
health perspective with the individuals' value judgments on issues
involving the sanctity and quality of life. It is at this level that
religious values or secularly derived moral codes will be most telling.
The doctor may serve as a conduit through which the limits of technology
can be passed to the parents. Certainly the doctor as a recognized and
respected expert will generally receive a privileged position in this
dialogue. But the extent of this privilege will vary depending on the
parents' values. Those whose world view presents all life, no matter
what its condition, as sacred provide strict limits on which technical
applications are acceptable. Those who act out of concern over the
child's quality of life—and these decisions often resemble situational
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ethics will necessarily work closely with the physician in order to
determine the range of options, their consequences, and probability.
These different outlooks guarantee that, taken as a whole, decisions
made at this level will vary and in ways inconsistent with each other.
This, of course, parallels the experience with abortion.
The outcome of this process is a form of incrementalism.
Individual decisions accumulate into a pattern and the process of
accumulation may serve to perpetuate the decisions made. In other
words, the repetition of a choice may lend it a form of contextual
legitimacy. It is incremental because the legitimacy builds slowly from
actions which are motivated by events close at hand, including
precedents for the chosen action, but not by an overriding goal with a
clear strategy on how to achieve it. This was seen in the slow but
steady acceptance of genetic screening. It moved from a technique of
choice to the point where it was recognized by courts as a standard
element of health care. The problem with this form of incremental
acceptance of the technique lies in the existence of the competing
world-views within which the techniques appropriateness is evaluated.
The legitimacy of the technique that precedent of use provided placed
genetic screening in the context of a health care technique that grows
out of quality of life concerns. The process through which this ripened
sufficiently for the courts to accept it did not provide a forum where
the indirect consequences and opportunity costs could be examined. This
would involve highlighting its link to abortion at the cost of sanctity
216
of life values. In sum, the courts sanctified the quality of life
perspective
.
What gives the fact of incremental decision-making importance is
the issue of the mobilization of bias
.
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How an issue or interest is
politically organized (that is, organized in a manner meaningful for
political action) determines the political definition of the issue.
This includes such considerations as: the relevant actors, the issues to
which it is likened, the values at stake, and the range of likely
options and outcomes. This is what is meant by bias. Mobilization
enters in the choice of organization used to bring the issue to the
political agenda and the degree to which the issue is visible (in
Schattschneider's terminology, socialized).
Technological incrementalism places the political and social
issues at a low level of visibility, although the spectrum of issues
present may be wide. Decisions are made privately, between the patient
(or parents and doctor or semi-privately
,
in conjunction with hospital
review committees. The substantive conclusions gain precedential
legitimacy as long as they are not challenged. Legitimacy means here
that the participants can act with relative autonomy.
The scope and bias of action at this level is varied. As was
stated, above, the scope varies between religious/moral constraints or
actions and a health care perspective. This can be illustrated by
examples from sterilization. The difficult sterilization question is
how to deal with those unable to consent voluntarily. A restraining
force is a belief in the sanctity of the body and autonomy over
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reproductive decisions. This was the unspoken quarrel between Justice
Douglas in Skinner 22 and Justice Holmes in Buck
.
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On the other side,
sterilization provides a technically effective means to achieve the
health goal of meaningful contraception. Stating it thusly illustrates
how, even at the individual level, broader forces influence the
decision. In particular, one finds religion, liberty of choice,
normality, and the lure of the technologically sweet. A concern that
brought the issue to the attention of the courts was that parents would
respond to social pressures defining mental incompetents as
descriptively and normatively abnormal. This influence may be
exaggerated when a safe and effective technology exists to limit the
damage, so to speak, to one generation. A person may fear that the
failure to be sterilized (or parents failing to sterilize their
incompetent child) may result in personal or social retributions ranging
from disapproval to the withdrawl of social benefits (by either the
public or the private sector). That these social pressures and concerns
over normality exist can be seen in the controversies surrounding
decisions to let mentally deficient couples keep children and
homosexuals be foster parents.
A second actor is the market. The market regulates access to
the health care system. In doing this, it determines the options known
and available to an individual. The market may intervene to prevent
access. Those who lack health care resources may be sufficiently
removed from the health care system so as to be denied knowledge about
the techniques; financially denied access; or inadequately socialized to
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or moral value of the
the values of preventive medicine. If the health
technique is considered significant, then the government may intervene
to provide, or even mandate, access. This was unsuccessfully attempted
in the Baby Jane Doe controversy24 and successfully carried out in the
neonatal screening programs.
A second influence of the market focuses on the health care
providers. The individual s access to a technology, especially within a
system of expertise and technical knowledge as the health care system
is, may depend on the provider actually informing the individual of the
technology's relevance and availability. The patient may have the
finances, appreciate the role of preventive medicine, and be deeply
involved in the health care system (e.g., regular care) but unable to
partake of its fruits if uninformed. This was the issue in the wrongful
birth cases. The government's intervention here resulted from equity
concerns
.
The pattern of outcomes of private decisions raises a set of
concerns that raise the stakes of the process. These issues involve
parental rights and responsibilities. A common influence of technology
on society is to push existing tendencies further than individuals could
or would have pushed them before the introduction of the technique. In
the case of the biological/genetic techniques discussed above, this
appears to be the nature of their influence. One parental concern is
the responsibility toward the fetus, the abortion issue. Prenatal
screening provides the parent with increased abilities to control the
nature of their offspring. The parents can choose their children s
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gender and can monitor (within limits) their physical and mental
development. This new ability confers onto the parents the
responsibility of making judgments concerning quality of their
children s life. The wrongful birth cases can be understood as a
willingness to provide the parents with the opportunity to make these
choices. The long-term concern centers on whether this ability is
turned into an expected or optional parental responsibility.
Certainly, the wrongful birth cases have ensured that the
federalist value of diversity is being honored. But, at this stage of
the debate, the principal follow-up technique, abortion, remains a
controversial remedy and the diversity of the wrongful birth law raises
the concern that the political system sanctions murder (too much access
to screening) or repression (too little access). Neither side can be
satisfied. The rigidity of the activists' positions on abortion hinders
attempts to find a coherent middle ground on prenatal screening. The
prenatal screening techniques define abortion as therapeutic and have
increased the number of opportunities for choosing therapeutic abortion.
But defining abortion as simply therapeutic diminishes the stakes raised
by both sides of the abortion debate. It is a moral Right or moral
Wrong; in either case the logic impels a single national policy. The
desire to provide parents with more information, control, and
responsibility over their children's lives has the unintended effect of
challenging the rigidity of abortion positions. If abortion is a Wrong,
prenatal screening loses legitimacy; if it is a Right, prenatal
screening becomes a subsidiary right. Stated this way, attempts to
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incrementally introduce new techniques, and exploit the flexibility of
federalism, becomes illegitimate. The dilemma this causes was uncovered
by Kristin Luker s study which found the public most sympathetic to
aborting deformed fetuses but found the right— to—life activists^
opposition strongest against this form of abortion
.
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To complicate the issue further, the quality of life perspective
may result in the fetus developing rights against the parent. The
wrongful birth cases imply that the mother should make decisions on
behalf of the fetus. What if she fails to avail herself of these
techniques? Wrongful life cases, which fall into this extended picture,
are against the doctor, but what is to prevent them from extending to
the parent who has access to the technologies and refuses to use them?
An intermediate issue is the fetus suing the mother for inadequate
prenatal care due to smoking, drinking, or drug addiction. In both
cases a parental nondecision becomes a decision. The first of these
extensions— the fetus suing the mother for failing to use the test—is a
logical extension of the wrongful birth position; the second extension
is more probable but not necessary. Holding a mother accountable for
damage due to drug addiction or even smoking, taken by itself, may be
defensible. It extends, nonetheless, the meaning of parental
obligations and responsibility. Although the specifics of court
decisions may be discrete and applied narrowly, the trickle down impact
of an evolving understanding of parental responsibility may not. The
decision-making forum cannot take into account how the new
responsibilities effect other issues (such as abortion) and the fact
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that the decisions are state based may have the effect of widely
diverging standards. In an issue such as this, the wrong, to those who
see it as such, is of such a moral nature that allowing it in some cases
and not others means the system is implicated by the wrong because it is
tolerated at all.
To summarize, decisions left to the individual will, on the
whole, promote the flexibility that individual choice implies; the
decision's low level of visibility may contain the consequences, in
particular moral consequences of the decision; and the incremental
decision-making may allow the society to slowly become educated on the
techniques and their implications while it limits the ability to turn
back. On the other hand, because the decision must come from within the
individual it is subject to internalized social values, including
religious/moral codes, learned health care values and opportunities, and
concerns over normality. Finally, the importance of many of these
values to individuals and the incompatibility of the full range of
decisions made means that pressure will be placed to raise the private
decision to a public issue. Most often this has resulted in judicial
involvement. Given the propensity to socialize the conflict, the next
set of questions deals with how much to socialize it and the desirable
scope and bias of the new conflict.
Throughout this study, the courts have come under close and
critical scrutiny in their attempts to regulate and balance these
concerns. The criticisms have centered on the bias of their outcomes.
In order to generalize on the advantages and disadvantages of the
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courts' role in regulating genetic technologies, it is necessary to
identify key institutional factors. Once these are established, it will
be possible to examine the scope and bias of judicial policy making in
this area.
Courts and legislatures diverge in their approach to governing.
The courts must work through reasoned and principled analysis while the
elected branches logroll or employ other techniques of bargaining. This
difference reflects differing objectives. Arguing this distinction,
Dworkin wrote:
Arguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an
individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to
establish a collective goal. Principles are propositions that
describe rights; policies are propositions that describe
goals. ... A political right is an individuated political
aim. ... A goal is a nonindividuated political aim, that is, a
state of affairs whose specification does not in this way call for
any particular opportunity or resource or liberty for particular
individuals
.
The bias of the court, therefore, rests in its focus on individuals and
in the language of rights.
In the two case studies, the courts were natural institutions
for those who employed them. The wrongful birth cases reflected
individuals seeking access to a technique. Few of the participants
perceived broad social goals at stake. The individuals felt wronged and
needed redress. Grady and Relf also addressed individual concerns: they
sought protection against applications of technology by authorities. In
this context, it is not surprising that the courts have, on the whole,
sought to ensure choice in the use of technology. In some cases this
has meant expanding its availability, in others, limiting it.
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Although it was not the intention of the litigants to set social
policy, establishing policy could not be avoided. The Relf case
provides a good beginning point. Inevitably this court entered into
social policy when it defined the mentally impaired out of the voluntary
consent category. Working without a legislative definition of consent,
the court established the meaning of an accepted constitutional right
(the right to procreate) in a narrowly construed context. Although the
finding had broad social policy implications, the court refused to
resolve them or look beyond the scope of established governmental
regulations. By raising the constitutional issue, however, the court
made subsequent attempts to resolve the policy consequences difficult.
This follows Schattschneider's theory that enlarging a conflict
changes what the conflict is about. In the cases reviewed, the changes
centered around making explicit and public the value and moral issues in
dispute: in the case of genetic screening, certifying the issue as one
of public health and medical practices; in the sterilization cases, the
courts recognized that issues of power and coercion were at stake.
Finally, the courts placed the issues into the language of rights.
Although significant variations exist among the courts, the incremental
movement is toward greater judicial activism in extending access to
technology and to do so within the context of rights sets precedent (and
therefore defines the bias) in the same way that individual incremental
decision-making does. The courts, however, do so in a more public and
authoritative manner. One of the characteristics of incremental change
is that although it moves forward in small steps, it is difficult to
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reverse direction, except incrementally. Here is seen Schattschneider's
insight: once the substance of the conflict is changed, the next change
is not likely to return to the status quo ante but rather to a new
conflict, albeit the offspring of the first two.
Taken as a whole, the Relf court acted responsibly. It focused
on the facts before it and evaluated the consequences of governmental
practices on an individual. This is what courts should do and can do
well. At this point, Dworkin's distinction becomes central. Different
objectives imply different institutional roles. The complexity of
society, however, means that these roles and goals will overlap. At
what point does the presence of the other institution's objectives
diminish an institutions responsibilities to pursue its own? Stated
differently, did the fact that social policy was involved mean that the
Relf court overextended itself? J. Craig Youngblood and Parker Folse,
also concerned with identifying boundaries, raised this issue as
follows
:
Courts govern, and they produce social policy; yet their
institutional nature is such that they do not always produce sound
social policy, at least as judged from the social scientist's
perspective. Their attention to the individual rather than to
social conditions generally and their emphasis on principle, even
when principle is inadequate to capture the complexity of a social
organization, are not conducive to effective policymaking. . . . The
dilemma, however, is only apparent. A society that wishes its
government to do more than simply make policy— that wishes its
government also to accept claims that interfere with the making of
policy—must become comfortable with institutions like the American
j udiciary
.
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The bias of Re If was to Limit the scope of a technology's application
without denying the technology in general and by limiting, but not
excluding, the role of elected officials.
Whether or not this decision falls within the acceptable limits
of the judicial role depends on how one answers the general question of
the role of the court. It is not self-evident that a reasonable man
must necessarily find informed consent under these circumstances
unreasonable. A federal court in North Carolina, for example, found it
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reasonable. Most courts, however, have begun to follow the activist
course set out in Relf and in doing so illustrate the scope and bias of
an activist court. The scope in Relf was broad but the substance of the
scope resulted from the bias restricting its focus to an individual
case. Although it made policy, it worked from the narrower base of its
legal context, in this case the constitution, rather than centering on
the substance of the policy.
This scope and bias may leave the court as a poor choice to be
the institution of first resort in the area of technological
application. This is illustrated by the debate between the Grady and
Eberhardy courts. The Grady court was unwilling to accept the strong
position on consent taken in Relf . Although the court did not argue
this directly, it appeared to be motivated by the desire to make
sterilization a viable policy option. While working within the language
of procreative rights, it sought to keep the option open. Once
rejecting this as involuntary sterilization, the court felt compelled to
constrain the opportunities for abuse. This was not necessary. The
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court could have ruled that sterilization was permissible but that
inadequate guidelines existed and then returned the issue to the
legislature. This was the Eberhardy resolution. By rejecting this, the
court established policy guidelines without reviewing either the past
and current practices or the practice and needs of caring for the
mentally impaired. These are not considerations central to the
determination of rights but are at the core of establishing social
goals. Their neglect is also part of the bias of rights oriented and
individual centered institutions promulgating broad social policy. This
was the thesis of Youngblood and Folse's argument. Given this position,
was it necessary to carry the argument as far as the Grady court did to
resolve the issue of rights? If society must accept institutions like
the American judiciary, the judiciary must make a good faith effort to
stay within its domain. The Relf case illustrates a protection of
rights with a minimal intrusion into social policy. Grady only needed
to establish the issue of rights and could have left the implementation
of its ruling to the legislature. Eberhardy recognized this as a
justiciable issue but desired to wait for legislative guidelines as to
the policy goals. Once these are established, the court could examine
the rules and evaluate their impact on rights. The Grady approach
prematurely raises the rights issue and constrains the policy-making
institutions from subsequently dealing with these questions. The
difference between the scope and bias found in the Eberhardy and Grady
approaches is the difference between using the courts as the institution
of first or second resort.
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Several political consequences follow from an activist court.
By granting the status of right to individual technologies, the question
of what general principle is behind that right remains. Did the outcome
in Grady really mean that a woman has the right to the most effective
contraception? If so, this could severely limit the legislatures'
ability to regulate reversible sterilization. This issue resembles the
influence of the abortion right on the courts' willingness to accept the
wrongful birth position. In each case, a right's scope grows as new
capabilities extend the opportunities to apply it. But all the
situations are not equivalent. What general principle resides behind
these rights? Is it the privacy of the body? The sanctity of the body?
The courts need to draw out the arguments more fully and explicitly in
order to provide the policy-making institutions with guidance. If the
right's scope grows too large, the political system will be handicapped
in its attempts to regulate new technologies. At issue here is whether
courts should be evaluating techniques or principles.
Another consideration of the activist court, especially one
establishing a positive right, is that it further socializes the issue
by committing the state to a certain position. This was true of Grady
and certainly was true of the wrongful birth cases. Again, the use of
the courts as the institution of first resort biased the policy issue.
Prenatal screening is one of several technologies whose purpose is to
allow potential parents to choose their children. This choice may be
zero-sum— to beget or abort—or it may, in the future, allow for
remedial work that may change the child's nature (fetal therapy). The
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question becomes: to what extent society wishes these to be unregulated
opportunities or rights. By linking prenatal screening to the abortion
right and imposing the burden on doctors of offering it as routine
health care (enforced through malpractice tort law) the courts have
limited a legislature's ability to control this issue. It has also
placed the state's institutions in the role of ensuring the option of
eugenic abortion. Again, this is a consequence of approaching the issue
as one of individual rights rather than public policy. The trend by
courts to link access to technologies and individual rights has limited
the ability to treat the issue of regulating the body—both current and
future bodies—as a coherent policy issue. For this reason, the
decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court to return the surrogate
parenting issue to the legislature is welcome. More surprising,
however, was their urging the legislature to look at reproductive
technologies as a whole. Although the opinion reflects a bias toward
allowing access to technology, it also reflects a recognition that these
are interrelated and problematic issues of public policy, not principled
and individuated questions of rights.
In doing this, they recognize the limits of the courts to
resolve the pressures placed on the political system by these
techniques. No longer can abortion and abortion guided by prenatal
screening be seen as equivalent. The first has many motives; the second
is an issue of breeding goals. But a cogent and complete analysis of
these connections cannot be undertaken by an institution whose scope is
limited by the questions brought to it by the litigants; who must wait
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tor issues to come; and who lack the institutional capabilities and
representational mandate to bring together, debate, evaluate, and
conciliate the varied interests and values raised by modern technology.
Once again the argument points toward the legislative nature of
these issues. In fact, even if many of the institutional obstacles to
the courts could be overcome, these remain legislative matters. This
follows from a lesson the text has sought to teach: in subtle ways,
technology legislates. It legislates through directing our actions and
outlook in a certain manner (in this case, the genetic model and
reductionism) and it provides both tools and justifications to extend
the technique to issues beyond those initially addressed (e.g., genetic
screening for lifestyle conditions). The bias of technology itself
raises issues of general public policy. Rights are involved but the
problem with the judicial outcomes is that they have treated access to a
technology as a right in and of itself. This is, for lack of a better
term, "rights reductionism." Rights become specific technologies
(abortion, sterilization) rather than substantive or procedural issues
of politics (free speech, due process). As is true for technological
reductionism, this confuses means and ends. By making the technology
itself a right, the courts also institutionalize the public policy
embodied in the technology. This concern adds to the problems of
judicial governing in this area.
Aside from the limitations of the courts as technology policy-
makers, the legislature as an institution has several virtues. Not the
least is that it should be more democratically responsive. It is
230
designed to offer the most complex and complete representation of the
various interests and perspectives within the country. As it has
developed its system of committees and support organizations, such as
the Office of Technology Asse .ment, it offers the possibility of
integrating democratic representation with technical knowledge. This,
ideally, results in responsible governance. Compared to the courts,
this should allow for a greater representation of all relevant interests
and capabilities to place issues into broader policy contexts.
Therefore, genetic screening could be considered in conjunction with
surrogate parenting and AID programs all of which reflect similar
desires to control reproduction for quality of life concerns and
implicate important social relationships (love-reproduction) and social
institutions (parenting).
Unfortunately, the experience of legislatures uncovered, above,
is not promising. What emerged reaffirmed Theodore Lowi's gloomy theory
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of interest group liberalism. Lowi argued that the
institutionalization of positive government transformed the role of
interest groups from a necessary, but worrisome, aspect of balanced
government, to an integral part of government. Groups have played an
important part in American political theory. Madison, in his defense of
the Constitution, sought multiple and diverse groups to create balanced
politics. Representatives would act as a filter capable of transforming
narrow social interests into broader political ends, to refine and
enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
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their country ." 31 implicit in this scheme is distancing the group from
the institutions of government.
This contrasts sharply with the modern role of interest groups.
Madison's filtering mechanism no longer filters. Rather than the
government acting as a means to enlarge private interests, the groups
now shape and help define the actions of the government. The place of
group politics has shifted from interests organized in the society to
groups serving in the government; it has moved from pluralism in the
society to pluralism in the government. The consequences for
contemporary governing are diffusion of authority and conflict
resolution through bargaining. Lowi described this as follows:
Typical American politicians displace and defer and delegate
conflict where possible; they face conflict squarely only when they
must. Interest-group liberalism offered a justification for keeping
major combatants apart and for delegating their conflict as far down
the line as possible. It provided a theoretical basis for giving to
each according to his claim, the price for which is a reduction of
concern for what others are claiming. In other words, it
transformed access and logrolling from necessary evil to greater
good . 32
Working from this perspective, the legislative process, raised as the
proper response to the courts, may not be adequate to its assigned task.
The previous three chapters presented legislatures which chopped
the technological issues into instrumental aspects of continuing issues.
Early use of sterilization was adopted to meet the eugenicists' fear of
immigrants; genetic screening served the needs of public health
advocates and ethnic politics. But in no case were technologies treated
as active forces drawing links to issues outside of the immediate debate
through links forged by the capabilities offered by the technique.
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Specifically, the legislatures missed the slide from therapy to
breeding. In the case of the early sterilization laws and the Sickle
Cell Anemia screening programs, this resulted in bad politics and bad
policy. In genetic screening in general, it has dimmed awareness of the
qualitative difference between public health screening for genetic
diseases and screening for susceptability to conditions triggered by
lifestyle. The rationale for drawing individuals into the latter
screening programs must be different from the public health programs due
to the greater social dimension of the information sought.
Interest group liberalism claims that governing is dominated by
two forces. First is interest groups serving as representatives of the
public and second is functional expertise. Together they mobilize a
bias which is narrow and technical. Reviewing the substance of the case
studies, both forces were dominant. The early screening laws responded
to the apparent expertise of the eugenic community which had leading
geneticists in prominent positions, lending credibility to their claims.
The role of expertise was again apparent in the immigration legislation
of 1924 and in Harry Laughlin's advisory position to the House Committee
on Immigration and Naturalization. The genetic screening legislation
more clearly reflects the functional approach to legislation. The
principal actors were interest groups and public health experts who
sought to demonstrate the public utility of new technologies and then
institutionalize their use. The advisory network developed so as to
exclude the quality of life/sanctity of life debate. This is a
contentious cleavage in American politics and not one that fits into the
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functional arrangement of committees or into the administrative
structures. By reducing the issues to technical matters, the
politicians were able to skirt what most consider a no-win debate.
It seems reasonable to conclude that reliance on legislatures to
resolve issues surrounding the social adoption of new technologies will
have certain predictable features. First, the legislatures will not
address the genetic issue on its own merits as if it were a discrete
policy issue. Instead the issue will be placed into another context.
Although this is not an absurd approach, it misses the extent to which
the broad issues surrounding breeding can be addressed. The issue will
then be delegated to an agency which will re-enforce the narrowing
circle of issues and interests addressed. In sura, the legislative
process treats genetic technologies as therapeutic techniques. In the
fashion of interest group liberalism, the more controversial and
problematic issues of how far society should allow refashioning the
human essence and issues of normality's social pressures are neglected.
Compared to the courts, the legislatures have succeeded in
opening the issues up to democratic scrutiny, but due to their current
processes and procedures, they have limited the scope. The visibility
and socialization of the issues are expanded but the scope and bias are
generally confined to public health or the use of public health for
ethnic politics. The shame of this resides in the fact that the failure
to question the technologies' appropriateness has given them the stamp
of approval by the state. This, no less than treating them as rights,
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limits the ability to control their expansion into new areas, whether
they be the issues of wrongful birth or workplace screening.
The limitations of this narrow focus can be probed by returning
to the issue of modern eugenics raised at the end of Chapter One. The
issue of eugenics has haunted this work: frequently lurking beneath the
surface but rarely allowing the scrutiny of light. Its ubiquity is
inevitable given that the two areas chosen both grew out of the eugenics
movement. Eugenic's suspended animation results, in part, from the
success of Osborn and those who sought to minimize the intrusiveness of
eugenics. By reducing it to an add-on, rather than an issue in its own
right, its presence remains but its shape is obscured. In order to
tease out the underlying forces at work, Chapter One concluded by
contrasting eugenics and genetic engineering. By returning to the
issues upon which they were compared, it is possible to see the
dimensions missed by the scope and bias of the legislature (although the
courts come closer to addressing them) and to review the two areas
examined in this work.
Eugenics and engineering were distinguished by their reliance on
therapeutic or breeding goals; on an individual or societal focus; and
on average or idealized man. Each of these, as well as the non-
eugenic/eugenic issue, should be made into a continuum. For each pair,
the left end would be the least eugenic. Seen as a whole, the case
studies do not move far down the line toward eugenics. They do,
however, provide the groundwork necessary if that movement became
desirable
.
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Recent experience with both sterilization and genetic screening
has been motivated largely by therapeutic concerns at the individual
level. Contraceptive sterilization was done for matters of lifestyle,
although in the case of Lee Ann Grady societal motives intruded. They
were, however, custodial issues and not issues of breeding. The welfare
abuses offered coercive societal motives but, again, they were not
breeding concerns and were ultimately deemed illegitimate.
Issues of genetic normality remained but in a muted form. In
sharp contrast to the earlier sterilization campaign, the focus on
Grady's deviation from normality centered on her ability to exercise
judgment, not a concern over the future of the race. The societal issue
underlying the Grady controversy was the fate of any offspring she might
produce: would they be brought up well? Deviations from average
capabilities (maybe due to genetic abnormalities) was the standard
against which the need for sterilization was measured. The use of
sterilization in order to compensate for a lack of capabilities shares a
naturalistic bias with eugenics. Each works on the assumption that the
root of the problem is biological and that a biological remedy is
therefore appropriate.
Genetic screening, too, falls at the therapeutic end of the
spectrum, but closer to breeding than does sterilization. Movement
toward the eugenic end of the spectrum is also present on the issues of
individual/societal interests and on the average/normality range. This
movement results, in large part, from the influence of carrier and
prenatal screening. The more precise and powerful the technique, the
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greater the ability to achieve an idealized norm which moves screening
further down the continuum toward eugenics. Moving to the non-
eugenic/eugenic continuum, one finds that genetic screening moves closer
to eugenics by reaching, at times, a de facto eugenics. This is not the
intention of the programs but is an unintended by-product. Screening
reaches closer to this than does sterilization because all three
continuums work together. Idealized norms play a greater role; societal
interests motivate many of the programs, even as they are voluntary and
serve individual interests; and therapeutic programs, in particular
carrier and prenatal, produce breeding consequences. Each re-enforces
the other in terms of de facto eugenics.
When the legislatures treat screening or sterilization as
techniques designed to aid existing goals, they miss the movement along
these continuums. They also miss the power exercised over nature, and,
in particular, the increased activity aimed at defining and achieving an
idealized biology. While many of these programs legitimately are public
health, failure to identify these underlying themes misses an
opportunity to explore them in preparation of future genetic advances.
Eugenics may or may not be appropriate policy (Chapter One suggests it
may not), but it should not become policy without careful debate and
scrutiny.
Even if eugenics is rejected as an explanatory framework for
these policies, the issue of power remains. Rather than power through
eugenics, the vehicle may be technological faith. This shares with
eugenics a naturalistic bias and the accompanying faith in the power of
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science. The reason for continuing research in this area is to gain
power over genes: to work toward an ideal genetic condition. Business
has sought to gain power over the body in order to ensure a healthier
workforce (workplace screening). The state has sought power in order to
improve the public health to lower medical costs and improve the
citizens' quality of life. Finally, the individual desires power in
order to ensure a healthy family and/or life.
Two issues stand out in the discussion over power. First,
technological advances have provided sophisticated and effective tools
to achieve these goals. Furthermore, access is relatively
decentralized, enabling a wide range of interested parties the
opportunity to employ them. Second, the naturalistic bias re-enforces
the notion that these tools are the appropriate approach to take; that
they provide meaningful information. Legislative and administrative
approaches to technology have blinked at these concerns, instead
institutionalizing the incremental decision-making that takes place at
the individual level.
In sum, the discussion has proceeded full circle. The
individuals have sought out technical solutions to their problems, the
courts have obliged and so too have legislatures. Defined by the
individual as public health measures, the government has
institutionalized the model. Joined with this is the scientific model
of controlling and manipulating nature. Missing from the package is a
critical eye turned toward the cumulative effect of these techniques and
the social and political dimensions to the goals underlying their use.
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The technologies provide power, the ability to control. It is necessary
to recognize that issues which previously were "an act of God" or
"nature's roll of the dice" are now ours to decide. Consequently, it is
necessary to demystify the technology and focus on the goals underlying
its use. This, however, cannot be done through the language of rights
or the language of policy spoken through logrolling.
While the specific applications of the technologies today may be
benign social policy, they leave in place the institutional framework
for an easy slide into more powerful techniques. This institutional
framework consists of a belief that a genetic strategy (naturalistic
bias) is a reasonable, fair, and meaningful approach to these issues;
the socialization of the public into accepting public health officials'
desire to identify and act upon one's genetic characteristics and the
appropriateness of our acting individually to shape our genetic future;
the courts legitimation of the technologies; and the legislatively
mandated legal and administrative structure from which the programs
could expand. Inertia is a powerful force. Once these arrangements
are in place, it is easier to approach problems through available means
than to search for alternative understandings of a problem and the
probability that new institutional arrangements will be necessary.
These institutional arrangements did not develop out of any plan (unless
one accepts the victory of the eugenic hypothesis, which this research
has not confirmed). However, a politics dominated by interest groups
and logrolling is not well equipped to reflect carefully on the linkages
between new political issues and new technologies.
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IV
The events presented were not masterminded by deviant scientists
in the tradition of either Dr. Strangelove or Dr. Frankenstein. Nor
were there conspirators motivated by eugenics. Each movement was a
small step related to the previous stage. Castration progressed into
sterilization. Sterilization's social application moved from the crude
use by the eugenicists to more refined applications under the Grady
rule. Genetic screening, too, has worked in steps. Carrier screening,
originally hastily applied to pander to interest groups, now is where it
belongs: a voluntary health program, coupled with research components.
Neonatal screening has slowly expanded to include more diseases and now
takes a natural step toward genetic registries in order to continue to
treat those afflicted. Prenatal screening has slowly worked into
routine health care. Technological incrementalism.
This incremental movement will, in all probability, continue on
its present course. This will mean extending the concerns addressed
through the body. Because genes are so controlling, they are a prime
vehicle and this means the practices will, on occasion, fit the
eugenicists' agenda. But there is no evidence to suggest that the role
of eugenics will be any greater than the de facto eugenics presented,
above. One extension that is likely is an increasingly systematic
extension of genetic screening to other genetic techniques, such as
AID.^ This means increasingly planned and rationalized birth.
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Future research on the applications of biological knowledge
needs to examine the applications in light of these questions. The
abuses of the early sterilization programs as well as the weaknesses of
genetic screening endeavors were addressed, in part, because they were
public programs. To what extent are the priorities of which diseases or
problems are addressed the result of a social need or profit motive?
Can privacy be maintained? Will coercion become a problem? The
changing nature of the research and development system indicates that
the traditional public policy framework, where the policies are
explicitly government policies, is inadequate. Yet, policies on
screening and pressures toward rationalized reproduction will persist.
What will be harder to find is who or what is or can be in control.
Another concern is privacy. The principal concern here is one
of confidentiality. If the scope of managing the body expands, those
who carry out the programs will gain significant information about the
individual. It is imperative that this be kept confidential.
Privacy cuts in a different direction. As more public policy
focuses on the body, to what extent can the individual maintain
autonomy? As the possibilities of AID or surrogate parenting become
understood or even encouraged, will this subtly limit an individual s
ability to control his/her germ line? The concern over autonomy centers
on the status of the body. This needs to be examined. The
Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. This has been interpreted to exclude, as unreasonable,
surgery to remove a bullet near the heart but includes the drawing of
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35blood. The state police powers have been extended to include
vaccination and sterilization . 36 As science and policy's focus moves to
the body, its legal status needs to be clarified. This may necessitate
its prudent remystification.
Finally, the difficult problem of democratic decision-making on
technical issues needs to be addressed. Should the society address
workplace insults or lifestyle side effects through screening even if it
is the most effective and efficient means? Should the costs and
benefits of screening be measured by its genetic consequences or by
political considerations developed by the public? These are complex
problems, but given the fact that they address the fundamental make-up
of individuals they must be democratically resolved. But the record
found, above, indicates that the system has been unwilling to examine
directly these questions. They are, afterall, questions akin to an
individual examining his soul. They ask, and the technology demands,
that we examine our biological and human essence. Given the
contentiousness of these issues, it is not surprising that the one
institution, the courts, that occasionally, but incompletely, addressed
these issues was the least democratic. Democratic participation and the
bias of technology, however, produce competing pressures. The
techniques narrow the focus to the individual while the pressures of
37
democratic decision-making are to expand the conflict. But the
important role played by social standards of normality and the power of
the techniques to change ourselves and our self-image necessitates that
the expanded conflict be engaged.
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VAny conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion must
recognize that this work served as a cautionary tale more than policy
analysis aimed at prescription. How one takes the moral depends, in
part, on what is brought to the tale. Freedom of choice expressed
through the privacy law, the screening malpractice cases, and the
support for the technical fix has been a value the political system
sought to enhance. Balanced against this were concerns over
normalization, the instrumental treatment of life, and eugenics. It is
ironic that so much power to improve the quality of an individual's life
has been made available and used under the rubric of liberty but that
each extension added to the growing instrumental treatment and
understanding of the individual.
A recent example of this is abortion. The nationalization of
abortion was, to its supporters, a great strike for liberty. Now,
O O
abortion may be applied to micromanage multiple births. ° in this case
fetuses, chosen at random, will be aborted in order to enhance the
remaining fetus' chances for normal development. The technique moves
from providing the woman freedom to control her body in a gross sense to
fine-tuning birth. Although the technique remains the same, its
extended application highlights its instrumental logic and extends the
universe available to our instrumental manipulation.
The criticism leveled against the courts and legislatures in the
case studies was their failure to take this ironic twist into account.
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But the problems uncovered cannot be blamed simply upon institutions
failing to live up to their promise; the problem is also one of
perspective. For this reason, recommending institutional reform or a
new institutional mix (e.g., a greater role for the Department of Health
and Human Services) will not solve the problems.
Before institutional tinkering can work, the influence of
science on our values must be recognized and considered. The power of
science to change perceptions was stated well by Joseph Haberer:
To be sure, "in most scientific study, questions of good and evil,
or right and wrong, play at most a minor and secondary part." Yet
questions on the moral and ethical responsibility of science, cannot
be relegated to another realm, called politics. Scientific
knowledge per se is neither moral nor immoral. Nonetheless, this
knowledge does not remain neutral but makes important contributions
to human existence—technologically, and, more crucially, because
its theories change man's image of himself and later his
cosmology.
Abortion, AID, screening, and sterilization have all developed in such a
way as to challenge our traditional biological or social norms. Each
developed in a narrow framework, abortion and AID as extraordinary and
exceptional practices, sterilization as a private practice, and
screening, generally speaking, as part of the public health function of
the state. Now abortion will be used to manage pregnancies, AID has
made surrogate parenting possible, screening may allow for precise
control over the workplace or lifestyles, and sterilization floats in
and out of eugenic and welfare politics. Each has become more
sophisticated in substance or application. They have entered new
institutional arrangements making more human control over human life
possible. In sum, the biological sciences have made and strive to
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continue to make possible man's ability to change not only his image of
himself but also himself. The movement is relentlessly in the direction
of removing the randomness of chance.
The political system's response to this must recognize science
as the sine qua non of contemporary society. Practically, this will
mean recognizing that the laissez-faire model of science is politically
unacceptable. Science and the fruits of science, like their industrial
predecessor, must be regulated in the public interest. Of course,
prudence dictates that this movement be done with care so that science
as an institution does not suffer unduly. In order to do this, it is
necessary for the political system to view technology and science as
more than just a neutral tool to achieve previously agreed upon ends.
The transformation of abortion just noted or the application of genetic
screening to lifestyle concerns or the use of AID in surrogate parenting
illustrate that a tool is capable of creating new ends.
When the political system addresses new technologies it must
review their immediate purposes but also remain cognizant of the values
they touch. The Congress has begun this process by creating committees
whose jurisdiction includes science, as well as creating support
institutions to help analyze the social impact of technology. The
executive, too, has advisors designated to treat science on its own
terms. The trend applies to the courts as well. As was noted, above,
the recent Baby M case classified surrogate parenting with other new
reproductive techniques, suggesting that the legislature examine their
cumulative impact. These actions are among many institutional
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recognititions that politics as usual is not adequate. But the most
important issue remaining is viewing science as an independent variable.
Creating a commission on biotechnology composed of representatives from
the policy-making branches, students of science and politics, and those
from other callings may help raise the visibility of the educational
side of the issue. There is no guarantee that this will produce
miraculous transformations, but its virtue, however, is that education
and vision are the preconditions for successfully dealing with science
and society and commissions have been successful at introducing issues
into public discourse.
Relying on the market to regulate these technologies is
difficult. Unlike traditional economic products, the currency of
technological politics is information which is harder for a market to
regulate than widgets. Furthermore, the market takes short-term costs
into account but the "costs" of science are often in the future.
Working the long-term factors into the short-term will depend upon
informed consumers aware of the issues at stake.
In a political system experienced in incremental decision-
making, working out ends and exploring the interrelationship between
means and ends is difficult. But the need to do this is at the core of
a responsible politics of science. The courts have recognized this in
some cases but they are not capable of this practice. These are
legislative concerns and the central task of American politics will be
to convince the voters that their representatives must govern, not
logroll. In this system, the responsibility ultimately resides with the
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voters since they, through the ballot, express their opinion on the
direction and soundness of the political system. Parochial legislation
in the area of science reflects the individualistic and possessive view
the public has of technology.
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